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This  dissertation  is  about  control  in  multidivisional  firms.  In  its  most  simple  form  the 
multidivisional firm consists of a corporate center or headquarters, responsible for the overall 
management  of  the  firm,  and  a  number  of  semi-autonomous  divisions,  subsidiaries  or 
business units, each responsible for its own region, industry, or product-market combination. 
Hence,  the  multidivisional  firm  resembles  a  collection  of  single-business  firms  operating 
under corporate management. Compared with single-business firms, however, multidivisional 
firms are faced with cost disadvantages due to corporate overhead, which can be offset only if 
divisions perform better as members of a corporate family than as stand-alone entities. Here 
lies a crucial task for corporate center management. For example, divisions may benefit from 
the knowledge and experiences of corporate executives in determining divisional strategies 
(Chandler,  1991).  Corporate  headquarters  may  also  play  an  active  role  in  creating  the 
organizational  infrastructure  for  realizing  synergies  through  the  exploitation  of 
interrelationship  across  divisions  (Goold  &  Campbell,  1998;  Moss  Kanter,  1989;  Porter, 
1985). Furthermore, internal efficiency of divisions may improve upon exposing them to the 
discipline of an internal capital market (Williamson, 1975). In this dissertation, the crucial 
task  of  corporate  headquarters  is  labeled  control  and  refers  to  the  mechanisms  used  by 
corporate  center  executives  to  manage,  coordinate,  direct,  and  monitor  the  actions  of 
divisional  management.  Through  the  adoption  of  these  control  mechanisms  corporate 
headquarters can add value to the divisions in the corporate portfolio and this is what makes Chapter 1 
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control such a crucial issue for a multidivisional firm: it provides an important justification for 
its existence. This chapter will make clear how this study attempts to contribute to existing 
research on control in multidivisional firms. A birds eye view of the existing research will be 
provided first, though. 
 
 
1.2 Control in multidivisional firms 
 
Research  on  the  organization  of  the  diversified  firm  started  with  Chandler  (1962),  who 
studied  the  development  of  large  American  firms  over  time.  Chandler  found  that  the 
functional structure, which most of these firms had adopted, has some intrinsic weaknesses. 
These weaknesses emerged particularly after a strategy of expansion into new product lines or 
geographical  regions.  For  example,  top  management  tended  to  become  so  engrossed  in 
operational coordination that long-term planning suffered. According to Chandler, these firms 
found the solution to their problems in re-organizing the firm into self-contained divisions, 
each  responsible for a  distinct business and in the possession of  all relevant functions to 
perform their task. The decentralization of responsibility for operating decisions and business 
level strategic decisions to the distinct divisions enabled the corporate center to concentrate 
on the long-term strategic direction of the corporation as a whole. Since the new structure 
consisted of separate divisions that could be held accountable for the financial performance in 
their  respective  businesses,  control  over,  and  resource  allocation  to  divisions  could  be 
relatively easy  established by measuring  and comparing the financial  contributions of the 
distinct businesses. In line with this, Williamson (1975) compared the functions of general 
management in multidivisional firms with those of outside investors in the capital market: to 
allocate  scarce  financial  resources  among  competing  divisions  or  investments  and  to 
discipline the efficiency of poor performers.  
 
Traditionally,  then,  the  multidivisional  structure  was  considered  superior  to  other 
organizational forms because it established a strict separation of responsibilities and ensured 
performance  accountability  of  divisions,  which  together  provided  opportunities  to  expose 
divisions to the discipline of an efficient internal capital market. This view changed when 
researchers began to identify variations in multidivisional structures in terms of degree of 
centralization, internal controls, and reporting structures (see, e.g., Hill & Pickering, 1986) Introduction 
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and related these to variations in diversification strategies (see, e.g., Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; 
Hill,  1988b).  Whereas  the  traditional  multidivisional  firm  (or  M-form  firm)  was  still 
considered  appropriate  for  unrelated  diversifiers,  a  more  complex  variant  proved  better 
equipped to realize the benefits of related diversification. The potential benefits of exploiting 
excess  resources  in  related  businesses  had  since  long  been  recognized  (Penrose,  1959; 
Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1982). Yet, many firms failed to reap these potential benefits because 
they  lack  the  appropriate  organizational  arrangements  (Moss  Kanter,  1989;  Porter,  1985). 
Hence, the solution to this problem was found in a variant of the traditional M-form, which 
became known as the centralized M-form (Hill, 1988b) or cooperative form (Hill, Hitt & 
Hoskisson, 1992; Hill, 1994).  The upshot of the studies that followed is that performance in 
multidivisional firms depends on the correct fit between diversification strategy type and M-
form  control  characteristics.  More  specifically,  the  traditional  M-form  characteristics, 
including strict separation of strategic and operational responsibilities and the use of strict 
financial  controls,  were  found  appropriate  for  unrelated  diversifiers.  In  these  firms,  the 
independent divisions could be treated as separate investments to achieve the benefits of an 
efficient  internal  capital  market,  as  propagated  by  Williamson  (1975).  More  complex 
mechanisms were required in related diversified firms. These mechanisms included direct 
involvement of corporate center executives in operational affairs. Moreover, in the face of 
performance ambiguity, financial controls had to be replaced by strategically oriented controls 
to  more  adequately  assess  the  contributions  of  individual  divisions.  A  number  of  studies 
followed  these  initial  observations  but  perhaps  the  most  comprehensive  study  is  the  one 
performed  by  Hill  et  al.  (1992)  who  focused  on  multiple  administrative  arrangements, 
including  degree  of  centralization,  lateral  integration  mechanisms,  control  systems,  and 
incentive schemes. With the exception of some mixed findings for the use of integration 
mechanisms,  they  found  support  for  the  contingency  relationship  between  diversification 
strategy and administrative attributes. More recently the studies of Markides and Williamson 
(1996) and St. John and Harrison (1999) provide additional support. In sum, contingency 
thinking found its way in research on multidivisional firms (see also Pitts, 1980). 
 
In contrast with the corporate focus of the studies described so far, other researchers 
began to focus more on intra-firm differences in strategic contexts and control arrangements. 
Some  first  evidence  was  obtained  by  empirical  studies  on  portfolio  planning  practices  of 
multibusiness  companies  (Bettis  &  Hall,  1983;  Haspeslagh,  1982).  Portfolio  planning 
techniques, which were popular among these companies in the 1970s (Goold & Luchs, 1993), Chapter 1 
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emphasize  the  creation  of  balanced  portfolios  that  enable  firms  to  generate  cash  in  one 
industry to finance investments in others. Hence, divisions are assigned different missions. 
The  findings  of  these  studies  suggest  that  firms  should  differentiate  their  administrative 
processes accordingly. In a conceptual paper, Govindarajan (1986) provided the theoretical 
underpinnings of these findings, using insights from contingency theory. Focusing on one 
specific structural attribute, the degree of centralization, he shows that divisional effectiveness 
depends  on  the  fit  between  corporate  structural  arrangements  and  divisional  contextual 
factors, such as environmental uncertainty, mission, degree of interdependence, and business 
strategy. Subsequent empirical studies support this notion for various aspects of structure and 
control,  including  degree  of  centralization  (Golden,  1992;  Gupta,  1987),  performance 
evaluation (Gupta, 1987), and the incentive system (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1986)
1. The general claim is that studies on M-form structural arrangements 
are far from complete if they fail to account for intra-firm differences in business unit context. 
Nohria  and  Ghoshal  (1994,  p.  492),  who  studied  headquarters-subsidiary  relationships  in 
multinational  corporations,  make  a  similar  point:    the  literature  on  the  governance  of 
headquarters-subsidiary  relations  suffers  from  []  the  reductive  fallacy  of  reducing 
complexity to simplicity, or diversity to uniformity.
2 On the other hand, this view on the 
control  of  business  units  is  not  free  of  criticism  either.  After  all,  such  a  differentiated 
approach is complex to manage (Lorange, 1993; Markides, 2002; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) 
and may lead to jealousies and confusion among business unit managers (Goold & Campbell, 
1987). 
 
                                                 
1  An  overview  of  main  studies  in  this  area,  as  well  as  an  overview  of  empirical  studies  on  the  contingency 
relationship between diversification strategy, structure/control dimensions, and corporate performance is included in the 
appendix to chapter 1. 
2 The authors refer to Fischer (1970) who discusses a large number of fallacies in writing and researching history in 
his book Historians fallacies: Toward a logic of historical thought.  Introduction 
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1.3 Aim of the study 
 
Hence, after Chandlers seminal study two views dominate research on control of business 
units  in  multidivisional  firms  (see  also  Markides,  2002).  The  two  have  remained  largely 
distinct  in  the  existing  literature,  which  is  unfortunate  because  different,  and  largely 
contradictory, implications for the management of diversified firms can be derived from the 
respective findings. For example, whereas one view would recommend firms to choose the 
controls  that  match  their  corporate  strategy,  the  other  view  emphasizes  the  internal 
differentiation of control to match the circumstances of individual business units. The fact that 
both views received considerable empirical support adds to the confusion even more because 
it is now unknown whether control should be treated as a corporate-wide or business unit-
specific phenomenon. 
 
Surprisingly, internal control differentiation and the associated complexities play  a 
somewhat peculiar role in the previous studies. It is largely absent in the first view, as the 
emphasis is on the overall corporate control style under the, often implicit, assumption of 
uniformity across business units. It is very much present, but never actually studied, in the 
second view. In these studies, conclusions on the merits of differentiation are based on studies 
of individual business units. The actual differences in control styles between business units of 
the same firm, as well as the complexities of adopting such a differentiated control style for 
the corporation as a whole, usually fall beyond the scope of these studies. Hence, the role of 
control  differentiation  differs  between  the  views  but  has  not  been  the  subject  of  direct 
investigation in either one of them. 
 
The multidivisional firm remains one of the dominant organizational forms for large 
corporations  (Galunic  &  Eisenhardt,  1996;  Whittington  &  Mayer,  1997),  indicating  the 
importance of research in this area. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to provide a more 
comprehensive  understanding  of  the  management  of  diversified  firms  by  integrating  the 
insights and implications from the two prevailing views and by studying, as one of the first, 
the complexities associated with the internal differentiation of control mechanisms. This will 
be  done  in  four  different  projects,  each  contributing  to  our  understanding  of  control  of 
business units in multidivisional firms. The results of these projects are discussed in the four Chapter 1 
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chapters that form the core of this dissertation. Before taking a preview of these chapters, 





Figures 1a to 1d have been derived from Galunic and Eisenhardts (1996) typology of existing 
research  on  multidivisional  firms  and  can  be  used  to  further  clarify  the  position  of  this 
dissertation. The two views discussed above are summarized in figures 1a and 1b. Galunic 
and Eisenhardt (1996) speak of Corporate strategy and structure fit and Intracorporate fit 
to denote the focus on  control arrangements  as either corporate- or business unit-specific 
phenomena,  respectively.  Figure  1c  represents  research  on  the  structures  and  controls  in 
business units. The business units in diversified firms can be organized along functional lines 
but can also operate as a multidivisional firm themselves. The latter is not unusual in large 
corporations where semi-autonomous, self-contained units can be found at multiple levels in 
the hierarchy (Chandler, 1991). The internal structures of business units and the control of 
subunits by business unit management fall beyond the scope of this study, as the focus will be 
on control of business units by company headquarters rather than the internal organizational 
arrangements within the business units. Throughout this dissertation the terms business unit, 
division, and subsidiary will be used interchangeably to refer to the organizational units that 
are placed directly below the corporate center. 
 
Figure  1d  represents  the  growing  stream  of  research  on  intra-firm  networks  and 
horizontal relationships between business units (see, e.g., Tsai, 2000, 2001). In this study 
these horizontal linkages are taken into account in two ways. First, as discussed earlier, the 
degree of inter-unit resource sharing is an important determinant of the nature of control 
mechanisms  used  by  company  headquarters.  Second,  the  literature  on  network  structures 
considers  lateral  integrating  devices  as  important  alternatives  to  hierarchical  means  of 
coordination and control (Ferlie & Pettigrew, 1996). The position taken here is that these 
lateral means of coordination are among the mechanisms of coordination and control that can 
be found in multidivisional firms, the use of which can differ between (Hill et al., 1992) and 

























Figures 1a-d: Research on organizational 
arrangements in multidivisional firms (Source: Galunic 




At this point it seems appropriate to briefly elaborate on the term control as it is used 
in  the  remainder  of  this  study.  As  evidenced  by  Hill  and  colleagues  (1992),  a  variety  of 
control arrangements exists. This is in line with general research on organizational design, 
which has identified different organization design variables, including centralization, planning 
and  control  systems,  formalization,  lateral  relations,  and  compensation  systems  (see,  e.g., 
Galbraith,  1977;  Khandwalla,  1977).  All  these  design  attributes  may  be  used  to  establish 
control over divisions. In fact, organizations and the attributes of organization design have 
been equated with issues of organizational and managerial control (Das, 1989; Fisher, 1995; 
Flamholtz, 1983; Tannenbaum, 1968), and the ways to achieve control have been considered 
numerous, including, for example, the creation of shared norms and values (Ouchi, 1979). 
This  implies  that  control  is  more  than  comparing  results  to  planned  targets  and  taking 
corrective actions (Fisher, 1995). Control, then, involves all those mechanisms through which 









Figure 1a: Corporate 
strategy and structure fit
Figure 1b: Intracorporate fit
Figure 1c: SBU strategy 
and structure fit
Figure 1d: Intracorporate 
networksChapter 1 
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to  achieve  the  organizations  goals  (cf.  Lebas  &  Weigenstein,  1986;  Ouchi,  1979; 
Tannenbaum,  1968).  In  the  literature,  various  other  labels  are  used  to  denote  control 
mechanisms  in  multidivisional  firms,  including,  for  example,  administrative  mechanisms 
(Govindarajan, 1988), administrative tools (Grant, 1988; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), internal 
organizational  arrangements  (Hill  et  al.,  1992),  control  practices  (Alexander,  1991),  or 
corporate-SBU (Strategic Business Unit) relations (Golden, 1992; Gupta, 1987). Although 
control will be used as the common denotation, combinations of the various labels will also be 
used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. 
 
Finally,  although  not  positioned  in  the  international  management  literature,  this 
dissertation  lends  from,  and  contributes  to  the  research  on  control  of  business  units  in 
multinational corporations as well. Firms adopt multidivisional structures as a response to 
diversification  into  new  businesses,  into  new  geographical  regions,  or,  very  often,  a 
combination of both. The latter applies to a small country such as the Netherlands, which 
formed the basis for the empirical studies in this dissertation (see section 1.6). Because of the 
limited size of the home country, one will have a hard time finding large Dutch companies 
that have diversified into new businesses without expanding internationally also. Still, many 
Dutch firms obtain a considerable part of their sales from domestic operations and even the 
truly multinational corporations among them usually have a considerable number of business 
units  located  in  the  home  country,  especially  at  the  highest  level  at  which  these  semi-
autonomous units can be found. Hence, this study is not limited to purely domestic or purely 
multinational corporations because the boundaries between the two are often blurred and the 
insights and findings generated from studies in one of these settings can easily be transferred 
to  the  other  (see  also  Ghoshal  &  Nohria,  1993;  Gupta  &  Govindarajan,  1991;  Nohria  & 
Ghoshal, 1997). Nonetheless, the international context does not play a prominent role in the 
positioning,  theory  development,  and  empirical  studies  of  this  dissertation.  Insights  from 
studies in that context will be frequently used, though. Introduction 
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1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
 
The body text of this dissertation consists of four chapters that are written in the form of 
independent papers. Hence, each chapter can be read independently from the others. The first 
two chapters deal with the distinction between business unit and corporate level. It will be 
argued  that,  rather  than  keeping  the  two  levels  separate,  research  can  benefit  from 
incorporating both levels jointly. Chapter 2 is a conceptual paper. The existing literature on 
control of business units is discussed and gaps are identified. It is concluded that much of the 
existing confusion stems from the focus on either the corporate or the business unit level as 
the dominant focus of previous studies. A multilevel theoretical framework is developed to 
increase  understanding  of  control  of  business  units  in  multidivisional  firms,  establish 
integration  between  the  two  views  that  dominate  existing  literature,  and  present  new 
theoretical insights. 
 
Chapter 3 is an empirical study that uses a multilevel modeling technique to examine 
the  corporate  and  business  unit  effects  of  corporate  control  mechanisms.  Hypotheses  are 
developed,  and  supported,  for  the  relationships  between  the  resource  sharing  intensity  of 
individual  business  units  and  four  dimensions  of  corporate  control:  autonomy,  strategic 
control,  integration  mechanisms,  and  network-based  incentives.  Corporate  effects  are 
controlled for in a multilevel analysis of the data. Multilevel modeling techniques are relevant 
in this area because they allow simultaneous examination of data at different levels in the 
multidivisional firm. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the complexities of control differentiation using theoretical 
perspectives  that  are  relatively  new  to  the  study  of  control  practices  in  diversified  firms. 
Chapter 4 uses an upper echelon perspective. The central idea is that the adoption of multiple 
control styles places requirements on the information-processing and cognitive capacities of 
corporate center executives. It is found that control differentiation is negatively related to the 
performance of the corporation as a whole because of the complexities associated with it. It is 
also argued that top management team composition may play a moderating role because top 
management teams are supposed to differ in their ability to deal with complex situations. 
Results partially support this notion. Chapter 1 
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Chapter  5  uses  a  procedural  justice  perspective  to  study  the  effects  of  control 
differentiation on the performance of individual business units. It is argued that differences in 
the  controls  used  across  business  units  may  give  rise  to  feelings  of  unfairness  because 
business  unit  managers  associate  these  differences  with  political  favoritism  and 
discrimination.  It  is  hypothesized,  and  supported,  that  the  effects  on  business  unit 
performance depend on the specific contexts of business units, notably the degree of resource 
sharing with other business units, the communication with corporate headquarters, and the 
size of the business unit. 
 
Chapter 6 recapitulates the findings in a discussion of five topics that cut through the 
different  studies  of  this  dissertation.  Rather  than  elaborating  upon  the  conclusions  and 
findings of each study individually (something already done in the respective chapters), the 
focus will be on general insights gained from the studies. Subsequently the following five 
topics  will  be  discussed:  multilevel  perspective,  types  of  relatedness,  new  organizational 
forms, control differentiation, and control mechanisms. The discussion aims to set the stage 
for future research. 
 
 
1.6 Methodological considerations and samples used 
 
In  chapter  2  the  emphasis  is  on  the  development  of  a  conceptual  framework  that  uses  a 
multilevel perspective to link together the two prevailing views on control of business units in 
an attempt to further our understanding in this area. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 combine theory 
development and empirical testing in empirical studies on control of business units in Dutch 
corporations. The widely available literature makes it possible to ground the studies in, and 
depart  from,  the  existing  research  in  this  area.  For  example,  the  information-processing 
perspective adopted in chapter 3 is well established in research on organization design in 
general and control of business units in particular. Moreover, although control differentiation 
and its associated complexities have not been examined directly in the two views discussed 
earlier, early conceptual work (e.g., Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and empirical research on the 
basis of in-depth case studies (e.g., Bartlett &  Ghoshal, 1989; Goold & Campbell, 1987) 
paved  the  way  for  theory  development  in  this  area,  and  guided  the  search  for  applicable 
theories and perspectives to draw upon. This resulted in the use of theoretical perspectives Introduction 
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that are relatively new to this research area, such as the upper echelon perspective adopted in 
chapter 4 and the procedural justice perspective adopted in chapter 5.   
 
Because  data  on  control  practices  in  diversified  firms  are  usually  not  publicly 
available, many of the data had to be collected from primary sources. The empirical testing of 
hypotheses justifies a quantitative methodological design (Baumard & Ibert, 2001; Charreire 
& Durieux, 2001)
3. Therefore, it was decided to use surveys as the primary means of data 
collection. This made it possible to target a larger number of companies and business units 
than would be possible with alternative data collection methods (Ibert, Baumard, Donada & 
Xuereb, 2001). This was considered important for at least two reasons. First, since we
4 were 
interested  in  examining  both  corporate-  and  business  unit-level  effects  in  chapter  3,  a 
substantial number of observations at both levels was considered necessary. Second, most of 
the existing empirical evidence on the complexities of control differentiation, which took up a 
central role in chapters 4 and 5, is based on a limited number of in-depth case studies. Hence, 
it was considered worthwhile to strive for findings that could be generalized across a larger 
number of organizations. In addition, survey is the dominant data collection approach in the 
two prevailing views of control in diversified firms, which enabled us to use, combine, learn 
from, and draw upon a wide array of existing survey instruments and measures. 
 
Two separate data collection projects were undertaken. The first project consisted of a 
survey among the managing directors of business units and took place late 2001 and in the 
first half of 2002. We sent questionnaires to the managing directors of 614 business units and 
obtained a response rate of 22.8% (140 responses). The final sample consists of 136 usable 
observations. The business units are part of 45 different corporations and exploit activities in 
a  variety  of  industries  (construction  (12.5%);  manufacturing  (27.2%);  printing/publishing 
                                                 
3  Charreire  and  Durieux  (2001)  distinguish  between  exploration  and  testing  as  two  central  processes  in  the 
construction  of  knowledge.  Exploration  is  the  process  through  which  researchers  seek  to  develop  new  theoretical 
explanations and predictions, either by connecting theoretical insights (theoretical exploration) or by observing empirical 
facts  (empirical  exploration).  Testing  is  the  process  used  to  compare  these  explanations  and  predictions  with  reality. 
Although the two processes do not presuppose a particular data collection approach, exploration is usually associated with 
qualitative methods while quantitative  methods are  more  frequently used to serve the purpose of testing. However, the 
distinction between the two is often blurred (Baumard & Ibert, 2001), many methods are mixtures of both (Ghauri, Grønhaug 
& Kristianslund, 1995), and empirical research methods that have been considered predominately qualitative in nature, such 
as case-studies, can be used to test as well as generate theories (see, e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The same could hold 
for  quantitative  methods  as  evidenced  in  chapter  3  of  this  dissertation,  in  which  we  use  a  quantitative  method  to  test 
hypotheses at the business unit level but at the same time examine corporate level effects in a more exploratory fashion. 
4 The plural form is chosen for consistency reasons. It reflects that some of the chapters are the result of joint work 
and have been presented as co-authored papers on academic conferences. The content of this dissertation, including any 
remaining errors or inconsistencies, remains the sole responsibility of the author, however.  Chapter 1 
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(10.3%);  service  (28%);  trade  (22.1%)).  A  total  of  34  business  units  (25%)  were  located 
outside the Netherlands. On average, the business units employed 1596 employees. The data 
collected in this project were used in the empirical studies of chapters 3 and 5 and were used 
to cross-check some of the data obtained in the second survey. 
 
The second survey was set up independently from the first one and involved data 
collection among corporate center executives and staff. The data were used in the empirical 
study of chapter 4. Questionnaires were sent to multiple key informants in 96 corporations. 
Responses  were  obtained  from  55  corporations  (57.3%  of  our  initial  sample  of  96 
corporations), of which 54 were used in the final analyses. Additional data were collected 
from secondary sources. The average corporation in this sample has eight business units that 
report to corporate center management directly, employs 24370 employees, operates in four 
different industries, and exploits activities in 21 countries. Main activities of the firms in this 
sample  include  construction  (7.3%),  manufacturing  (38.2%),  printing/publishing  (5.5%), 
service (30.9%), and trade (18.2%). 
 
Although the two surveys were set up as independent studies, there was some overlap 
in the measures and some corporations are present in both samples. This overlap was used to 
validate some of the measures used in chapter 4. For a total of 17 corporations in sample 2, 
data for at least three business units were also included in sample 1. 
 
 
1.7 In conclusion 
 
This  dissertation  contributes  to  the  understanding  of  control  of  business  units  in 
multidivisional corporations. The following chapters present the findings of four studies that 
were undertaken as part of the dissertation project. The four chapters have been written in the 
form of separate papers and can therefore be read independently. Nonetheless, the interested 
reader would find the first paper (chapter 2) a logical starting point because it provides an 
overview of the existing literature as well as a comprehensive conceptual framework that 
captures many of the issues discussed in the chapters that follow. The three empirical studies 
use different theoretical perspectives to develop hypotheses that are subsequently tested on a Introduction 
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sample of business units (chapters 3 and 5) or corporations (chapter 4). Chapter 6 differs from 
the others as it contains a brief discussion of topics that cut through the various papers. 
 
A  final  note  pertains  to  the  overlap  that  exists  between  some  of  the  chapters.  To 
guarantee the readability of chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 as separate papers, some repetition across 
these chapters is considered unavoidable. This repetition stems from the fact that the four 
research  projects,  though  very  different  in  focus,  share  the  common  theme  of  control  of 
business units in multidivisional firms and depart from, and aim to contribute to, the existing 
research in this area. The presentation of the research projects as separate papers also implies 
a limited number of cross-references. With the exception of chapters 1 and 6, the chapter texts 




Control of business units: 









Thirty years of research on the linkage between diversification and performance have not 
produced  consistent  results  (Hoskisson  &  Hitt,  1990;  Palich,  Cardinal  &  Miller,  2000; 
Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). One of the factors that may cause the lack of consistency 
is  the  organization  of  the  diversified  firm,  because  the  potential  value  of  product 
diversification only materializes if the correct organization is in place (Hill, 1994; Hoskisson 
& Hitt, 1990; Nayyar, 1992, 1993; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; St. John & Harrison, 
1999). The importance of the organization of the diversified firm is reflected in the large 
number of studies that have addressed this topic in the past decades. 
   
In these studies, it is generally recognized that the creation of self-contained, semi-
autonomous business units or divisions is an adequate first step in organizing a diversified 
firm.  Since  long,  researchers  have  also  acknowledged  that  multidivisional  firms  are  not 
identical organizations (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hill & Pickering, 1986) but differ widely in 
terms of the mechanisms corporate center executives use to manage, coordinate, direct, and 
monitor the actions of business unit management. As already indicated in the introductory 
chapter of this dissertation, two views of how these control mechanisms differ prevail (see 
also Dess, Gupta, Hennart & Hill, 1995; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996; Markides, 2002). The 
first  view  focuses  on  differences  across  corporations,  treating  control  within  firms  as 
relatively  uniform.  The  second  view  focuses  on  control  of  individual  business  units, Chapter 2 
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propagating  within-firm  differences  in  the  control  mechanisms  used  by  company 
headquarters. Both views have received considerable support in the literature but are not free 
from criticism either. For example, the assumption of uniformity has been considered overly 
simplistic as it fails to recognize the different strategic contexts that business units within the 
same  corporation  face  (Calori,  Johnson  &  Sarnin,  1994;  Nohria  &  Ghoshal,  1994). 
Alternatively, control differentiation within a firm may lead to a better fit between control 
mechanisms and business unit specific circumstances but is complex to implement (Lorange, 
1993; Markides, 2002; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and may bring about feelings of jealousy and 
confusion among business unit managers (Goold & Campbell, 1987, 2002). 
 
The control of business units is one of the most crucial and difficult tasks for corporate 
center management. The appropriate execution of this control task allows firms to realize 
benefits  from  operating  in  multiple  industries  while  mitigating  the  risk  of  opportunistic 
behavior of business unit managers (Chandler, 1991; Hill, 1994; Markides, 2002). Given its 
importance, a comprehensive understanding of the antecedents and performance implications 
of this control task remains a challenge to both researchers and practitioners. The two views 
on control of business units both add to our understanding of the complexities of organizing 
the diversified firm. At the same time, they present us with a paradox. When considered in 
isolation, each view provides suggestions of how to control business units in diversified firms. 
When considered jointly, however, the suggestions seem to be in conflict: firms should either 
choose control mechanisms in line with the strategy of the firm as a whole and apply these 
across  the  portfolio  of  business  units  in  a  relatively  uniform  manner,  or  they  should 
differentiate  control  to  cope  with  business  unit-specific  circumstances.  Resolution  of  this 
issue is important if we are to further our understanding of control in diversified firms and all 
its associated complexities. Therefore, in this paper, we combine the two views into a new, 
integrative  framework  on  control  in  diversified  firms.  The  framework  is  based  on  the 
acknowledgement that control is a multilevel issue, which allows us to integrate the different 
views, whilst taking the critiques of both into account. Literature review and multilevel framework 
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Multilevel researchers emphasize the multilevel nature of organizations and stress the 
limitations
1 of only focusing on a single level of analysis (Klein, Dansereau & Hall, 1994, p. 
198): ªNo construct is level free. Every construct is tied to one or more organizational levels 
or entities, that is, individuals, dyads, groups, organizations, industries, markets, and so on.º 
Hence, it is the challenge of multilevel research to make explicit how phenomena at different 
levels relate to one another. In doing so, the multilevel perspective takes into account the 
contextual influence that higher-level phenomena exert on lower-level phenomena as well as 
the bottom-up processes through which lower-level characteristics combine or aggregate to 
form higher-level constructs
2. Altogether, this should lead to a more accurate understanding 
of organizational phenomena that unfold across different levels in an organization (Klein & 
Kozlowski, 2000, p. XVI): ªA multilevel perspective may thus add depth and richness to 
theoretical models and studies of topics traditionally examined at just one level of analysis.º  
 
A  multilevel  perspective  is  relevant,  given  the  context  of  our  study.  Control  of 
business  units,  the  antecedents,  and  the  performance  outcomes,  have  been  traditionally 
examined either at the corporate-wide or the business unit-specific level
3. By combining both 
levels in a multilevel framework we aim to reconcile the two, seemingly conflicting, views, 
and add depth and richness to the literature on control in diversified firms. 
                                                 
1 Much of the discussion on limitations of single level studies centers around their limited generalizability: false 
conclusions may be drawn when the research findings are generalized to a higher or lower level than the one used to generate 
the findings. Although this is also very much related to data collection and analysis issues in empirical research, the focus of 
this study is on developing a theoretical framework mainly. 
2 An example of how top-down and bottom-up influences co-exist is organizational culture. Organizational culture 
influences the behavior and values of individuals. At the same time, the behaviors and values of these individuals combine to 
form organizational culture (cf. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). 
3  An  exception  is  Egelhoff  (1988)  who  developed  and  tested  a cross-level  theory  of  organizational  design  in 
multinational  corporations,  the  insights  of  which  were  conducive  to  the  development  of  our  framework  as  well.  Our 
framework differs from Egelhoff as it makes use of the multilevel guidelines and principles developed in adjacent disciplines 
in order to more fully capture the potential of the multilevel perspective.  Chapter 2 
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We begin our paper with a review of the existing literature on control of business units 
in diversified firms. Existing research is classified into four categories. We discuss why two 
views on control of business units prevail, explain the assumptions underlying the two views, 
and  motivate  how  a  multilevel  perspective  can  lead  to  reconciliation.  The  multilevel 
theoretical framework is presented next. We make explicit, and discuss, the linkages between 
theoretical concepts that have been traditionally examined at a single level of analysis. In our 
framework we include control as a corporate level concept and control as a business unit-
specific  concept  and  explain  the  relationship  between  the  two.  The  antecedents  and 
performance outcomes at both levels will be made explicit as well. The implications that can 




2.2 Literature review 
 
In this section the existing research on control of business units in diversified firms will be 
discussed. We classify the existing literature into four categories, starting with the seminal 
works of Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975), and ending with the literature on business 
unit specific control. From these four categories
4 the two views of control of business units 
are derived. The review section ends with the conclusion that a multilevel perspective can add 
to our understanding because previous studies focused only on a single level of analysis. 
 
Multidivisional structure 
Research  on  the  organization  of  the  diversified  firm  started  with  Chandler  (1962),  who 
studied  the  development  of  large  American  firms  over  time.  Chandler  found  that  the 
functional structure, which most of these firms had adopted, has some intrinsic weaknesses. 
These weaknesses emerged particularly after a strategy of expansion into new product lines or 
geographical  regions.  For  example,  top  management  tended  to  become  so  engrossed  in 
operational coordination that long-term planning suffered. As a remedy, firms adopted the 
multidivisional structure. A firm with a multidivisional structure is composed of a number of 
                                                 
4 These four categories should not be confused with the typology presented in chapter 1 (figures 1a-d) of the 
dissertation. Rather, the first three categories discussed in this review section could be placed under what Galunic and 
Eisenhardt (1996) labeled the ªCorporate strategy and structure fitº research. The fourth category represents what Galunic 
and Eisenhardt (1996) called ªIntracorporate fitº research.    Literature review and multilevel framework 
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self-contained  divisions  and  a  corporate  office  or  headquarters.  The  allocation  of  tasks 
between the two levels is fixed. Each division controls all functional activities and can take all 
operational  decisions  pertaining  to  a  specific  business.  The  corporate  office  focuses  on 
strategic planning, allocation of resources to the divisions, appraisal or monitoring of the 
performance of the divisions, and coordination of the divisions. 
   
Williamson (1975) interpreted the advantages of the multidivisional structure in the 
framework  of  transaction  cost  economics.  For  example,  the  multidivisional  structure  is 
assumed to economize on bounded rationality and reduce opportunism, mainly because top 
managers  are  not  overburdened  by  operational  affairs  and  strategic  planning  is  less 
susceptible  to  partisan  influences  of  lower-level  functional  managers.  Accordingly, 
Williamson (1975) devised the M-form hypothesis, which predicts superior performance for 
the M-form, or pure multidivisional structure. Basically, this comes down to the notion of 
ªone size fits allº. One specific type of divisionalized structure is assumed to be optimal for 
all larger firms, irrespective of, for example, the corporate strategy they have followed. 
 
Results of the empirical tests of the M-form hypothesis are mixed. Some studies found 
support for the hypothesis, other studies did not support the hypothesis, and the outcomes of a 
third category of studies were ambiguous (for an overview, see Cable, 1988). What led to the 
next stream of research on the organization of the diversified firm were the findings from a 
number  of  studies  of  British  firms  (Hill,  1988a,  1988b;  Hill  &  Pickering,  1986;  Steer  & 
Cable, 1978). These showed that the M-form was not as ubiquitous among large corporations 
as  might  be  expected  because  of  its  hypothesized  superior  performance.  A  possible 
explanation is that the suitability of the M-form depends on the specific strategy a firm has 
chosen (Hill & Pickering, 1986). 
 
Corporate control models 
The second stream of research still presupposes a divisionalized structure, but  rejects the 
notion that one particular type would be optimal for all larger firms. Instead, the corporate 
office can choose from a number of alternative models to control the divisions. Since the 
stream originates from criticism of Williamson's M-form (1975) hypothesis, the alternative 
corporate  control  models  originally  were  very  close  to  his  work.  Apart  from  the  above-
mentioned M-form, Williamson and Bhargava (1972) distinguished, among others, the CM-
form,  or  corrupted  multidivisional.  Firms  that  have  adopted  the  CM-form  are  labeled Chapter 2 
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corrupted,  because  their  corporate  offices  are  involved  in  the  operations  of  the  divisions. 
However, Hill (1988b) and Hill and Hoskisson (1987) argue that the realization of synergies 
requires exactly this kind of involvement. CM-form then becomes centralized multidivisional 
(Hill, 1988a, 1988b). 
 
The appropriate corporate control model for a given firm has been argued to depend 
on its diversification strategy. Since each firm can have a distinct diversification strategy the 
internal organizational arrangement must differ between firms as well. Consequently, because 
diversification strategy applies to the entire firm the focus is on control differences across, but 
not within firms. According to the contingency hypothesis (Markides & Williamson, 1996), 
the M-form is expected to be appropriate for unrelated-diversified firms, whereas related-
diversified firms are expected to be better off with a CM-form (Hill, 1988a, 1988b, 1994; 
Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1992; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, 1987). Empirical tests of 
the contingency hypothesis can be found in several studies. They seem to agree that the M-
form is more appropriate for unrelated diversification than for related diversification (Hill, 
1988b;  Hoskisson,  1987;  Hoskisson,  Harrison  &  Dubofsky,  1991;  Lamont,  Williams  & 
Hoffman, 1994). This does not automatically imply that highly or unrelated-diversified firms 
should choose an M-form, because there is some evidence of superior performance of the 
CM-form  for  these  firms  (Hill,  1988a,  1988b).  In  addition,  there  are  doubts  about  the 
suitability of the CM-form for related-diversified firms. Although Hill (1988b) reports that 
these  firms  are  most  profitable  when  they  have  adopted  the  CM-form,  Markides  and 
Williamson (1996) find that the CM-form is only appropriate for some types of strategic 
relatedness. Therefore, the results of the tests of the contingency hypothesis are inconsistent. 
 
In more recent studies, Williamson and Bhargava's (1972) M-form and CM-form have 
evolved  into,  respectively,  the  competitive  organization  and  the  cooperative  organization 
(Hill,  1994;  Hill  et  al.,  1992).  Other  exponents  of  the  second  stream  of  research  on  the 
organization of the diversified firm are Goold and Campbell (1987). They identified eight 
management  styles  for  the  corporate  offices  of  diversified  corporations,  such  as  strategic 
planning and financial control. A possible explanation of the inconsistent results of tests of 
the contingency hypothesis can be found in the design of the empirical studies of these more 
recent corporate control models. Hill et al. (1992) did not manage to test relationships with 
product  diversification  at  the  level  of  the  competitive  and  the  cooperative  organization. 
Instead,  they  had  to  apply  a  ªreductionist  analytical  strategyº  (Hill  et  al.,  1992,  p.  518), Literature review and multilevel framework 
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meaning that they tested relationships at the level of the control mechanisms that make up the 
two organization forms, such as centralization and evaluation. The eight management styles 
Goold and Campbell (1987) identified, were based on a study of only sixteen firms. Each 
management style represents a specific combination of two control mechanisms: the influence 
the  corporate  office  has  on  the  strategic  plans  for  the  divisions  and  the  type  of  control 
exercised  by  the  corporate  office.  If  a  study  of  only  sixteen  firms  already  yields  eight 
combinations, a study of additional firms may produce even more possible combinations of 
the two control mechanisms.  
 
Both studies indicate that corporate control models, although didactically attractive, 
may not be not very realistic (Hill et al., 1992) or parsimonious (Goold & Campbell, 1987) 
representations of the organization of diversified firms. Focusing on specific corporate control 
mechanisms could be more productive. This is what the next stream of research entails. 
 
Corporate control mechanisms 
The third stream of research on the organization of the diversified firm appears to be a loose 
collection  of  conceptual  (e.g.,  Dundas  &  Richardson,  1982)  and  empirical  (e.g.,  Vancil, 
1978), and inductive (e.g., Chandler, 1991) and deductive (e.g., Hitt & Ireland, 1986) studies 
that have been performed over a long period of time (e.g., Berg, 1969; St. John & Harrison, 
1999).  What  they  have  in  common  is  a  focus  on  the  relationship  between  diversification 
strategy and one or more mechanisms the corporate office of a diversified firm can use to 
control its divisions. Mechanisms that are most frequently proposed are strategic planning, 
allocation of resources, monitoring of performance, selection and rotation of key personnel, 
compensation of managers, coordination, and centralization of services (see, e.g., Berg, 1969, 
1973;  Collis  &  Montgomery,  1998;  Dundas  &  Richardson,  1980,  1982;  Galbraith  & 
Nathanson, 1978; Grant, 1988; Hall, 1987; Mintzberg, 1979; Pitts, 1977; Porter, 1985, 1987; 
Vancil, 1978). The pattern that emerges from the available studies is that firms do not adopt, 
for  example,  either  an  M-form  or  a  CM-form  to  manage  diversification.  Instead,  their 
corporate  offices  can  choose  from  a  rather  wide  array  of  mechanisms  to  manage 
diversification. They are able to substitute mechanisms and they are not forced to choose 
extreme versions of the mechanisms, but can opt for more intermediate positions (see also 
Van Oijen & Douma, 2000).  
 
 Chapter 2 
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Business unit-specific control 
The corporate focus of the studies described so far has been criticized for not recognizing the 
specific circumstances of individual business units. Indeed, in most diversified firms, strategic 
variety among the business units along various dimensions is likely to occur (Calori et al., 
1994). For example, business units within one firm can differ with respect to the uncertainty 
and complexity of their environments (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Govindarajan, 1984; Nohria 
& Ghoshal, 1994), the maturity of the industries they are active in (Chandler, 1991; Collis & 
Montgomery, 1998; Grant, 1988), the resources and capabilities they own (Ghoshal & Nohria, 
1989;  Nohria  &  Ghoshal,  1994;  Tsai,  2001),  the  degree  of  resource  sharing  with  other 
business units of the same firm (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986; 
Tsai, 2000), and their missions and strategies (Gupta, 1987; Hamermesh & White, 1984). This 
requires the application of different control mechanisms by the corporate office, resulting in 
differentiation  of  control  within  one  firm  (Dess  et  al.,  1995;  Goold  &  Luchs,  1993; 
Govindarajan, 1984; Gupta, 1987).  
   
This can be illustrated with portfolio planning. Portfolio planning techniques highlight 
the  importance  of  a  balanced  portfolio  of  businesses.  The  balance  can  be  achieved  by 
assigning different missions to the business units. For example, business units with a strong 
position in a low growth industry should harvest, in order to generate cash flows. The cash 
flows are redirected to promising business units with a build mission. Business units with 
dissimilar  missions  require  different  corporate  control  instruments  (Bettis  &  Hall,  1983; 
Haspeslagh, 1982). For example, the compensation of a manager of a business unit with a 
build mission should be based on the improvement of the competitiveness of the business 
unit, even if this harms short-term profitability. In contrast, the manager of a business unit 
with  a  harvest  mission  should  be  rewarded  for  his  or  her  ability  to  increase  short-term 
profitability. 
 
The relationships between the strategic characteristics or contexts of business units 
and corporate control mechanisms have been the subject of a number of empirical studies 
(Golden, 1992; Govindarajan, 1984, 1988, 1989; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985; Govindarajan 
& Fisher, 1990; Gupta, 1987). In these studies, business unit mission, competitive strategy, 
and environmental uncertainty are related to a wide range of administrative arrangements, 
such  as  degree  of  decentralization,  degree  of  subjectivity  used  in  evaluation  and  reward 
systems,  budgetary  control  style,  openness  and  informality  of  corporate-business  unit Literature review and multilevel framework 
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relations, and selection of business unit managers. Overall, the studies provide support for the 
argument that corporate control mechanisms should be tailored to the needs of individual 
business  units.
5  Nonetheless,  studies  that  propagate  internal  differentiation  of  control 
mechanisms have not remained free from criticism either. After all, differentiation of control 
does have clear drawbacks, as it is complex to implement (Markides, 2002) and may lead to 
fragmentation (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987) and jealousies (Goold & Campbell, 1987) among 
business unit managers. 
 
Conclusion 
Above we classified research on the organization of the diversified firm into four categories. 
From the first to the fourth category, the degree of complexity increases. The first two seem 
overly simplistic. The notion that one specific type of multidivisional structure is optimal for 
all large firms has to be rejected, because firms can follow different diversification strategies, 
which require different organizations. The notion that firms can choose from a number of 
corporate control models also has to be approached with skepticism, given the inferences that 
can  be  drawn  from  several  empirical  studies.  In  practice,  a  virtually  infinite  number  of 
corporate control models might exist, because corporate offices can choose from a wide array 
of mechanisms to manage product diversification and mechanisms can be substituted and 
used to varying degrees, as indicated by the third category. The fourth category seems to 
entail even more complexity because the appropriate configuration of mechanisms can now 
differ between business units as well. Hence, each business unit may present corporate center 
management  with a different  control problem, requiring different  combinations of control 
mechanisms within the firm. 
 
Thus, two views prevail. Both focus on the various mechanisms the corporate office 
can use to control its business units, but they differ in the level of analysis. Whereas the first 
view concentrates on the corporate level, the second one takes individual business units as the 
                                                 
5 The subsidiaries of a multinational are almost by definition characterized by strategic variety, because of the 
different geographic regions they usually work in. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the notion of differentiated 
fit became a popular theme in international management research as well. For example, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), in their 
seminal work on the management of multinational corporations, found that some of the most successful companies they 
studied were able to differentiate their systems of planning and control to fit the contexts of different units. Nohria and 
Ghoshal (1994) reported similar findings in a study of headquarters-subsidiary relations in 54 multinational firms. Recent 
attention is directed towards differences in role or strategic importance of subsidiaries in the corporate network and the 
implications these roles have for the nature of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilenius & 
Arvidsson, 2000; Birkinshaw, Hood and Jonsson, 1998; Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994; O'Donnell, 2000). Chapter 2 
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primary level of analysis. Both views provide interesting insights into the organization of 
diversified firms and received considerable empirical support. However, both views also have 
their  limitations.  For  example,  a  focus  on  the  corporation  as  a  whole  ignores  potential 
differences that exist at lower levels in the organization (Govindarajan, 1988; Gupta, 1987; 
Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). Similarly, a focus on individual business units ignores the wider 
implications, such as the costs and complexities associated with the adoption of different 
styles of control under the same corporate roof (see, e.g., Collis & Montgomery, 1998; Goold 
&  Campbell,  1987;  Lorange,  1993;  Markides,  2002;  Prahalad  &  Bettis,  1986).  Hence,  a 
thorough understanding of control of business units in diversified firms is hindered because of 
the existence of two distinct views, neither of which is superior to the other per se, and the 
suggestions of which seem to be in conflict with one another. For example, it remains unclear 
whether control is a corporate-wide phenomenon that should be aligned with the strategic 
context of the firm as a whole, or whether it should be treated as a business unit-specific 
phenomenon,  tailored  to  the  needs  of  individual  business  units.  As  long  as  researchers 
continue to focus on either the corporate or the business unit level of analysis, reconciliation 




2.3 Levels issues and underlying assumptions 
 
Levels issues are receiving more and more attention in organization theory and research (see, 
e.g.,  Klein  &  Kozlowski  (2000)  for  an  overview  of  developments  in  multilevel  theory 
development and data analysis). The importance for conducting strategy research has been 
elaborated upon as well (see Dess et al., 1995). The multilevel perspective highlights that 
studies with a single-level focus often fall short in developing a full understanding of the 
complexity  of  many  organizational  phenomena.  After  all,  the  typical  organization  is 
multilevel in nature and many relationships exist between the different levels (Klein et al., 
1994). Hence, the focus on a single level of analysis
6 almost by definition implies making, 
                                                 
6 The emphasis of this paper is on developing a theoretical framework. Hence, level of analysis should not be 
equated with level of data analysis. Rather, it refers to the level of the target (e.g., business unit or corporate level) or level of 
the  theoretical  construct  (e.g.,  control)  that  we  examine  (cf.  Klein,  et  al.,  1994;  Kozlowski  &  Klein,  2000).  Klein  and 
colleagues (1994) distinguish between level of theory, level of measurement, and level of statistical data analysis. The levels 
of measurement and statistical data analysis do not play a major role in this paper as they pertain to empirical research. Literature review and multilevel framework 
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often implicitly, simplifying assumptions about the others. For example, studies that examine 
control as a corporate-level issue, seem to be built on a homogeneity assumption (cf. Klein et 
al., 1994), which is typical when the focus is on a collective, higher-level phenomenon under 
the assumption that the entities that belong to this collective are similar with respect to the 
phenomenon of interest. Indeed, the focus is on determining a control style for the corporation 
as a whole without taking into account differences that may exist in the controls used for 
different business units. On the other hand, the focus on control of individual business units 
seems to be built on the assumption of independence (cf. Klein et al., 1994), which is typical 
for studies that focus on an individual entity without taking into account the higher-level 
context in which this entity is embedded and without taking into account the other entities that 
belong to the same higher-level collective. The focus of these studies is on determining the 
appropriate control mechanisms for an individual business unit. The corporate-level context in 
which these business units operate and the control mechanisms used for other business units 
in  the  corporation  do  not  usually  play  a  major  role
7.  Hence,  it  remains  unclear  what  the 
implications of such a tailor-made approach are for the corporation as a whole. 
 
Aligning  the  two  views  requires  adopting  a  multilevel  perspective.  One  of  the 
fundamentals of such a perspective is the recognition that top-down and bottom-up processes 
link together concepts that have previously been examined at a single level only (Kozlowski 
& Klein, 2000). For example, top-down processes may refer to the group or organizational 
context  in  which  individuals  operate  and  that  influences  the  behaviors,  actions  and 
perceptions of these individuals. On the other hand, bottom-up processes may refer to the 
influence of the behaviors, actions and perceptions of individuals on the context of the group 
or organization to which they belong. With these bottom-up processes multilevel researchers 
accentuate that many collective phenomena emerge from the characteristics of lower-level 
entities that belong to that collective. As a result, a phenomenon that becomes manifest at, for 
instance,  the  group  level  often  characterizes  the  patterns,  shared  properties  or  variability 
among  individual  group  members'  contributions  to  that  group  level  phenomenon  (cf. 
Kozlowski  &  Klein,  2000).  Examples  include  group  size,  cohesiveness,  working 
                                                                                                                                                          
Needless to mention that the levels of theory, measurement and data analysis should be in line if one is to avoid drawing 
erroneous conclusions. 
7 Although it is not uncommon to include corporate factors as control variables in statistical tests of business unit- 
level phenomena (see, e.g., Gupta, 1987), the corporate-level effects and implications fall outside the scope of these studies. Chapter 2 
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participation,  demographic  diversity  and  performance.  Each  of  these  can  be  used  to 
characterize a group but they cannot be separated from the individuals that form the group. 
 
In a similar vein, the relevant concepts of studies on control of business units can be 
linked  to  one  another.  The  studies  have  in  common  that  they  examine  the  contingency 
relationships between strategic context, control mechanisms, and performance, but they differ 
in the levels at which these concepts are examined. An important feature of the framework 
that we present next is the recognition of the multilevel nature of these three concepts. Hence, 
we recognize that strategic context, control, and performance manifest at the corporate and at 
the business unit level
8. A discussion of the cross-level linkages explains how these concepts, 
which have previously been examined at separate levels, relate to one another. In doing so, we 
take  issue  with  the  simplifying  assumptions  of  previous  studies.  For  example,  the 
homogeneity assumption is relaxed because internal differences between business units are 
accounted  for  in  the  framework.  Moreover,  the  independence  assumption  is  considered 
unrealistic because business units do not operate in a vacuum but are influenced by factors at 
a higher level in the corporation.  In turn, these higher-level factors are in large part also 
influenced by the characteristics of individual business units. Altogether, the adoption of a 
multilevel perspective should lead to reconciliation of the issues that remain unresolved when 
the two levels of analysis are kept strictly separated. 
 
In sum, we aim to identify the relevant constructs at different levels, make explicit the 
links between them, and provide new insights by shifting from a single level to a multilevel of 
analysis. In essence, this is what multilevel theory development is about (see, e.g., Klein, Tosi 
& Cannella, 1999; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). 
                                                 
8 In a sense, control can also be thought to reside at an intermediate level as it characterizes the relationship 
between corporate headquarters and its business units. However, the fact that control may be business unit specific justifies 
its treatment as a business unit-level factor. The corporate level equivalent captures the characteristics of all headquarters-
business unit relationships within the corporation, as we will explain later. The treatment of control as a business unit-level or 
a corporate-level phenomenon is in line with the distinction made in the two prevailing views discussed earlier. Literature review and multilevel framework 
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2.4 Theoretical framework 
 
Figure 1 presents the multilevel control framework for a company with n business units. Each 
business unit operates in a specific strategic context and is subject to the specific control 
mechanisms used by corporate headquarters, which includes corporate center management 
and supporting staff. Business unit strategic contexts can be characterized along a number of 
dimensions,  including  for  instance,  competitive  strategy,  mission,  role  in  the  corporate 
portfolio, or the degree of resource sharing with other units in the corporation
9. Similarly, the 
control relation between corporate headquarters and a business unit can be characterized on 
such dimensions as the degree of centralization and the criteria used to evaluate business unit 
performance.  Hence,  it  may  include  any  combination  of  control  mechanisms  corporate 
headquarters have at hand to manage, coordinate, monitor or steer the actions of a business 
unit. In line with the findings of the studies that have taken the business unit as their level of 
analysis,  we  argue  that  business  unit  performance  is  positively  affected  by  the  degree  to 
which controls are tailored to business unit context
10. The corporate-level conceptualizations 
of  strategic  context,  control,  and  performance  are  based  on  the  aggregated  bottom-up 
influences of all the business units in the corporation. In turn, the corporate-level concepts 
strategic context and control form the context in which individual business units operate and 
exert influence on these business units in a top-down relation. In the remainder of this section 







                                                 
9 For the sake of simplicity these horizontal linkages between business units are not visualized in the framework. 
They are included as characteristics of strategic context, however. In a similar vein, lateral integration devices, such as 
committees, liaison positions, or project teams, are treated as part of the range of control mechanisms that can be used in a 
headquarters-business unit control relation. The argument is that the use of these mechanisms can differ between business 
units, although we acknowledge that the horizontal nature of these devices implies that the use of these mechanisms for one 
business unit, almost by definition implies the use for at least one other business unit as well. Hence, we do not discard the 
growing attention paid to multi-unit organizations as intraorganizational networks (see, e.g., Tsai, 2000, 2001) but consider 
these lateral linkages as part of the debate: one can examine the existence of lateral linkages at a corporate or at a business 
unit level.  
10 It is by no means our intention to provide a full explanation of performance. Rather, we limit ourselves to the 


















Figure 1: Multilevel framework of control of 




Link  1:  Control  of  individual  business  units.  Linkage  1  is  a  set  of  relationships  that 
represent the dominant focus of the second view of control in diversified firms: the primary 
level of analysis is that of the individual business unit. In short, the general line of reasoning 
can be summarized as follows. Each business unit can be characterized along dimensions such 
as  its  strategy,  environment,  or  role  in  the  corporate  portfolio.  The  characteristics  of  an 
individual unit place requirements on the controls used for that business unit (1a). Tailoring
11 
refers to the degree to which the controls match the business unit's characteristics (1b), which 
should  ultimately  enhance  business  unit  performance  (1c).  Theoretically,  this  can  be 
explained  using  a  number  of  perspectives.  Here  we  rely  on  the  information-processing 
                                                 
11 We are unsure about who first coined the term tailoring in this context although Haspeslagh (1982) was probably 
one of the first to speak of corporate top managers who tailor their attention to each business unit. More general terms such as 
fit,  matching,  and  aligning  are  also  frequently  used  in  subsequent  studies  to  emphasize  the  contingency  nature  of  this 
relationship. Moreover, most studies have usually equated tailored control with differentiated control. We will explain later 
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perspective, which is widespread in organization theory and has been widely used in studies 
of  control  of  business  units  in  diversified  (see,  e.g.,  Golden,  1992;  Govindarajan,  1986; 
Gupta, 1987) and multinational (see, e.g., Egelhoff, 1988) corporations
12. The information-
processing perspective (see, e.g., Egelhoff, 1988; Galbraith, 1977; Tushman & Nadler, 1978) 
holds that organization design variables should be aligned with the information-processing 
requirements  imposed  by  an  organization's  strategic  context  to  ensure  its  effectiveness. 
Because organizational design variables differ in the information-processing capacities they 
possess,  the  nature  and  use  of  them  differs  across  strategic  contexts  as  well.  Hence,  the 
controls  used  for  an  individual  business  unit  should  have  enough  information-processing 
capacity to deal with the information-processing requirements of that business unit's strategic 
context. Consider, for example, the difference between a unit in a mature, stable industry and 
one that operates in a turbulent, newly-established business, where new product development 
and innovation are central to success (see, e.g., Chandler, 1991). Whereas strict financial 
targets can be imposed on the former, performance evaluation of the latter requires more 
information-richness in the controls to adequately assess the quality of decisions rather than 
the  magnitude  of  their  short-term  financial  contributions  (cf.  Hitt,  Hoskisson,  Johnson  & 
Moesel, 1996). Moreover, the information-processing perspective also holds that, in the face 
of high environmental uncertainty, decision-making authority should be decentralized to the 
business unit level to allow for timely responses to environmental changes and appropriate 
local  decision-making  (Golden,  1992).  Alternatively,  in  the  case  of  interdependence  with 
other business units in the firm more decision-making authority is placed in the hands of 
corporate center management because the wider perspective available at a higher level allows 
for  better  inter-unit  coordination  (cf.  Egelhoff,  1988).  Empirically,  these  ideas  have  been 
supported as well (see our literature review). Hence, the message of these first relationships is 
unequivocal: business unit performance benefits from the tailoring of control to business unit 
strategic context. 
                                                 
12  The  information-processing  perspective  recognizes  the  various  dimensions  of  control,  unlike,  for  example, 
agency theory, which is commonly used for only some dimensions of control, notably incentive systems. However, the use of 
agency theory to theoretically ground the importance of fit between business unit context and control mechanisms used by 
the corporate center is recognized (see, e.g., O'Donnell, 2000), just as we recognize the use of Ouchi's control framework 
(Hennart, 1991), or some combination of the two (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). Chapter 2 
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Link  2:  Corporate  context  and  control  of  individual  business  units.  The  information-
processing arguments above suggest a need to tailor control to the strategic context of an 
individual  business  unit.  However,  the  information-processing  capacities  available  at  the 
corporate center may be limited and may prohibit the adoption of the control mechanisms that 
would  be  appropriate  given  the  information-processing  requirements  of  the  individual 
business units. These limitations stem from the bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963; 
March & Simon, 1958) of corporate center management and supporting staff. The degree to 
which they can cope with uncertain and complex situations to a large extent depends on how 
well  their  information-processing  capacities  stick  up  with  the  information-processing 
requirements of the situation they face. Since this situation is not limited to an individual 
business unit but includes all business units the corporate headquarters is confronted with, the 
total  corporate  level  information-processing  requirements  are  a  function  of  the  overall 
corporate strategic context. This is recognized in the literature, which has identified a number 
of  relevant  dimensions  of  corporate  strategic  context,  including  the  overall  degree  of 
relatedness in the portfolio, the overall degree of product-market uncertainty, the size of the 
corporation, and the need to cope with widely varying contingencies (see, e.g., Alexander, 
1991; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Hill, 1994; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hitt et al., 1996; 
Markides,  1995).  As  we  will  discuss  under  link  3,  however,  these  corporate  strategic 
characteristics  can  be  conceptualized  as  originating  from  the  strategic  contexts  of  the 
individual business units. 
 
When  the  information-processing  requirements  of  the  corporate  strategic  context 
exceed  the  available  information-processing  capacity,  corporate  office  executives  may 
economize on the scarce capacities available at the corporate center by using an arm's length 
style of management. This entails delegation of decisions to the business level and the use of 
relatively easy to measure financial criteria to assess business unit performance, even if this is 
inappropriate given the strategic contexts of the business units
13. Similarly, there is a tendency 
of corporate center management teams to cling to the limited range of control mechanisms 
they are most familiar with when faced with widely varying contingencies in their portfolio, 
in  part  because  the  prevailing  worldview  makes  apparent  dissimilarities  in  business  unit 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, and not necessarily related to information-processing limitations, corporate center executives may 
also have the tendency to interfere in business unit affairs without direct need or install complex mechanisms of control and 
coordination to seek synergy in places where there is no potential for it. Unproductive interference and redundant hierarchy 
could be the results (Goold & Campbell, 2003).  Literature review and multilevel framework 
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contexts remain unnoticed (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). In both cases the control mechanisms 
adopted may deviate from those required by an individual business unit
14. Hence, linkage 2 
suggests that corporate level information-processing requirements and capacities can impose 
constraints  on  the  ability  to  tailor  control  in  individual  headquarters-business  unit 
relationships (cf. Egelhoff, 1988). 
 
Link  3:  Corporate  and  business  unit  strategic  context.  In  the  previous  linkage,  we 
discussed a number of likely sources of information-processing requirements. These sources 
include the size of the corporation and the overall degree of uncertainty, relatedness, and 
variety in the firm's portfolio. The existing manners in which these corporate level strategic 
dimensions have been conceptualized do not offer much help in our multilevel framework, 
however. For example, discussions on corporate strategic context focus predominately on the 
conceptualization and measurement of a firm's product diversification type. And although the 
bottom-up nature of this corporate-level construct is acknowledged (see, e.g., Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson & Moesel, 1993), internal variations in degree of relatedness between business units 
do not usually play a major role. The same holds for corporate-level conceptualizations of the 
overall degree of product-market uncertainty. Furthermore, although strategic variety should 
capture these internal variations, this concept remains largely unspecified in the corporate-
level studies discussed in our literature review. This is unfortunate. For instance, Grant (1988, 
2002) already pointed at the fact that business units can be considered strategically unrelated, 
or different, if they require different management and control approaches from the corporate 
center. However, whereas Grant points at the difficulties of specifying the relevant strategic 
characteristics of business units to determine strategic relatedness, we would argue that the 
existing studies on business unit specific control provide a good starting point. For example, 
the relevance of environmental uncertainty, business unit mission, competitive strategy, and 
degree of resource sharing has been theoretically grounded and empirically supported by a 
number  of  previous  studies,  as  we  saw  in  our  literature  review.  Hence,  a  corporate-level 
conceptualization  of  strategic  context  based  on  the  lower-level  strategic  context  of  the 
individual business units seems appropriate. 
                                                 
14 This is one of the reasons why limits to efficient diversification exist. The diversification literature argues that 
firms  cannot  diversify  indefinitely  (Hill,  1994;  Markides,  1995).  At  a  certain  point  information-processing  limitations 
prohibit further profitable diversification (see, e.g., Palich et al., 2000). Inappropriate controls cause problems when firms 
diversify beyond this point. As a reaction to this, firms could either increase their information-processing capacity or reduce 
their level of diversification.  Chapter 2 
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Linkage  3  visualizes  the  relationship  between  business  unit-  and  corporate-level 
strategic context. This bottom-up relationship indicates that individual business units form the 
basis for the corporate-level conceptualization of strategic context, just as individual members 
of a group often form the basis for characterizations of the group as a whole. Besides the size 
of the corporation, which is an important indicator for the complexity of the control task 
facing the corporate center (see also Hill & Hoskisson, 1987)
15, two other dimensions stand 
out. These other dimensions capture the ªpatternº and ªvariabilityº of individual business unit 
characteristics (cf. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000, p. 29), for which we use the labels mean and 
variance  respectively
16.  The  mean  reflects  the  average  corporate  position  on  each  of  the 
relevant  business  unit  characteristics.  For  example,  it  reflects  the  average  degree  of 
uncertainty or resource sharing across the whole portfolio of businesses units. It also reflects 
the  average  corporate  standing  on  other  important  business  unit  characteristics,  such  as 
business unit strategy and mission. The variance, then, refers to strategic variety (cf. Prahalad 
&  Bettis,  1986)  or  the  variation  in  the  strategic  contexts  of  all  the  business  units  in  the 
company.  Inclusion of strategic variety acknowledges that within diversified firms business 
units may face different environments, play different roles, or pursue different strategies or 
missions. Moreover, it acknowledges that business units may display different degrees of 
relatedness, leading some to become more involved in resource sharing than others (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1986; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Tsai, 2000). Note that strategic variety can 
be low or non-existent. This would, for example, reflect a situation where business units have 
identical strategic characteristics. Also, note the distinction between two kinds of relatedness. 
The first refers to the average degree of resource-sharing potential that exists across all the 
business units in the corporate portfolio. Hence, it is represented as a mean in the framework 
and resembles the traditional related diversification category so dominant in corporate-level 
studies of control. The second refers to the degree of strategic variety. In this respect a firm 
would be classified related when the business units have identical strategic characteristics, 
irrespective of their resource-sharing potential (cf. Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). This type of 
relatedness has also been labeled organizational relatedness, to refer to the degree to which 
control of business units can be organized in similar ways (Collis, 1995). 
                                                 
15 In this context Hill and Hoskisson (1987) speak of corporate span of control and the number of business units 
that are controlled by corporate headquarters directly as a more concrete proxy of corporate size. 
16 It is not our intention to discuss the exact operationalization and measurement of constructs. Hence, mean and 
variance should not be strictly interpreted in terms of the statistical equivalents. However, we believe that the chosen labels 
do capture a firm's standing on a number of critical strategic characteristics.   Literature review and multilevel framework 
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Link 4: Control as a corporate-level concept. Similarly, a conceptualization of control at 
the corporate level may be based on the mean and variance in the control mechanisms used in 
each headquarters-business unit relationship. For example, firms may display a high average 
degree of decentralization across the business units or make high overall use of financial 
controls to assess the performances of their business units. This average position is in line 
with previous studies that have examined control at the corporate level, as the focus of these 
studies  is  on  the  overall  corporate  policy  towards  a,  potentially,  wide  array  of  control 
mechanisms  available  to  corporate  center  management  (see,  e.g.,  Hill  et  al.,  1992).  The 
corporate  level  focus  of  the  studies  makes  them  treat  these  mechanisms  as  homogeneous 
across  the  business  units  within  firms,  however.  Therefore,  variance  is  included  in  our 
framework as an indicator for the degree of control differentiation that exists in a firm's 
portfolio.  For  example,  whereas  mean  in  centralization  would  be  indicative  for  the 
corporation's standing on this control mechanism, the variance would indicate the degree to 
which the business units of the firm differ in terms of the decision-making authority they 
have. Naturally, the higher the variance in centralization, the lower the accuracy of mean in 
centralization  as  a  sufficient  statistic  for  classifying  corporate  control  style.  Together, 
however,  mean  and  variance  provide  a  more  accurate  characterization  of  a  firm's 
configuration of control mechanisms. 
 
Link  5:  Corporate  control  and  the  effects  on  business  unit  performance.  Linkage  5 
suggests that business unit managers compare the controls imposed on them with those used 
for other business units in the firm. A number of problems may result when this comparison 
reveals differences with the rest of the corporation, or at least with the business units that 
serve as reference group for the focal business unit. For example, differences may lead to 
jealousies and create ambiguities as business unit managers fail to understand the different 
styles their superiors use (Goold & Campbell, 1987). Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987) pointed at 
the danger of fragmentation as business units receive different treatment from the corporate 
office. This issue was also raised by Collis and Montgomery (1998), who found that uniform 
compensation  systems  facilitated  rotation  of  managers  and,  consequently,  transfer  of 
knowledge and experiences throughout the firm. 
 
Additional insights come from literature on procedural justice, which focuses on the 
perceived fairness of decision-making processes (see, e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). According to the procedural justice perspective, observed Chapter 2 
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differences  may  cause  business  unit  managers  to  question  the  inherent  fairness  of  the 
corporate  control  system  because  dissimilar  treatments  by  corporate  executives  may  be 
associated with discrimination and political favoritism (cf. Kim & Mauborgne, 1993b, 1995). 
Unfair treatment triggers a variety of negative attitudes, including distrust in superiors and 
low commitment to the organization as a whole (see, e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989). These 
attitudes  may  in  turn  result  in  lack  of  cooperative  behavior,  unwillingness  to  share 
information, and sabotage of future decision processes (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Korsgaard, 
Schweiger & Sapienza, 1995). Given these observations, and given the fact that the quality of 
strategic decision making in multidivisional firms usually requires some degree of interplay 
and cooperation between corporate and business level executives (Lorange, 1993), unfairness 
perceptions are expected to place the performance of business units at stake. Linkage 5 is 
included to capture these negative effects of unfairness perceptions as well as the ambiguity, 
jealousies, and fragmentation discussed before. 
 
In multilevel theory the relative or comparative effect is known as frog-pond effect
17, 
which implies that individual behavior is strongly affected by the assessment of one's relative 
standing in a reference group (Firebaugh, 1980). In a similar vein, the managers of business 
units compare their situation with those of other business units in the firm. This comparison 
may  yield  a  negative  or  positive  evaluation  of  their  own  treatment,  or  it  may  reveal  no 
differences at all. This suggests that differences may also have a positive effect on business 
unit  managers'  attitudes.  However,  we  would  argue  that  the  observed  differences  are,  in 
general, more likely to cause negative effects for at least three reasons. First, to the extent that 
differences may be positive for some but negative for others, resource and knowledge sharing 
between interdependent business units will undoubtedly suffer from the animosity of some of 
the parties. Second, the exact treatments of peers might be largely unknown. However, just as 
people overestimate the pay levels of co-workers (Bloom, 1999) they may also overestimate 
the treatments received by the company headquarters. Third, fairness perceptions are largely 
based on the treatment of the group as a whole (Naumann & Bennett, 2000). To the extent 
that differences may be thought to result from discrimination of some group members, they 
will influence the perceptions even of those managers that can be considered better off than 
                                                 
17 The frog-pond metaphor is used to illustrate the comparative effect: depending on the size of a pond the very 
same  frog  may be considered large or small (see also Klein et al., 1994). The effect applies to a variety of situations, 
including, for example, school performance and income satisfaction (Firebaugh, 1980). Literature review and multilevel framework 
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the others. Moreover, these managers may fear becoming the victim of political favoritism in 
the future themselves. 
 
Link  6:  Consequences  for  corporate  performance.  Linkages  6a  and  6b  capture  the 
corporate-level performance implications of control of business units. Linkage 6a indicates 
the bottom-up relationship that exists between corporate performance and the performance of 
individual business units. Such a bottom-up linkage is in line with the arguments of others, 
who claimed that the effects of value-creation in diversified firms become most apparent at 
the  level  of  individual  business  units  (Dess  et  al.,  1995;  Golden,  1992;  Gupta,  1987; 
Montgomery,  1985).  Indeed,  although  some  value  creation  will  relate  primarily  to  the 
corporation  as  a  whole,  the  benefits  from  operating  in  multiple  businesses  materialize 
especially  at  the  level  where  competitive  battles  are  fought  (cf.  Gupta,  1987;  Gupta  & 
Govindarajan, 1986; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Hill, et al., 1992; Markides & Williamson, 
1996;  Porter,  1985).  Hence,  linkage  6a  suggests  that  control  of  business  units  affects 
corporate performance through its effect on the performance of individual business units. The 
performance  implications  for  individual  business  units  were  discussed  as  part  of  the 
argumentations used for links 1 and 5. We will refrain from repeating these arguments here 
and limit ourselves to pointing at the fact that the corporate performance implications may 
differ between the business units in a firm. For example, whereas a corporate center may 
succeed in tailoring control to the contexts of some business units, they may fail to do so for 
others.  In  a  similar  vein,  negative  reactions  to  control  differentiation  may  not  be  equally 
strong across business units. Hence, the corporate influence on business unit performance can 
differ between business units in the same corporation (Brush & Bromiley, 1997), and so do 
the  contributions  of  individual  business  units  to  the  performance  of  the  corporation  as  a 
whole. 
 
Finally,  linkage  6b  points  at  the  relationship  between  corporate  headquarters  and 
corporate performance. Again, we limit our discussion to control-related effects, which we 
believe to be negative in this case. The argument is that the control of business units incurs 
costs,  which  can  be  associated  with  the  required  information-processing  capacity  at  the 
corporate  center  (see,  e.g.,  Hill  &  Hoskisson,  1987;  Hill,  1994;  Jones  &  Hill,  1988).  As 
discussed  before,  control  of  business  units  places  demands  on  the  information-processing 
capacities of corporate center executives and their supporting staff. As these demands become 
more severe, either the available capacity needs to be expanded, or else a failure to adopt the Chapter 2 
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appropriate control mechanisms can result. In both cases the ªcostsº of control rise. Either 
directly,  for  instance  through  increases  in  the  size  of  corporate  center  staff  and  the 
development  of  sophisticated  management  information  systems,  or  indirectly,  because 
restrictions  at  the  corporate  level  hinder  the  tailoring  of  control  to  business  unit 
circumstances
18. The latter manifest in lower performance of individual business units, which 
affects corporate performance through linkage 6a. The former manifests at the corporate level 





In the preceding sections we presented our integrative framework of control of business units 
in diversified firms by incorporating two dominant levels of analysis. We made explicit the 
assumptions of previous studies and illustrated how, by relaxing these assumptions, a more 
complete picture can be drawn of this topic. At the same time, the concepts and relationships 
that have dominated previous studies remain visible. It becomes apparent, then, that the two 
distinct views on the organization of diversified firms need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, 
our  framework  shows  that  control  mechanisms  can  be  tailored  to  business  unit  strategic 
contexts and corporate strategic contexts at the same time. Moreover, it shows that this can 
lead to uniformity or differentiation in the control mechanisms used. This can be illustrated 
with an example. Suppose two firms, A and B, are identical in the sense that both of them 
display a high average degree of resource sharing across their portfolio and both show the 
accompanying  control  characteristics,  such  as  a  high  average  degree  of  centralization  to 
facilitate  coordination.  The  firms  differ  in  terms  of  variance,  however.  Whereas  firm  A 
displays low levels of variance in resource sharing across business units (i.e., business units 
are equally involved in resource sharing), firm B witnesses a high degree of variance (i.e., 
business units differ considerably in the degree of resource sharing with other units in the 
corporation).  To the extent that the amount of variance in degree of centralization matches 
the amount of variance in resource sharing, both firms exhibit control styles that are tailored 
                                                 
18 The results could be unproductive interference in business unit affairs and controlling against the wrong targets 
(Goold & Campbell, 2003; Goold and Luchs, 1993; Markides & Singh, 1997; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). In this context, 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) speak of the hidden costs of diversification. Other costs result from opportunistic behavior of 
business unit managers (see, e.g., Hill, 1994; Jones & Hill, 1988). In our framework these costs have a dampening effect on 
business unit performance, mainly through the failure of company headquarters to adopt the adequate control mechanisms 
given a business unit's context.  Literature review and multilevel framework 
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to the business units as well as to the context of the corporation as a whole. Naturally, firm A 
would be characterized by a low degree of control differentiation whereas firm B would be 
characterized by a high degree of control differentiation
19.   
 
As a response to the complexities inevitably involved in differentiating control to fit 
the strategic contexts of individual business units, corporations have been advised to create 
portfolios  of  business  units  with  similar  strategic  characteristics  (see,  e.g.,  Collis  & 
Montgomery,  1998;  Goold  &  Campbell,  1987).  Indeed,  the  framework  implies  that  this 
enables corporations to achieve the benefits of tailoring, while preventing the difficulties of 
differentiating. However, creation of uniform portfolios seems an advice too simplistic for 
most of today's corporations. After all, the mere fact that business units evolve, industries 
change,  and  newly  acquired  firms  become  part  of  a  corporate  family,  inevitably  leads  to 
differences across the whole range of business units in most corporate portfolios. In fact, the 
claim  has  been  made  that  the  ability  to  keep  entrepreneurial  ventures  structurally  and 
culturally separated from the core divisions is a prerequisite for large firms to exploit their 
core  activities  while  exploring  new  ones  at  the  same  time  (Day  &  Schoemaker,  2000; 
Markides,  1998;  Tushman  &  O'Reilly,  1997).  In  a  similar  vein,  the  creation  of  balanced 
portfolios almost by definition implies different treatments by the corporate center because 
business units will be assigned different missions (Bettis & Hall, 1983; Haspeslagh, 1982). 
 
Hence,  discussions  should  not  be  limited  to  the  inherent  goodness  or  badness  of 
control differentiation but may focus more on how to deal with the complexities associated 
with  it.  In  that  respect  our  framework  points  at  two  crucial  issues.  First,  it  points  at  the 
complexities at the corporate level. Limitations in the capacities available at the corporate 
center could very well hinder the effective differentiation in the first place. Alternatively, 
investing in information-processing capacity could increase the costs at the corporate level to 
levels where the benefits of tailoring at the business unit level are outweighed by the costs 
associated with it at the corporate level. Second, the framework points at the complexities at 
lower  levels.  After  all,  the  use  of  different  control  styles  may  lead  to  fragmentation, 
jealousies,  confusion,  and  feelings  of  unfairness,  which  may  have  a  dampening  effect  on 
business unit performance. Whereas previous studies focused on the importance of tailoring, 
                                                 
19 At least, based on this one dimensions of control: the degree of centralization. We could have picked any other 
dimension of control for illustration purposes.  Chapter 2 
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our framework points at the importance of taking into account the differentiation that could, 
but need not necessarily, be associated with it as well. This implies that control differentiation 
should  be  given  a  more  prominent  role  in  studies  on  the  control  of  business  units  in 
diversified firms. 
 
Using multilevel thinking we proposed a conceptualization of corporate-level concepts 
on  the  basis  of  business  unit-specific  characteristics.  The  proposed  conceptualizations 
complement and refine existing ones in at least three ways. First, the framework emphasizes 
organizational  entities  (business  units)  rather  than  industries,  segments,  or  product-market 
combinations,  as  the  basis  for  determining  corporate  strategic  context.  In  doing  so,  we 
recognize the existence of relevant strategic characteristics of business units, other than the 
characteristics of the industries they operate in. In a similar vein, it recognizes that sometimes 
industry  characteristics  are  poor  indicators  for  the  control  mechanisms  required  from  the 
corporate  center.  For  example,  resource  sharing  potential  between  industries  or  segments 
could  be  accommodated  for  by  grouping  related  activities  together  under  business  unit 
management to stimulate intra-business unit coordination, while keeping inter-business unit 
interdependence to a minimum (cf. Goold & Campbell, 2000). Second, our corporate-level 
conceptualizations of strategic context and control include mean and variance to capture both 
a corporation's overall standing as well as the internal variation. Traditionally, equivalents of 
the former have dominated corporate-level studies of control. The framework implies that 
assessments  of  variation  or  dispersion  may  be  equally  important  because  high  levels  of 
internal variation may lead to false conclusions when one relies on mean scores only. Again, 
this can be illustrated with the example of the two firms, A and B, used earlier. Now suppose 
that  firm  B,  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  variance  in  resource  sharing,  adopts  a 
standardized control style in which business units are given an equal, fairly low, degree of 
autonomy  for  decision  making.  The  firm  could,  again,  display  a  fit  between  the  average 
degree of resource sharing and the average degree of autonomy in the portfolio. However, 
control would not be tailored to the specific contexts of individual business units. Redundant 
or inappropriate interference by company headquarters (Goold & Campbell, 2003; Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1986) or inability to react quickly to environmental changes (Markides, 2002) could be 
the results. Finally, the framework provides a basis for assessments of strategic variety, a 
corporate level concept that has remained largely unspecified in the literature. Although a 
wide variety  of dimensions could be relevant in determining the degree of differences in 
business  unit  strategic  contexts  (Grant,  1988,  2002),  the  theoretical  underpinnings  and Literature review and multilevel framework 
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empirical support for a number of them can be found in the existing literature on business 
unit-specific  control.  Hence,  the  multilevel  perspective  allows  for  a  more  profound 
assessment  of  strategic  variety,  one  that  is  both  theoretically  grounded  and  empirically 
supported by previous research. 
 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
The multilevel perspective allowed us to align the two views that have dominated research on 
control of business units in diversified firms. Although distinct in the existing literature, the 
two  views  seem  to  be  complementary  rather  than  contradictory.  By  aligning  both  in  a 
multilevel framework, a more comprehensive understanding of control of business units could 
be achieved. This is important considering the importance of the organization of diversified 
firms for the performance of business units and firms as a whole. The multilevel linkages 
between concepts that have previously been examined at either the corporate or the business 
unit level provide a more accurate foundation for the antecedents and performance outcomes 
of  control.  They  also  provide  the  basis  for  more  refined  measurements  of  traditional 
corporate-level concepts, such as corporate strategic context and the overall style of control.  
 
The linking together of studies that differ in their levels of analysis can be considered 
one  of  the  major  contributions  of  the  multilevel  perspective  in  general,  and  multilevel 
research  on  organizational  phenomena  in  particular.  Therefore,  multilevel  research  has 
contributed to the integration of different disciplines as well. For example, multilevel research 
combines  the  micro  perspective  of  individuals,  common  in  psychology,  with  the  macro 
orientation of group, as is common in sociology (see, e.g., Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Given 
its multidisciplinary, multilevel, and eclectic nature, the multilevel perspective provides an 
important avenue for future research in strategic management too, as researchers before us 




Control in multidivisional firms: 









The effectiveness of large companies depends on their ability to establish integration between 
differentiated subunits in order to accomplish the task and purpose of the organization as a 
whole  (Lawrence  &  Lorsch,  1967).  This  paper  deals  with  a  specific  type  of  these  large 
companies:  the  multidivisional  firm.  Multidivisional  firms  are  organized  into  different 
divisions  or  business  units,  responsible  for  their  own  industry,  region,  or  product-market 
combination. A crucial task for the corporate center, or corporate headquarters, is to establish 
control  over  the  divisions.  Control  refers  to  the  use  of  management  instruments  and 
organization design variables to ensure that divisions operate in congruence with the goals of 
the  firm  (cf.  Ouchi,  1979).  Examples  of  these  instruments  are  centralization  of  decision 
making,  horizontal  integration,  remuneration  of  division  managers,  and  performance 
evaluation. 
 
The  literature  on  control  in  multidivisional  firms  can  be  divided  into  two  distinct 
perspectives. According to one perspective, control is determined by corporate-level factors, 
such as corporate diversification strategy and size. For example, in firms that have adopted a 
strategy of unrelated diversification, few activities and decisions should be centralized at the 
corporate headquarters, resulting in a high autonomy for the business units. Since corporate-
level factors are identical for each business unit, the consequence is that all business units of a 
firm are controlled in an identical way. This notion is worked out in a number of studies that Chapter 3 
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pay  specific  attention  to  the  administrative  differences  between  related  and  unrelated 
diversified firms (see, e.g., Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1992; Markides 
& Williamson, 1996). Proponents of the second perspective question this approach and argue 
that  the  characteristics  of  the  business  units  of  a  firm  can  vary  (see,  e.g.,  Golden,  1992; 
Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Gupta, 1987). Control by the corporate headquarters should be 
tailored  to  the  particular  characteristics  of  each  business  unit,  otherwise  business  unit 
performance will suffer. Examples of business unit characteristics that have been treated in 
the  literature  are  the  degree  of  resource  sharing  and  environmental  uncertainty  and 
complexity.  For  example,  these  researchers  have  argued  that  business  units  of  the  same 
corporate family may display different degrees of relatedness, leading some to become more 
involved  in  resource  sharing  than  others  (Govindarajan  &  Fisher,  1990;  Tsai,  2000). 
Accordingly, the degree of autonomy will differ as well. 
 
The criticism of the traditional perspective seems justified. In most firms considerable 
strategic variety exists (Calori, Johnson & Sarnin, 1994) and corporate headquarters should 
accommodate this, as opposed to adopting a ªone size fits allº approach. On the other hand, 
this logic does not exclude a potential corporate effect. That is, corporate headquarters may 
tailor control to the particular characteristics of the business units, but, at the same time, 
control may be influenced by corporate-level factors. This would imply a type of control that 
is tuned to individual business unit characteristics, but still distinct for each firm.  
 
Therefore, a focus on either the business unit or the corporate level of analysis may 
reflect an oversimplification of control of multidivisional firms in practice. Instead, the issue 
of control in multidivisional firms calls for multilevel analysis, since contextual factors at 
different levels may influence the control styles used by corporate headquarters. Multilevel 
research has been successfully applied in various research disciplines, such as sociology and 
education,  and  has  recently  begun  to  draw  the  attention  of  management  scholars  as  well 
(Hofmann, 1997). For example, it has been applied to explain individual behavior in work 
groups on the basis of both individual and work group characteristics (see, e.g., Kidwell, 
Mossholder & Bennett, 1997; Naumann & Bennett, 2000). However, so far, this approach has 
been absent in the research on control in multidivisional firms. Insights from a multilevel analysis 
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In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  one  important  business  unit-level  factor,  the  degree  to 
which an individual business unit is engaged in resource sharing with other business units in 
the  firm,  while  controlling  for  corporate  effects  in  a  multilevel  analysis.  We  develop 
hypotheses  for  the  relationship  between  degree  of  resource  sharing  and  a  number  of  key 
control  mechanisms  available  to  corporate  center  management.  The  choice  for  resource 
sharing is in line with traditional organization theorists who emphasized the importance of 
resource sharing or interdependence between sub-units as determinant of organization design 
in general (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 
1978) and control of business units in particular (Pitts, 1980). Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
(HLM, Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) is used to empirically test our hypotheses on a sample of 
136 business units. HLM allows us to test the hypothesized relationships at the level of the 
individual business unit and, at the same time, control for both observable and unobservable 
corporate-level effects. Our goal is to investigate whether the application of the technique in 
this  field  generates  new  insights  into  the  control  in  multidivisional  firms,  and,  more 
specifically,  into  the  importance  of  business  unit-  versus  corporate-level  factors  for 
headquarters' control. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next paragraph provides a brief theoretical 
background of  control in multidivisional firms, which is  rooted in information-processing 
theory (see, e.g., Egelhoff, 1988; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). We then develop the hypotheses 
on the linkages between resource sharing and control instruments. The subsequent paragraph 
deals with the methods we used in our empirical study, including a brief discussion of HLM. 
The results of the study are presented in the following paragraph. We conclude our paper with 





Information-processing theorists view organizations as systems for gathering, transforming, 
storing, and communicating different types of information (Egelhoff, 1988, 1991; Galbraith, 
1973; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). In general, the information-processing framework holds that 
the  effectiveness  of  organizations  depends  on  how  well  they  are  able  to  facilitate  these 
processes  through  the  creation  of  sufficient  information-processing  capacity  in  their Chapter 3 
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organization design. As the total information-processing requirements facing the organization 
increase,  the  structure  and  administrative  arrangements  to  cope  with  these  requirements 
become more complex and elaborated. 
 
Historically, the adoption of a multidivisional structure has been considered to be the 
appropriate  response  to  cope  with  information-processing  limitations  that  functionally 
organized companies face as they grow in size and complexity (Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 
1975).  Nowadays,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  multidivisional  organizations  differ  in  the 
information-processing requirements they face. Moreover, within firms, each business unit 
may  pose  different  information-processing  requirements  on  the  organization.  Therefore, 
organization  design  may  differ  across,  as  well  as  within  corporations.  Environmental 
uncertainty  and  complexity,  strategy,  and  inter-unit  interdependence  have  been  argued  to 
affect information-processing requirements (see, e.g., Alexander, 1991; Gupta, 1987; Golden, 
1992; Govindarajan, 1986; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Jones & Hill, 1988; Tushman & Nadler, 
1978). Since we are interested in the relationship between resource sharing and organization 
design we will now focus our attention on the latter. 
 
Typically, differentiating the organization into subunits implies that different types of 
knowledge and information reside in different places in the organization (Wolf & Egelhoff, 
2002). Though fit to perform their own task, the information available in a single business 
unit  is  insufficient,  as  business  units  engage  in  resource  sharing  with  other  units  in  the 
corporation.  Effective  problem  solving  and  coordination  requires  information  residing  in 
different  units  to  be  combined  as  input  for  decision  making.  This  can  only  be  achieved 
through information sharing between business units or interference by the next highest level 
in the hierarchy. In both cases, total information processing increases as lateral and vertical 
information exchange and communication become more frequent and intense. Segmenting the 
organization into different business units has another important implication for information 
processing.  Almost  by  definition  different  subunits  develop  different  frames  of  reference 
(Lawrence  and  Lorsch,  1967)  and  jargons  (Ouchi,  1979)  to  accomplish  their  own  task. 
Although  this  may  facilitate  communication  and  stimulate  swift  decision  making  within 
business units, joint decision making and coordination across business units may be severely 
hampered  as  business  units  approach  problems  from  different  points  of  view.  To  ease 
communication and increase mutual understanding, a wider perspective is required. Such a 
wider  view  on  the  organization  is  usually  available  at  higher  management  levels,  but Insights from a multilevel analysis 
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organization  design  arrangements  can  also  be  used  to  stimulate  shared  views  and 
understanding  at  the  business  unit  level.  A  final  observation  concerns  the  influence  of 
resource sharing on the information that serves as input for the corporate control system. 
Information processing takes place between the corporate and the business unit level to the 
extent that performance information is being sent up the hierarchy and returned down the 
hierarchy in the form of evaluation and feedback information (Egelhoff, 1988). This process 
becomes  more  demanding  to  the  extent  that the  performance  of  individual  business  units 
becomes dependent on the actions of other units in the corporation. Interdependence makes it 
difficult to assess the contributions of individual units (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). Rich 
and  detailed  information  is  then  required  to  cope  with  these  limitations  and  to  provide 





In this section, we develop four specific hypotheses. We use four dimensions of corporate 
coordination  and  control  (subsidiary  autonomy,  integration  mechanisms,  network-based 
incentives,  and  strategic  control)  that  have  been  well  established  in  the  literature  on 
headquarters-business unit relationships (see, e.g., Hill et al., 1992; Hill, 1994) and formulate 
hypotheses for the relationships between degree of resource sharing and each of the four.  
 
Business unit autonomy 
Our first hypothesis concerns the degree to which decision-making authority resides at the 
corporate or the business unit level. Traditionally, the potential information overload at the 
corporate level has been considered a key reason to break up the organization into separate 
business units and decentralize authority to the business level (Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 
1975). Business units are given responsibility over important strategic and operating decisions 
for  their  own  industry,  region,  or  product-market  combination.  The  consequence  is  that 
information becomes dispersed and different business units develop different perspectives on 
how  to  operate  and  take  decisions  in  certain  situations.  If  two  business  units  engage  in 
resource sharing with each other, the decisions made and the actions taken by each business 
unit are likely to affect those of the other. By placing decision-making authority in the hands 
of general management, a wider perspective can be obtained, information from both business Chapter 3 
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units can be used as input for decision making, and a better understanding of the contexts of 
different business units can be achieved (Egelhoff, 1988). Moreover, such a central decision-
making body is able to intervene, settle disputes and resolve conflicts between interdependent 
units (Argyres, 1995; Hill et al., 1992; Michel & Hambrick, 1992) Centralization has been 
considered one of the basic information-processing mechanisms available to organizations 
(Egelhoff,  1988;  Galbraith,  1973).  It  facilitates  coordination  (Child,  1984;  Hill,  1988b), 
prevents  suboptimization  (Egelhoff,  1988),  and  allows  corporate  center  management  to 
become more actively involved in decision making at the business unit level (Markides & 
Williamson, 1996). In sum, we would expect the autonomy of an individual business unit to 
decrease as it becomes more actively involved in resource sharing with other units in the 
corporation. Alternatively, at low levels of resource sharing, the advantages of centralization 
become less apparent. The information advantages of centralizing authority at a higher level 
decrease. To economize on the information-processing capacities of the corporate center and 
to prevent unproductive interference of corporate level management in business unit affairs 
(cf.  Goold  &  Luchs,  1993;  Michel  &  Hambrick,  1992;  Vancil,  1978)  decision-making 
authority is likely to be placed at the business unit level. In sum: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The degree to which an individual business unit is involved in 
resource  sharing  with  other  business  units  in  the  corporation  is  negatively 




Despite the fact that the highest level executives in the corporation are often actively involved 
(Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Michel & Hambrick, 1992), they are unlikely to be able to 
coordinate  all  resource  sharing  that  takes  place  through  direct  input  in  decision  making. 
Rather, resource sharing also requires joint problem solving and mutual adjustment between 
business  units.  However,  as  we  saw  earlier,  this  requires  information  exchange  between 
business units that usually have different frames of reference and use different jargons. The 
use of integration mechanisms has been considered one of the most important means for 
providing the organization with information-processing capacity (see, e.g., Galbraith, 1973; 
Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). The installation 
of lateral linkages, such as task forces or committees, in which members of different business 
units participate, stimulate direct communication and information sharing between business Insights from a multilevel analysis 
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units.  They  provide  the  mechanisms  that  allow  information  from  different  units  to  come 
together and serve as input for joint problem solving. The effectiveness of communication and 
joint decision making can be increased if the instruments for integration are complemented by 
the  use  of  socialization  mechanisms  to  create  common  understanding,  commitment,  and 
openness  to  divergent  perspectives  (Edström  &  Galbraith,  1977;  Gupta  &  Govindarajan, 
1991;  Roth,  Schweiger  &  Morrison,  1991).  The  use  of  integration  and  socialization  can 
facilitate communication (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Hill et al., 1992), increase mutual 
understanding (O'Donnell, 2000), and stimulate the use of a common ªlanguageº (Michel & 
Hambrick,  1992;  Tsai,  2000).  We  refer  to  these  mechanisms  broadly  as  integrating 
mechanisms and we would expect company headquarters to stimulate and facilitate the use of 
these mechanisms if resource sharing between business units takes place. For an individual 
business unit, this implies that the more the unit is involved in resource sharing, the more it 
will be integrated with other units in the corporation. Alternatively, we expect little use of 
integration mechanisms for business units that are mainly self-supporting, as these business 
units benefit little from communication and information exchange with other units. Moreover, 
these  mechanisms  have  been  considered  costly  in  terms  of  time  and  effort  (Tushman  & 
Nadler, 1978) and may hamper the flexibility of the business units. Therefore, in order to 
guarantee flexibility and economize on costs, integrative efforts and mechanisms will be used 
more sparingly for independent business units. In sum:  
 
Hypothesis 2:  The degree to which an individual business unit is involved in 
resource  sharing  with  other  business  units  in  the  corporation  is  positively 




Incentive  systems  can  complement  the  use  of  integration  mechanisms  to  stimulate 
information exchange and mutual adjustment. The use of variable compensation is a strong 
mechanism to align the goals of business units with those of other parts of the corporation. 
When compensation contains a variable part, business unit managers are motivated to do their 
task and opportunistic behavior is reduced. For interdependent business units, performance is 
largely  based  on  the  benefits  from  resource  sharing  with  other  business  units  in  the 
corporation. Likewise, the more interdependent business units are, the more likely it is that 
the  variable  compensation  of  subsidiary  depends  on  these  other  business  units  as  well. Chapter 3 
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Therefore,  the  pay  system  will  emphasize  performance  of  a  larger  cluster  or  network  of 
business units rather than individual business unit performance alone (Gomez-Mejia, 1992; 
Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Hill et al., 1992; Hill, 1994; Lorsch & Allen, 1973). The use of 
network-based incentives increases information processing in two ways. First, it increases the 
willingness  of  business  units  to  cooperate  and  engage  in  information  exchange  and  joint 
decision making (Golden & Ma, 2003). Second, it facilitates information processing, as it 
stimulates  the  business units  to  adopt  a  wider  perspective  (Gupta  &  Govindarajan,  1991; 
O'Donnell,  2000).  The  more  a  business  unit  is  engaged  in  resource  sharing  with  other 
business units in the firm, the more we would expect the compensation of its manager to be 
made contingent on the performance of his or her own business unit as well as of the business 
units to which it is linked. On the other hand, the managers of business units that are only 
marginally involved in resource sharing will become less motivated to perform their task if 
performance is assessed at a very high level of aggregation (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). 
Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 3:  The degree to which an individual business unit is involved in 
resource  sharing  with  other  business  units  in  the  corporation  is  positively 




Our  final  hypothesis  deals  with  the  nature  of  the  control  system.  In  multidivisional 
corporations, headquarters have been assumed to turn to either financial or strategic criteria as 
basis  for  evaluating  the  performance  of  individual  business  units  (see,  e.g.,  Hill,  1994). 
Although traditionally the emphasis has been on the use of objective, financial measures to 
expose business units to the discipline of an internal capital market (Jones & Hill, 1988), they 
provide inaccurate information to assess the contribution of interdependent business units. 
Resource sharing requires specific performance information to be processed, since it is argued 
to compromise the accountability of individual business units (Hill, 1988b; Hill & Pickering, 
1986). After all, poor performance of a particular division could be the result of inefficiencies 
in that division, but could also have been caused by inefficiencies in other divisions or by 
poor interference or coordinating efforts of corporate headquarters (Hill, 1988b, 1994; Hill et 
al., 1992). Rather than focusing on financial performance information, corporate managers 
have to fall back on more subjective, strategically oriented, non-financial measures of control. Insights from a multilevel analysis 
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These strategic controls require deep understanding of business level affairs and involve rich 
information  exchange  between  corporate-  and  business-level  managers  (Hitt,  Hoskisson, 
Johnson & Moesel, 1996; Hoskisson, Hitt & Ireland, 1994). They are assumed to provide the 
richness needed to assess the quality of the decisions and contributions of each individual 
business unit in a cooperative relationship. In sum, the use of strategic controls to assess 
performance  of  an  individual  business  unit  becomes  more  important  as  the  business  unit 
engages in resource sharing with other business units in the corporation. Alternatively, since 
information-processing  requirements  are  lower  for  independent  business  units,  we  expect 
headquarters to turn to the more simple and objective financial measures of control when 
resource sharing is low. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  The degree to which an individual business unit is involved in 
resource  sharing  with  other  business  units  in  the  corporation  is  positively 
related to the use of strategic control for the evaluation of the performance of 





Sample and data collection 
We  conducted  a  study  among  Dutch  corporations.  We  started  with  a  list  of  all  Dutch 
corporations listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and excluded all financial corporations 
and corporations with less than 500 employees, because this helps to rule out firms that do not 
have  a  multidivisional  structure  (Mintzberg,  1983).  We  then  studied  the  organizational 
structures of these corporations, using annual reports and the companies' websites. Our main 
goal was to identify the divisions, business units or operating companies that were located 
directly below corporate headquarters
1.  
 
We ended up with a selection of 614 subsidiaries from 57 corporations. Since most of 
the data we needed were unavailable from archival databases, we conducted a mail survey. 
                                                 
1 Corporations with functional structures were left out, as well as corporations for which the annual reports did not 
provide sufficient information on the organizational structure. We also excluded the corporation if it appeared to be majority-
owned by another corporation. The argument is that control practices in these firms would be highly influenced by the control 
style used by the parent, instead of the arguments presented earlier (cf. Hopwood, 1973; Mintzberg, 1983). Chapter 3 
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We sent questionnaires to the managing directors of each of the 614 subsidiaries. Out of the 
total  of  614  questionnaires  sent  to  business  unit  managing  directors,  140  filled  out 
questionnaires were returned (i.e., a response rate of 22.8%), of which 136 responses were 
usable in this study. The 136 business units represent 45 corporations and cover industries 
such as manufacturing (27.2%), service (28.0%), trade (22.1%), construction (12.5%), and 
printing and publishing (10.3%). In total, our dataset includes business units in 14 different 
countries.  A  total  of  34  business  units  (25%)  were  located  outside  the  Netherlands.  On 
average, the subsidiaries employed 1596 employees. 
 
Questionnaire development and translation 
We  used  many  ideas  from  previous  studies  (both  empirical  and  conceptual)  as  input  for 
developing  our  own  questionnaire.  Some  questions  were  almost  completely  derived  from 
existing instruments. However, most questions built on prior research and were subsequently 
changed,  newly  developed,  or  presented  differently  for  this  study.  The  questionnaire  was 
discussed at length with practitioners and colleagues in strategic management and accounting 
research. The questionnaire was developed in Dutch, but translated into German and English 
for foreign business units as well
2. We used backward-translation techniques to account for 
differences in interpretation. Based on the backward-translations and on the discussions with 
colleagues and practitioners, we made final changes to the questions. 
 
Operationalization of main variables 
Resource sharing. This variable was measured through eight questionnaire items. We chose 
the items to include both tangible and intangible resources (Porter, 1985, 1987; St. John & 
Harrison,  1999)  and  to  include  resource  sharing  in  different  functional  areas  (Gupta  & 
Govindarajan, 1986). Subsidiary managers were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale the 
extent to which their subsidiary cooperated with other units in each of the following ways: (a) 
sharing knowledge, information, ideas, etc.; (b) sharing technologies; (c) internal deliveries 
(e.g., components, products, services); (d) using common brand names; (e) sharing physical 
assets (e.g., machines, buildings); (f) exchanging personnel on a temporary basis; (g) collec-
tively  competing  with  competitors;  (h)  shared  functions  or  services  (e.g.,  purchasing, 
                                                 
2 Questionnaires in Dutch were sent to business units located in the Netherlands and the Flemish part of Belgium. 
We sent German translations to business units located in Germany and Austria. English translations were sent to business 
units located in all other countries.  Insights from a multilevel analysis 
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marketing, logistics). Cronbach's alpha as indicator for reliability of the construct was 0.87. 
Factor analysis confirmed the unidimensionality of the construct. 
 
Autonomy. The degree of subsidiary autonomy was measured with eight questionnaire items. 
The  items  were  selected  to  represent  different  strategically  relevant  decisions  (Gupta  & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Vancil, 1978). Subsidiary managers were asked to indicate on a seven-
point scale the autonomy they had in relation to headquarters in each of the following areas: 
(a) formulating the budget; (b) hiring managers or key staff employees; (c) determining the 
strategy  of  the  unit;  (d)  choice  of  investment  projects;  (e)  developing  new  markets;  (f) 
marketing decisions (e.g., price or promotion decisions); (g) selection of strategic partners; (h) 
changes in the portfolio of products or services (alpha = 0.87). Factor analysis confirmed that 
all items loaded highly on the same construct. 
 
Integration  mechanisms.  This  variable  was  measured  using  seven  questionnaire  items.  It 
includes formal integration mechanisms, aspects of socialization, and pure lateral as well as 
more  vertically  induced  means  to  establish  integration  and  coordination.  The  items  were 
selected from previous studies (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Miller & 
Dröge,  1986;  O'Donnell,  2000;  Roth  et  al.,  1991).  Subsidiary  managers  were  asked  to 
indicate on a seven-point scale the degree to which the following instruments' were used in 
their corporation: (a) horizontal integration through direct coordination by headquarters; (b) 
horizontal integration through use of integration personnel (e.g., integration managers); (c) 
horizontal integration through committees for joint decision making; (d) horizontal integration 
through project groups or teams; (e) horizontal integration through information systems (e.g., 
intranet); (f) origination of many subsidiary managers and key employees from other parts of 
the  corporation;  (g)  participation  of  subsidiary  managers  and  key  employees  in  training 
programs organized by headquarters. Factor analysis confirmed the unidimensionality of the 
construct. Analysis of inter-item reliability yielded a Cronbach alpha of 0.82.  
 
Network-based  incentives.  In  line  with  other  studies  (e.g.,  Gupta  &  Govindarajan,  1986; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000) this variable was measured as the percentage of total variable 
compensation that was based on the performance of a cluster or network of business units or 
the corporation as a whole. 
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Strategic control. Subsidiary managers were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale how 
much importance superiors at headquarters attached to non-financial  criteria to assess the 
performance of their unit. Two items were used: (a) the importance attached to quantifiable, 
non-financial aspects of the performance (e.g., market share); (b) the importance attached to 
non-quantifiable aspects of the performance (e.g., cooperation with other units, knowledge 
development). Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.57. The choice for the two items is in 
line with previous studies (e.g., Hill et al., 1992; Hill, 1994).  
 
Business-level control variables 
Business units may also differ in other characteristics than the degree of resource sharing. 
Therefore,  we  controlled  for  a  number  of  other  business  level  variables.  The  first  is 
uncertainty, which is a key driver of information-processing requirements and thus assumed 
to affect organizational design (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Tushman 
& Nadler, 1978). To account for the uncertainty faced by an individual business unit, we 
adapted  two  items  from  Miller  and  Dröge's  (1986)  environmental  uncertainty  scale. 
Subsidiary managers were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale the degree to which: (a) 
actions of competitors are easy to predict; (b) demand and client behavior are easy to predict. 
The items were reverse coded and averaged to obtain the measure for uncertainty. Cronbach's 
alpha for this scale was 0.74.  
 
Two additional control variables were included to capture the position or role of the 
business unit in the corporation as a whole. Business units can play a more prominent role 
when they have more valuable resources, knowledge or capabilities than others (Birkinshaw, 
Hood & Jonsson, 1998; Frost, Birkinshaw & Ensign, 2002; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Nohria 
& Ghoshal, 1994; O'Donnell, 2000). The control over critical resources causes a business unit 
to be less dependent on other parts of the corporation, which makes it more powerful and less 
subject to outside influences, uncertainty, and information-processing requirements (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1974; Tushman, 1977). We expected subsidiary size and the activities performed by 
the subsidiary to capture at least some of the differences in resource levels, power, and role 
played in the portfolio. Subsidiary size is measured as the total number of employees of the 
subsidiary. This variable was transformed (log) prior to inclusion in the analyses. Activities is 
a dummy variable with the value 1 if the business unit performs all three of the main activities 
marketing, production, and R&D and the value 0 if it performs only one or two of these 
activities. Insights from a multilevel analysis 
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Corporate-level control variables 
Corporate-level effects are controlled for by using HLM as method of analysis (see below) 
and including a number of corporate-level control variables. In general, as firms grow in size 
and  complexity,  the  overall  information-processing  requirements  facing  the  organization 
increase.  If  these  requirements  exceed  the  limits  of  organizational  design,  corporate 
management is hindered in effectively performing its monitoring, control and coordination 
tasks  for  each  business  unit  individually  (Alexander,  1991;  Hill,  1994;  Hitt  et  al.,  1996; 
Markides, 1995). Therefore, corporate size and complexity may influence the results of the 
tests  of  the  hypotheses.  Three  variables  were  chosen  as  proxies  for  overall  size  and 
complexity: product diversification, geographic diversification and corporate size. Product 
diversification is the number of industry codes in which the corporation exploits activities (cf. 
Wood,  1971).  Geographic  diversification  is  the  total  number  of  countries  in  which  the 
corporation has subsidiaries. Corporate size was measured as the total number of employees 
of the corporation (log transformed). 
 
Common method bias 
The reliance on a single key informant and the perceptual nature of many of our variables 
should make us aware of the risk of common method bias in this study (see also Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). We tried to reduce the risk by using multiple items to 
measure many of the constructs, by using different scale formats and anchors, by pre-testing 
the questionnaire to avoid complex and ambiguous questionnaire questions and items, and by 
targeting  business  unit  managing  directors  as  the  persons  who  could  be  considered  most 
knowledgeable in the subject area. Still, many constructs were measured using seven-point 
Likert  type  scale  items,  which  may  increase  the  probability  of  common  method  bias. 
Therefore, we performed an exploratory factor analysis with all construct items. Common 
method bias may be especially problematic if a single factor accounts for the majority of the 
covariance  among  the  measures.  This  was  not  the  case  as  we  found  six  factors  with 
eigenvalues greater than one, with the first factor accounting for 29.2% of the variance. Chapter 3 
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HLM and analysis strategy 
Since our aim is to test relationships between variables at the business unit level, taking into 
account the existence of a possible corporate effect, we decided to use hierarchically linear (or 
multilevel) modeling (see, e.g., Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997; Hox, 1995, 2002; 
Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998; Snijders & Bosker, 1999) to test our hypotheses. HLM offers a 
number  of  advantages.  First,  it  allows  the  estimation  of  the  effects  of  business  unit-  and 
corporate-level variables in one regression equation, taking into account the different sample 
sizes at the two levels. Second, it takes into account that business units are not independent 
observations,  since  control  styles  might  be  more  similar  within  corporations  than  across 
corporations. Third, total variance in dependent variables can be decomposed into business 
unit-level and corporation-level effects to assess the existence of corporate effects. 
 
Our analysis strategy is adapted from the full multilevel analysis strategies proposed 
by Hofmann (1997) and Hox (1995)
3. We begin with the estimation of the intercept-only or 
null model. The null model contains no explanatory variables and is equivalent to a one-way 
ANOVA with random effects. It can be used to assess the proportion of total variance in the 
dependent variables that can be explained by the grouping structure in the population (Hox, 
2002). Thus, the output of the null model provides information on the possible existence of a 
significant  corporate-level  effect.  Next,  we  estimated  random  intercept  models  with 
explanatory variables at the business unit level. The random intercept model estimates the 
overall regression equation for each dependent variable and enables us to investigate to what 
extent the intercepts of these equations differ across corporations. If a significant corporate 
effect is present, then we also include our corporate-level control variables to investigate to 
what extent these corporate-level variables can explain the corporate effect in the dependent 
variable
4. 
                                                 
3 A full multilevel analysis strategy can be used as an exploratory strategy in the absence of strong theoretical 
predictions (Hox, 1995) or to test a full multilevel theoretical framework, including hypothesized cross-level interactions 
(Hofmann, 1997). Here, we adopt a simplified analysis strategy without random slope effects and cross-level interactions. 
4 This complete model is estimated by the following regression equation for the predicted value of dependent 
variable Y for a particular business unit (i) in a particular corporation (j): Yij = 0j + 10 resource sharingij + 20 business unit 
sizei + 30 uncertaintyij+  40 activities + rij ; in which 0j = 00 + 01 product diversificationj + 01 geographic diversificationj + 




We used the program HLM 5 (Raudenbush, Bryk & Congdon, 2000) to perform analyses for 
each  of  the  four  dependent  variables.  One  of  the  dependent  variables,  network-based 
incentives, displayed a highly skewed distribution with relatively many observations with the 
score zero and violated the assumption of equal residual variance in groups. Therefore, we 
also considered transforming this variable to achieve a more normal distribution. Because 
analyses with a transformed variable (square root and logit) as well as analyses with the non-
linear extension of HLM provided similar results to the ones produced with the untransformed 
variable and the linear models, we decided to report the findings of the latter only
5. 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations have been included in the appendix to chapter 3. 
Analyses continued with estimating four null models, one for each of the four dependent 
variables.  Table  1  shows  the  decomposition  of  total  variance  in  each  of  the  dependent 
variables into corporate- and business unit-level effects (i.e. the variances of corporate- and 
business unit-level residual error terms are specified). Intra-class correlations are reported to 
indicate the proportion of total variance that can be explained by corporate membership. HLM 
uses  chi-square  statistics  to  determine  the  significance  of  corporate-level  variance.  For 
autonomy and strategic  control, these tests indicate that corporate-level  variance does not 
significantly differ from zero. This is a first indication that corporate-level variables do not 
affect the degree of autonomy business units have and the extent to which strategic controls 
are used to evaluate business unit performance. Significant corporate effects do exist for the 
use  of  integration  mechanisms  and  network-based  incentives.  The  intra-class  correlations 
indicate the variance in integration mechanisms (24%) and network-based incentives (12.9%), 
which can be explained by the grouping structure in the sample. Chi-square tests indicate that 
these effects are significant at the p < 0.001 and p < 0.05 levels respectively. 
                                                 
5 The logit transformation, log (x / (1-x)), is generally considered suitable for proportion data (Hox, 1995; Pieters & 
Bijmolt, 1997), which we obtained by rescaling the dependent variable to a score on a 0-1 scale rather than 0-100 scale. To 
facilitate transformation we replaced a score of 0 by 0.0001 and a score of 1 by 0.9999 (cf. Pieters & Bijmolt, 1997). We also 
rescaled the dependent variable to resemble count data and used the non-linear extension of HLM to run Poisson regression 
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In the next stage, we introduced resource sharing and the three business-level control 
variables to estimate a random intercept model for each dependent variable. As expected, 
introducing these variables improved the models significantly
6 and, except for the corporate-
level variance component for autonomy, decreased total variance at both levels. The decrease 
in corporate-level variance after including business unit predictors is common in multilevel 
modeling  (Snijders  &  Bosker,  1999;  Hox,  1995).  The  argument  is  that  business  unit 
explanatory  variables  may  also  have  a  corporate-level  aspect,  since  the  means  of  these 
variables  may  differ  across  corporations  (Snijders  &  Bosker,  1999).  Investigation  of  the 
variance components further indicates that no significant corporate effects were present for 
business unit autonomy, strategic control, and network-based incentives. This indicates that 
the intercepts of the regression lines do not differ significantly across groups for these three 
dependent  variables.  The  results  show  significant  corporate  effects  for  integration 
mechanisms. Therefore, we included our corporate-level control variables in the regression 
equation for integration mechanisms, but not for autonomy, network-based incentives, and 
strategic control. Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of the four random intercept 
models.  
 
The  results  confirm  the  strong  relationship  between  resource  sharing  and  all  four 
dimensions of corporate control and coordination. The coefficients have the expected sign and 
are significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level. This supports all four hypotheses and 
confirms  the  importance  of  resource  sharing  as  a  business  unit-level  determinant  of 
organizational  design.  Analysis  of  the  variance  components  of  the  models  for  autonomy, 
network-based incentives, and strategic control indicates that total variance decreases upon 
introducing  the  business  unit-level  explanatory  variables  and  that  no  significant  corporate 
effects exist. The significant corporate effect we found in the null model for network-based 
incentives  vanished  in  the  random  intercept  model,  indicating  that  the  business  unit-level 
variables explained much of the differences across corporations as well. The random intercept 
model for integration mechanisms contains business unit-level and corporate-level variables. 
We find a strong positive relationship between resource sharing and integration mechanisms. 
Moreover, the use of integration mechanisms is negatively related to the degree of uncertainty 
                                                 
6 We assessed improvement of overall model fit by comparing the deviance statistics of the random intercept 
models  with  those  of  the  null models.  As  deviance  is  a  measure  of  model  misfit,  a  decrease  in  deviance  indicates  an 
improvement of fit. Chi-square statistics indicated that the decrease in deviance was significant for all four models. 
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facing the business unit. This could indicate that links between business units are removed to 
ensure flexibility when business units face more uncertain environments. The three corporate-
level control variables have no significant effect on the use of integration mechanisms. After 
introducing these variables, a significant part of the corporate-level variance in the use of 
integration mechanisms remains unexplained. Apparently, our three corporate-level variables 
cannot explain this variance. 
 
Additional analyses 
The group sizes in our data vary from 1 to 11 observations per corporation (median = 3). 
Although  varying  group  sizes  and  group  sizes  of  one  are  not  problematic  for  the  use  of 
hierarchical linear modeling (Snijders & Bosker, 1999), we decided to run similar analyses 
with a more balanced data set. We left out corporations with 1, 2 and 11 observations. This 
resulted in a dataset with 89 observations at the business unit level and 22 observations at the 
corporate level (minimum = 3 observations per corporation; maximum = 7 observations per 
corporation). The results of these additional analyses were fairly similar to the ones produced 
by the initial analyses (see the appendix to chapter 3 for the results of the additional analyses).  
 
We performed additional analyses to take a closer look at the corporate effects we 
found  for  integration  mechanisms  and  network-based  incentives.  Because  we  expected 
resource sharing to be a corporate-level as well as a business unit-level explanatory factor, we 
decided  to  run  regression  models  that  included  both.  We  computed  the  average  resource 
sharing per group for the corporate-level variable and included group mean centered scores on 
resource sharing for individual business units. To determine the appropriateness of including 
a group average score on resource sharing we assessed the intra-corporate agreement and 
inter-corporate  variation  on  this  variable  (see  also  Kidwell  et  al.,  1997).  Almost  36%  of 
variance in resource sharing could be attributed to the corporate level and internal agreement 
within corporations appeared to be reasonably high (0.76, which is above the commonly used 
cut off point of 0.70; see e.g. James, Demaree & Wolf, 1984, 1993)
7. The findings reveal 
significant effects for both resource-sharing variables, indicating that the corporate average as 
well as individual business units' relative score could be potentially relevant predictors. We 
                                                 
7 The agreement index varied between near absence of agreement to perfect agreement within corporations. For a 
discussion on the use of the interrater agreement index, see also Bliese (2000). For a discussion of the 0.70 rule-of-thumb, see 
Harvey and Hollander (2004). 
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also performed these additional analyses with the compressed dataset. Both resource sharing 
variables were significantly related to the use of integration mechanisms. Corporate average 
resource  sharing  was  also  related  to  network-based  incentives.  The  group  mean  centered 
measure of resource sharing at the business unit level was not significant. This suggests that 
network-based incentives are more influenced by corporate average resource sharing than by 
the relative resource sharing of individual business units. The results for the analyses with the 
compressed dataset are included in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions and implications 
 
In the research on control of business units in multidivisional firms, two distinct perspectives 
can be distinguished. According to the first perspective, the choice of control mechanisms 
depends on corporate-level factors. Since these corporate-level factors are identical for all 
business units of a firm, this view implies that the corporate headquarters applies a similar 
type of control to all its business units. Therefore, control may vary across firms, but remain 
similar within firms. Proponents of the second perspective argue that the choice of control 
mechanisms depends on business unit-specific factors. The consequence of this view is that 
control of business units may be differentiated within firms. Our original suspicion was that 
both perspectives represent an oversimplification of the management of multidivisional firms 
in  practice.  Tuning  control  to  business  unit  specific  factors  might  enhance  business  unit 
performance. At the same time, corporate-level factors might influence the choice of control 
instruments, for instance because of information-processing constraints at the corporate level. 
 
The  application  of  multilevel  analysis  has  confirmed  our  suspicion.  Multilevel 
research has been adopted by researchers in a variety of disciplines, but gained popularity 
among  management  scholars  only  fairly  recently  (Hofmann,  1997).  To  the  best  of  our 
knowledge,  multilevel  analysis  has  not  been  previously  applied  to  research  on  control  in 
multidivisional firms. Given the complexity of these firms, involving many organizational 
levels, there seems to be much to gain from further development of multilevel research in this 
area. 
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In our study, multilevel analysis has generated new insights into the importance of 
corporate-level versus business unit-level factors for the choice of control mechanisms. We 
analyzed  four  common  control  mechanisms:  autonomy  (cf.  decentralization),  integration 
mechanisms, network-based incentives, and strategic control. The results showed that all four 
control mechanisms are tuned to the business unit-specific degree of resource sharing. For 
two  control  mechanisms,  integration  mechanisms  and  network-based  incentives,  we  also 
found corporate effects. The upshot is that control in multidivisional firms may be influenced 
by both corporate-level and business unit-specific factors, but that the influence depends on 
the particular control instrument. All control mechanisms seem to be tailored to business unit-
specific characteristics,  implying differentiation of control within firms, and some control 
mechanisms are also subject to corporate-level influences, implying differentiation of control 
both within and across firms. Consequently, the application of multilevel analysis suggests 
that the two traditional perspectives on the control of business units in multidivisional firms 
are complementary rather than conflicting. 
 
The present study is not without limitations. For example, the use of  product and 
country count measures of diversification and internationalization could be a shortcoming, 
because more sophisticated measures of these corporate-level factors are available in existing 
research.  For  example,  strategy  scholars  have  used  the  entropy  measure  of  product 
diversification,  which  includes  weighting  factors  on  the  basis  of  sales  rather  than  only  a 
simple  count  of  the  number  of  codes  (e.g.,  Hoskisson,  Hitt  &  Moesel,  1993).  Similar 
measures are available to better capture the degree of internationalization (e.g., Kim, 1989). 
Inclusion  of  these  more  sophisticated  measures  could  potentially  better  operationalize  the 
overall  size  and  complexity  of  firms.  Alternatively,  more  accurate  measures  of  these 
corporate-level variables could be based on the recognition that many higher-level concepts 
originate from the characteristics of lower-level entities. Hence, the insights from chapter 2 of 
this dissertation, in which we proposed a conceptualization of corporate strategic context on 
the basis of the lower-level strategic characteristics of the business units, could be of help in 
developing  more  accurate  measures  of  these  corporate-level  variables.  The  study  is  also 
limited  in  the  sample  size  we  use.  Although  no  specific  rules  exist  for  sample  size 
requirements  (Hofmann,  1997),  a  larger  number  of  business  units  per  corporation  in  our 
sample would increase the potential for multilevel analysis, including testing of cross-level 
interactions. Here, however, lies a general problem of research in this area: the absence of 
publicly available data on internal control processes in multidivisional firms (Hill, 1988b). Chapter 3 
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Despite  these  limitations,  the  study  has  provided  new  insights  into  control  in 
multidivisional firms. Advances can be made by further exploring multilevel research in this 
area. We discuss three avenues for future research. First, other explanatory variables could be 
included to capture the many potential determinants of corporate control style. At the business 
unit  level,  competitive  strategy  and  mission  have  been  found  to  be  of  relevance  (Gupta, 
1987).  At  the  corporate  level,  top  management  team  characteristics  could  be  taken  into 
account. Previous research has found that control styles are influenced by the experiences, 
backgrounds,  skills,  and  personalities  of  corporate  center  managers  (Goold  &  Campbell, 
1987;  Prahalad  &  Bettis,  1986).  The  control  styles  corporate  center  managers  prefer  can 
possibly account for some of the corporate effects of control. Second, new theories need to be 
developed  to  explain  some  of  our  findings.  For  example,  we  found  that  only  two  of  the 
examined control mechanisms are influenced by corporate factors. Apparently, corporations 
are distinguished in some dimensions of control, but not in others. It is not clear yet why this 
phenomenon occurs. Third, it is worth exploring the performance implications of establishing 
fit between control mechanisms and factors at both levels of analysis. Our findings suggest 
that firms adjust their control styles to business unit specific characteristics. This may indeed 
induce the performance of individual business units. However, the information-processing 
costs associated with tailored control may offset the benefits at the corporate level.  
 
Altogether,  this  study  shows  the  relevance  of  applying  multilevel  analysis  and 
hierarchical linear modeling techniques to research on control in diversified firms. In line with 
Hofmann's (1997, p. 741) observations, there is much to gain from further developing the 
multilevel perspective in this and related areas: ªAlthough hierarchical linear models, given 
their  infancy,  are  far  from  perfect,  they  represent  a  great  technical  leap  forward  and  can 
provide  a  mechanism  for  adequately  testing  relationships  between  variables  that  cross 
hierarchical levels. The continuing calls for the integration of macro and micro concepts into 
organizational theories, coupled with these technical advancements, should lead to a better 













In his classical study on the relationship between strategy and structure, Chandler (1962) 
found that many large firms adopted a multidivisional structure to cope with the problems of 
size and complexity after they had expanded into new product lines and regions. Today, many 
large firms still group their activities into semi-autonomous business units or divisions, which 
are responsible for the strategic and operating decisions in their respective areas. A crucial 
task for the top executives of these firms is the management of the business units through the 
adoption of the appropriate control arrangements. It should come as no surprise then that the 
nature  of  headquarters-subsidiary  relationships  has  received  much  attention  in  strategic 
management research (Gupta, 1987; Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1992; Markides & Williamson, 
1996). 
 
A factor that determines the success of headquarters-subsidiary relationships appears 
to be the degree to which corporate executives succeed in tailoring their styles of control to 
the needs of the businesses in the corporate portfolio (Chandler, 1991; Lorange, 1993). Since 
tailoring may imply a better fit between context and organization design (Galbraith, 1973), it 
could  improve  performance  for  individual  business  units,  as  well  as  the  corporation  as  a 
whole (Golden, 1992). This notion is supported by many empirical studies, all highlighting 
the importance of tailoring corporate control processes to the contexts of individual business 
units (see, e.g., Gupta, 1987; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). From these findings, the studies Chapter 4 
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have  concluded  that  differentiation  of  structures,  control  processes,  and  reward  systems 
improves firm performance. 
 
However, such a conclusion overlooks three important aspects. First, tailoring does 
not necessarily imply differentiation. If all business units of a firm are faced with a similar 
strategic context, their control needs are relatively homogeneous. Consequently, they can be 
controlled in a uniform way, which avoids the complexities of differentiated control. In other 
words,  creating  portfolios  of  businesses  that  share  a  similar  logic  enables  firms  to  tailor 
without the need to differentiate their styles of control (Collis & Montgomery, 1998; Goold & 
Campbell, 1987; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Second, if control differentiation does take place, 
it could involve problems that reduce firm performance. In particular, subsidiary managers 
may react negatively to inconsistencies and dissimilarities in the procedures used by their 
superiors (cf. Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a; Taggart, 1997). This could, for example, result in a 
breakdown  of  cooperation  among  business  units  and  a  loss  of  synergy.  Third,  the 
effectiveness  of  control  differentiation  depends  on  the  capacities  of  the  corporate  top 
management team (TMT). The average TMT is limited in the number of control styles it can 
effectively use (cf. Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). However, sufficient cognitive capacities at the 
TMT  level  might  aid  tailoring  and  thus  alleviate  some  of  the  negative  performance 
consequences of control differentiation. 
 
In sum, while previous studies have provided insights into the benefits of tailored 
control  for  individual  business  units,  they  have  not  shed  light  on  the  corporate  level 
performance implications of control differentiation. In general, the problems of differentiation 
have been largely neglected in the literature on corporate management and control processes. 
Studying them is relevant though, since the drawbacks of differentiation may compromise the 
benefits  of  tailored  control.  Therefore,  in  this  paper,  we  investigate  the  consequences  of 
control differentiation for corporate performance. We theorize that these consequences will be 
negative, due to the problems outlined above. However, given that corporate management 
teams  differ  with  respect  to  their  cognitive  and  information-processing  capacities  (cf. 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984), well-equipped and organized teams may partially offset these 
problems. Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We  begin  our  study  with  a  brief  background 
section. Subsequently, our theoretical arguments are outlined and summarized in the form of 
hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested on a sample of large Dutch corporations. A 





Tailoring and differentiation 
Among the first to highlight the importance of control differentiation were researchers who 
studied  the  portfolio  planning  practices  of  large  corporations  (e.g.,  Bettis  &  Hall,  1983; 
Haspeslagh, 1982). Portfolio planning, which became popular among firms during the 1970s 
(Goold & Luchs, 1993), emphasizes the importance of a balanced portfolio of businesses. The 
balance can be achieved by assigning different missions to the business units. For example, 
business units with a strong position in a low growth industry should harvest, in order to 
generate cash flows. The cash flows are redirected to promising business units with a build 
mission.  Business  units  with  dissimilar  missions  require  different  corporate  control 
instruments. For example, the compensation of a manager of a business unit with a build 
mission should be based on the improvement of the competitiveness of the business unit, even 
if this harms short-term profitability. In contrast, the manager of a business unit with a harvest 
mission should be rewarded for his ability to increase short-term profitability. 
 
These ideas were picked up by a number of researchers who investigated the business 
level performance implications of a fit between corporate control instruments and business 
unit  contextual  factors  such  as  mission,  strategy,  environmental  uncertainty,  and 
interdependence with other units in the corporation (Golden, 1992; Govindarajan, 1984, 1988; 
Govindarajan  &  Gupta,  1985;  Govindarajan  &  Fisher,  1990;  Gupta,  1987;  Gupta  & 
Govindarajan,  1986).  Theoretically,  these  studies  are  well  grounded  in  organization  and 
agency theory. Empirically, the results of quantitative studies support the relevance of fit. 
However,  as  we  already  argued  in  the  introduction,  conclusions  on  the  benefits  of 
differentiation  are  unwarranted,  since  the  studies  address,  and  support,  the  importance  of 
tailored control at the business unit level instead of differentiation. Some studies, based on 
qualitative rather than quantitative empirical research, addressed the issue more directly. For Chapter 4 
  66
example, Chandler (1991) found that corporate executives at Du Pont and General Electric 
realized that their planning and control systems had to vary with the characteristics of the 
different  industries  in  which  they  operated.  Others  found  that  corporate  executives  were 
limited in the number of control styles they could effectively adopt and suggested firms to 
build portfolios of businesses with similar characteristics to match the dominant control style 




In line with these latter observations, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) speak of the dominant logic 
that may hinder managers in managing a variety of businesses. Dominant logic refers to the 
dominant worldview or mindset that exists among corporate top managers, responsible for 
ªmanaging the totality of the firmº (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p. 489). In diversified firms, this 
view  of  the  world  is  reflected  in  the  way  corporate  managers  perceive  and  approach  the 
separate businesses of the firm and determines how effectively they can control, monitor, and 
coordinate the actions of business-level management (Grant, 1988; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). 
Although formal control systems, structural arrangements, coordination devices, and other 
administrative tools can handle some of the variety in the portfolio, the concept of dominant 
logic additionally implies the creation of sufficient cognitive capacity within the corporate 
management team: ª...  as well as  adopting  adequate administrative mechanisms, handling 
diversity  requires  high  cognitive  complexity  from  top  managers  in  order  to  embrace  the 
complexity of his or her environmentº (Calori, Johnson & Sarnin, 1994, p. 438). We will 
elaborate on this in the next subsection. 
 
The upper echelon perspective 
The focus on the top management team is in line with the upper echelon perspective, which 
states  that  managerial  characteristics  influence  strategies,  administrative  processes,  and, 
consequently,  firm  performance.  The  general  upper  echelon  framework,  presented  by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984), builds on the notion of bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 
1963;  March  &  Simon,  1958).  Because  managers,  like  all  human  beings,  are  boundedly 
rational,  they  use  cognitive  schemas  when  confronted  with  complex  decision-making 
situations. Cognitive schemas can take the form of pre-existing knowledge systems (Prahalad 
& Bettis, 1986) or managerial lenses (Miller, 1993) that determine managerial perceptions 
and interpretations (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). These lenses may act as filters that reflect Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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managers' knowledge, wisdom, values, beliefs, and assumptions in a certain area, and help 
managers  to  ª¼  wade  into  the  ocean  of  events  ¼º  (Daft  &  Weick,  1984,  p.  286)  that 
surrounds  them.  However,  cognitive  schemas  remain  a  simplification  of  reality 
(Noorderhaven, 1995) and may prove detrimental when applied in situations that are different 
from the ones experienced before. 
 
Limited  by  their  experiences,  individual  managers  are  usually  constrained  in  the 
amount of variety they can effectively manage (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Similarly, in groups 
of  top  managers,  the  individual  managerial  lenses  may  converge  into  a  higher  order 
perceptual and interpretative filter (cf. Daft & Weick, 1984), comparable to the dominant 
logic discussed above. This makes many top management teams limited in their ability to 
manage variety as well. Failure to develop multiple managerial lenses creates problems which 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986, p. 497) have called the ªhidden costº of diversification: ªA high 
level of performance in a diversified firm requires the ability to respond fast' to competitor 
moves, as well as respond appropriately'. One of the implications of our thesis, so far, is that 
top managers are less likely to respond appropriately' to situations where the dominant logic 
is different, as well as not respond quickly enough, as they may be unable to interpret the 
meaning of information regarding unfamiliar businesses.º  
 
Managing  variety  requires  management  teams  with  high  levels  of  sociocognitive 
complexity, which refers to the ability to develop multiple perspectives, interpretations and 
understandings  of  the  different  situations  they  are  faced  with  (cf.  Bartunek,  Gordon  & 
Weathersby, 1983; Ginsberg, 1990). Although not every management team is equipped with 
sufficient ªsociocognitive horsepowerº (Carpenter, 2002, p. 277), upper echelon researchers 
have proposed a number of team characteristics that make the difference (for overviews see, 
e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002). We return to a number of 




In line with Prahalad and Bettis (1986), we distinguish between two different levels of general 
management  in  a  diversified  firm:  the  corporate  and  the  business  level.  The  corporate 
management  team  is  responsible  for  managing,  coordinating,  evaluating,  and  rewarding 
business-level management, which is the next highest level in the hierarchy. Business-level 
management  refers  to  the  managers  (or  management  teams)  responsible  for  the  various 
business units, divisions or subsidiaries that report directly to the corporate level. Control 
differentiation refers to the degree to which the administrative processes used by corporate 
center top management teams differ across the various business units. We will argue that, on 
average, control differentiation will be negatively related to corporate performance. However, 
we also claim that the relationship will be moderated by top management team structure and 
composition.  
 
The main effect of control differentiation 
Our first hypothesis deals with the main effect of control differentiation, which we believe to 
be negative. The disadvantages of control differentiation are various. For example, the use of 
different styles may cause fragmentation (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987) and unclearness (Goold 
& Campbell, 1987) at the business unit level. Furthermore, dissimilarities in the procedures 
used across business units may cause feelings of unfairness (Taggart, 1997) and associated 
problems  such  as  distrust,  lack  of  cooperation,  low  commitment,  and  even  sabotage  by 
subsidiary managers (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998). To the extent that differentiation improves 
fit between control and subsidiary context, these disadvantages can be outweighed by the 
benefits  of  tailoring.  However,  teams  with  insufficient  sociocognitive  complexity  may 
differentiate their styles of control but fail to do so in an effective way, since the managers 
keep seeing things in terms of their functional expertise (Goold & Campbell, 1987) or the 
businesses they know best (Chandler, 1991). In other words, their lenses of experience make 
them  focus  on,  perceive,  and  interpret  information  incorrectly.  This  may  lead  to  late  or 
unproductive interference in business level affairs or controlling against the wrong targets 
(Goold  &  Luchs, 1993; Michel  & Hambrick, 1992). Unless  corporations create sufficient 
sociocognitive complexity in their top management teams, attempts to tailor control through 
differentiation are unlikely to succeed. Since the average team presumably lacks the required 
capacities to effectively adopt multiple control styles, the ªhidden costsº of diversification Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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add to the other disadvantages of control differentiation. In sum, under the assumption that the 
average team has insufficient sociocognitive complexity to manage variety, the relationship 
between control differentiation and performance will be negative: 
 




The moderating effects of TMT characteristics  
Teams differ in the cognitive skills and capacities they have and these differences can be 
attributed  to  team  structure,  composition,  and  processes.  Control  differentiation  requires 
teams with the capacity to adopt multiple mindsets at the same time so that the variety in the 
understandings  and  interpretations  is  equivalent  to  the  variety  in  the  situation  they  face 
(Bartunek et al., 1983; Ginsberg, 1990). In other words, control differentiation requires high 
levels of sociocognitive complexity. To the extent that top management team characteristics 
foster  sociocognitive  complexity,  we  expect  teams  to  be  able  to  effectively  differentiate 
control and avoid the ªhidden costsº. Hence, these teams are able to reap the benefits of 
tailoring which may offset all, or part of, the other disadvantages of differentiation. High 
sociocognitive complexity can be achieved if team members' managerial mindsets are diverse 
rather than uniform and if team processes and interaction stimulate divergence rather than 
convergence. In line with Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), we use team size, demographic 
heterogeneity,  and  the  roles  performed  by  team  members  as  moderator  variables.  These 
moderator variables meet the conditions for sociocognitive complexity, as we will discuss 
below.  
 
TMT size. The total sociocognitive complexity of a team reflects the cognitive complexities 
of each of its members (cf. Ginsberg, 1990). Likewise, the larger the team, the greater its 
sociocognitive complexity will be. This is consistent with the observation that the number of 
team members determines the resources available to a team (cf. Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992). 
Researchers have identified a number of advantages that large teams have over small ones. 
These  advantages  include  a  broader  range  of  perspectives,  greater  information-processing 
capacities,  greater  ability  to  process  large  amounts  of  diverse  information,  and  greater 
potential for dissimilarity (see, e.g., Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & D'Aveni, Chapter 4 
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1992; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Hence, team size increases the 
likelihood that diverse mindsets exist in the first place. Moreover, larger teams usually display 
more  cognitive  conflict  and  less  cohesiveness  than  smaller  teams  (Amason  &  Sapienza, 
1997),  which  stimulates  discussion  of  alternative  viewpoints  and  reduces  conformity 
pressures, premature consensus, and convergence (Priem, Harrison & Kanoff Muir, 1995). In 
sum, large teams are likely to develop sufficient sociocognitive complexity to differentiate 
their styles of control without running into the problems that cause the ªhidden costsº. Firms 
with  large  top  management  teams  may  still  have  to  face  the  other  problems  of  control 
differentiation, but the capacities of the team allow them to reap the benefits of tailoring. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Team size moderates the negative relationship between control 
differentiation and corporate performance. 
 
 
Demographic heterogeneity. Demographic heterogeneity is an important indicator of the 
cognitive  diversity  in  a  team  (see,  e.g.,  Boeker,  1997;  Finkelstein  &  Hambrick,  1996; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992)
1. Cognitive schemas are reflections of 
the backgrounds and experiences of managers. To the extent that managers differ in terms of 
their functional, firm and industry background, the perceptual and interpretative filters are 
likely  to  differ  as  well  (cf.  Sutcliffe,  1994;  Sutcliffe  &  Huber,  1998).  Heterogeneity  also 
influences the interaction among team members. The presence of multiple knowledge and 
belief systems implies less cohesiveness, more information sources, views, and perspectives 
and more discussion of alternatives (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Miller, Burke & Glick, 1998; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Also, group members tend to disagree more often and are more 
eager to challenge the ideas put forth by others (Miller et al., 1998). The debate with others 
confronts managers with new views and perspectives and stimulates them to draw on their 
own knowledge base and rethink their own points of view (Simons, Hope Pelled & Smith, 
1999).  All  in  all,  heterogeneity  meets  the  conditions  for  high  sociocognitive  complexity. 
Moreover, heterogeneity may also reduce part of the other problems associated with control 
differentiation.  More  specifically,  heterogeneity  may  foster  perceptions  of  fairness  by 
                                                 
1 For alternative viewpoints from authors who question the use of observable demographic proxies for managerial 
cognition see, e.g., Markóczy (1997) and Miller et al. (1998). Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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communicating that competing interests are taken into account by the corporate management 
team (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001). Altogether, this leads to hypothesis 3.  
 
Hypothesis  3:  TMT  demographic  heterogeneity  moderates  the  negative 
relationship between control differentiation and corporate performance. 
 
 
Role differentiation. Our final hypothesis deals with role differentiation in the team. In most 
teams,  some  form  of  division  of  labor  or  role  differentiation  takes  place.  In  fact,  the 
distinction of different roles can be an important determinant of the effectiveness of teams 
(Belbin, 1981). In its most basic form, role differentiation can involve the distinction between 
a CEO and the rest of the corporate management team. However, in many teams, each single 
member  is  assigned  a  formal  role  or  responsibility.  We  argue  here  that  assigning 
responsibilities  over  (groups  of)  business  units  to  specific  members  of  the  corporate  top 
management  team  can  increase  the  ability  to  adopt  control  differentiation.  We  have  four 
reasons for this. First, division of labor encourages specialization (Mintzberg, 1983). Giving 
managers the responsibility over a particular group of business units allows them to become 
familiar with the specific circumstances of those business units and the styles of control that 
are appropriate for those business units. Second, role differentiation allows selection of the 
manager that fits the control style of certain business units best. In this way, managers can be 
selected on the basis of their backgrounds and experiences, and, consequently, on the basis of 
their mindsets and belief systems. Third, role differentiation allows individual managers to 
focus on their own divisions, regions or business units in particular. This requires less mutual 
adjustment and lateral communication than would be the case in functionally differentiated 
teams (cf. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) or in teams that have no clear role differentiation. 
Likewise,  the  influences  managers  exert  on  each  other's  viewpoints  will  be  less  as  well. 
Finally, role differentiation induces the creation of different subgoals and frames of reference 
(cf. Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), which reduces the likelihood of excessive cohesion and the 
associated  risk  of  a  too  narrow  view  of  the  world.  In  sum,  assigning  team  members 
responsibility over separate (groups of) business units, divisions, or regions stimulates the 
creation  of  different  mindsets  and  reduces  the  likelihood  that  interaction  among  team 
members leads to premature consensus. This may reduce the potential negative effects of 
control differentiation. This leads to the final hypothesis: 
 Chapter 4 
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Hypothesis 4: Role differentiation moderates the negative relationship between 





Sample and data collection 
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of Dutch corporations listed on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange. We selected corporations with more than 500 employees to rule out the chance that 
functionally organized or single business unit corporations would be targeted (cf. Mintzberg, 
1983).  The  initial  sampling  procedure  yielded  a  list  of  96  usable  corporations  for  which 
measures of performance, our dependent variable, were widely available. Since many of the 
required  data  to  measure  our  independent  variables  were  not  available  from  secondary 
sources,  we  also  conducted  a  mail  survey.  Questionnaires  were  sent  to  a  key  informant 
(mostly the CEO) in all 96 corporations. We chose corporate-level informants since they are 
usually best informed about corporate-wide management issues.  In most corporations, we 
were also able to identify a second or third informant, mostly people holding other important 
corporate-level  positions  such  as  CFO  or  Director  of  Corporate  Strategy.  A  total  of  209 
questionnaires  were  sent,  of  which  79  were  returned  (a  response  rate  of  37.8%).  The  79 
respondents provide data of 55 corporations (57.3% of our initial sample of 96 corporations), 
of which 54 were usable. Tests for non-response bias revealed that the corporations in our 
sample did not differ significantly from the non-respondents in terms of Return on Assets and 
total number of employees. Marginal differences exist in total assets. Corporations in our 
sample are larger in terms of total assets than the non-respondents (p < .10). Corporations in 
our sample represent the following industries: construction (7.3%), services (30.9%), trade 
(18.2%), manufacturing (38.2%), and printing & publishing (5.5%).  
 
Unit of analysis 
In line with Prahalad and Bettis (1986), we focus on the corporate management team and its 
relationship with the next highest level of line management in the corporation, being either 
business-,  group-,  or  divisional-level  management.  In  Dutch  corporations,  the  corporate 
management  team,  or  Board  of  Executives,  is  usually  fairly  easy  to  observe  from  public 
sources such as annual  reports or company  websites.  It usually consists of a CEO  and a Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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number  of  other  executives
2  responsible  for  managing  the  corporation  as  a  whole. 
Differentiation  of  control  was  assessed  for  the  hierarchical  level  in  the  line  organization 
directly below the corporate management team. As such, we observe the degree to which 
different approaches are used by the corporate management team to control or manage the 
different business units at the hierarchical level directly below them
3. 
 
Operationalization of main variables 
Performance. We used Return on Assets (ROA) as indicator of corporate performance. We 
used the average ROA over 2001 and 2002 in the analysis. Other performance measures were 
used to check robustness of the models (see Additional analyses). 
 
Control differentiation. Although  research has  generated several high  quality measures of 
internal structure and control arrangements in diversified and multinational corporations (see, 
e.g., Hill et al., 1992; O'Donnell, 2000), measures of the degree of differentiation of these 
arrangements were not available. From the many possible dimensions of structure and control 
we  identified  four,  which  we  considered  key  in  identifying  the  relationship  between 
headquarters  and  the  separate  divisions  or  business  units  in  a  corporation:  centralization, 
evaluation, compensation, and formalization. Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-
point scale to what extent differences between business units exist in terms of: (a) the degree 
of autonomy business units have to take important decisions (e.g., with respect to strategy, 
investments, etc.); (b) the nature of the criteria that are used for  evaluating business unit 
performance; (c) the nature of the criteria that are used to determine compensation of business 
unit  managing  directors;  (d)  the  degree  to  which  procedures  and  directives  have  to  be 
followed by the business units (e.g., with respect to the budgeting process). Factor analysis 
showed that all four items loaded highly on one factor. The answers to the four questions 
were averaged to create a composite measure of differentiation. Cronbach alpha for this scale 
is  0.61,  which  is  low  and  acceptable  for  early  stages  of  research  only  (Nunnally,  1967). 
Considering the ªnewnessº of the control differentiation scale, we decided to accept the scale. 
However, we also ran tests with surrogate variables (see Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 
1998) to check the robustness of our models (see Additional analyses). Since we had multiple 
                                                 
2 Outside directors form a separate controlling body: the Supervisory Board.  
3 In most large corporations, multiple levels of management exist, as subsidiaries or operating companies often 
operate under divisional management and do not report to company headquarters directly. We did not assess differentiation 
between units at these lower levels of management. Chapter 4 
  74
respondents in 20 corporations, we defined interrater agreement indices (rwg) (see, e.g., James, 
Demaree  &  Wolf,  1984,  1993)  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  respondents  in  the  same 
corporation agreed on the degree of control differentiation. For each corporation with multiple 
respondents, we computed the agreement index. Overall the index was very high and well 
above generally accepted levels (median rwg = 0.93). Therefore, we averaged the scores of 
multiple respondents to arrive at a control differentiation score for the corporation as a whole. 
 
TMT size. We assessed TMT size as the total number of executive members of the corporate 
management team and averaged the number of team members reported in the annual reports 
of 2001 and 2002. 
 
TMT heterogeneity. Many demographic proxies for TMT heterogeneity are available from 
existing research (see, e.g., Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter, 2002; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). We used the following three indicators: (a) firm tenure heterogeneity; (b) 
functional background heterogeneity;  (c) industry  background heterogeneity. We expected 
these three to accurately reflect the diversity of experiences required to view and manage 
different types of businesses and different styles of control. Since the required TMT data were 
not available for all corporations, we had to rely on a subjective assessment of heterogeneity 
by the key informants
4. We asked them to assess the three dimensions of heterogeneity on a 
five-point scale. The three indicators loaded highly on one factor and were averaged to arrive 
at  a  composite  scale  for  TMT  heterogeneity  (Cronbach  alpha  =  0.60;  median  interrater 
agreement  =  0.97).  Surrogate  variables  were  used  to  check  robustness  (see  Additional 
analyses). 
 
TMT role differentiation. Respondents were asked to indicate what the areas were to which 
responsibilities in the team were assigned. Based on the answers, we developed a dummy 
variable.  This  dummy  variable  has  a  value  of  1  if  the  team  has  assigned  members 
responsibility over (groups of) divisions, business units or regions. The variable is valued 0 
                                                 
4 A complete directory of executive biographies does not exist in The Netherlands. Instead we had to rely on annual 
reports and company websites. In many cases, the required data were not available and could not be retrieved in other ways. 
Our  measure  of  heterogeneity  therefore  deviates  from  the  more  common  ways  to  measure  TMT  heterogeneity  through 
objective proxies. However, the use of objective, demographic proxies is not without criticism. It has been argued that 
demographic diversity does not necessarily reflect cognitive diversity (see, e.g., Miller et al., 1998). Under the assumption 
that our perceptual measure not only reflects actual objective heterogeneity, but is also determined strongly by the key 
informant's own perception and experiences in group discussion and interaction, our subjective measure might actually, to 
some extent, counter these points of criticism.  Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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for corporations that lack a clear role differentiation or that are differentiated to functional 
areas only.  
 
Operationalization of control variables 
We controlled for corporate size because this has been argued to affect the performance of 
firms as well as the relationship between top team composition and organizational outcomes 
(see, e.g., Carpenter, 2002). The variable was measured as the total assets of the corporation. 






Descriptives and correlation coefficients are shown in table 1. From table 1 it becomes clear 
that control differentiation correlates negatively with firm performance, which suggests some 
first evidence in support of hypothesis 1. Results also show a significant negative relationship 
between performance and top management team heterogeneity. No significant relations exist 
between  control  differentiation  and  two  of  the  moderator  variables:  TMT  size  and 
heterogeneity.  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  control  differentiation  and  role 
differentiation, however. Total assets is positively related to team size, which is in line with 
what one might expect, but negatively to team heterogeneity. Descriptive statistics also reveal 
that control differentiation is low on average in the corporations we studied. Chapter 4 
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Table 1: Descriptives and correlation matrix 
 
 
Mean  S.D.  1  2  3  4  5 
               
1.Performance  3.26  9.24           
2.Total assets (mln. Euro)
a  33,414  126,057  -0.174         
3.Control differentiation  1.86  0.51  -0.391 **  0.049       
4.TMT size  3.46  1.29  -0.002  0.705 ***  -0.052     
5.TMT heterogeneity  3.53  0.75  -0.345 *  -0.278 *  0.070  -0.162   
6.TMT role differentiation  0.78  0.42  -0.050  0.262   0.267 *  0.260   -0.250  
                
n=54 
: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001  
a : This variable has been transformed (log) to achieve a more normal distribution. Descriptive 
statistics are reported for the original variable. 
 
 
We used regression analysis to test our hypotheses. Table 2 shows the results of the 
different regressions models. Model 1 reports the main effects only. The results show that 
control differentiation is significantly negatively related to Return on Assets, which supports 
hypothesis 1. Results from model 1 also indicate a significant negative relationship between 
Return on Assets and TMT heterogeneity. The results also indicate a negative relationship 
between total assets and performance for the firms in our sample. Models 2, 3 and 4 extend 
model 1 with a single interaction term each. The three interaction terms were computed by 
taking  the  product  of  control  differentiation  and  each  of  the  three  moderator  variables. 
Following recommendations of Aiken and West (1991), we centered each variable, except for 
the  dummy  variable  for  role  differentiation,  before  composing  the  interaction  terms.  The 
results show that the inclusion of interaction terms improves the overall model fit of all three 
models. Inspection of the signs and significance levels of the regression coefficients of the 
interaction terms in models 2 and 4 shows support for hypotheses 2 and 4. Both team size and 
role  differentiation  moderate  the  negative  relationship  between  control  differentiation  and 
performance. Contrary to expectations, we did not find similar results for TMT heterogeneity. 
Rather, results from model 3 show that team heterogeneity amplifies rather than moderates 
the relationship between control differentiation and performance. Model 5 includes all main 
effects  and  interaction  terms.  Overall  model  fit  improves  significantly  upon  including  all Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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interaction  terms.  Inspection  of  the  individual  interactions  now  only  shows  significant 
interaction effects for TMT heterogeneity and role differentiation, which might be attributed 
to  the  small  sample  in  relation  to  the  number  of  variables  in  this  extended  model.  The 
inclusion of interaction terms and the correlation we found between some of the independent 
variables could indicate the presence of multicollinearity in the regression models. However, 
inspection of VIF scores showed us that none of these scores exceeded the generally accepted 




Table 2: Results of regression analyses 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
(Constant)  (¼.) *  (¼.) *  (¼.) *  (¼.) *  (¼.) * 
Total assets  -0.402 *  -0.360 *  -0.414 *  -0.359 *  -0.360 * 
Control differentiation  -0.332 **  -0.411 **  -0.395 **  -0.932 ***  -0.867 ** 
TMT size  0.192  0.167  0.162  0.171  0.146 
TMT heterogeneity  -0.397 **  -0.360 **  -0.411 **  -0.438 **  -0.423 ** 
TMT role differentiation  -0.005  0.058  0.089  0.093  0.160 
Control differentiation X TMT 
size 
  0.276 *      0.106 
Control differentiation X TMT 
heterogeneity 
    -0.308 **    -0.210  
Control differentiation X TMT 
role differentiation 
      0.651 **  0.501 * 
           
R
2  0.337  0.405  0.422  0.417  0.483 
F-ratio  4.877 **  5.341 ***  5.713 ***  5.594 ***  5.245 *** 
Change in R
2    0.069  0.085  0.080  0.146 
F-ratio change in R
2    5.415 *  6.895 *  6.424 *   4.221 * 
n=54 
Dependent variable is Return on Assets (mean ROA 2001 and ROA 2002). 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 (one-tailed if hypothesized; two-tailed otherwise). 
 
 Chapter 4 
  78
Figures 1, 2 and 3 are graphical illustrations of the interaction effects (see, e.g. Aiken 
& West, 1991) based on the results of models 2, 3, and 4. We plotted the relationship between 
control differentiation and Return on Assets for high (one standard deviation above mean) and 
low (one standard deviation below mean) levels of TMT size and heterogeneity and for firms 
with (dummy variable equals 1) or without (dummy variable equals 0) the proposed type of 
role differentiation. The relationships are all negative, but the steepness of the lines differs 
across  different  values  of  the  moderator  variables.  In  line  with  our  expectations,  the 
relationship  becomes  flatter  for  high  levels  of  team  size  and  for  teams  with  role 
differentiation. Contrary to expectations, the relationship between control differentiation and 






































Figure 2: Moderator effect of TMT heterogeneity 
 
 























To test the robustness of the models and the results we found, we performed a number of 
additional analyses. The analyses center around three characteristics of our methods that could 
be potential weaknesses: the use of a single criterion for performance; the use of a limited 
number  of  control  variables;  the  low  inter-item  reliability  coefficients  for  control 
differentiation and TMT heterogeneity. 
 
Performance. We addressed this issue by running the same regression models with a number 
of other dimensions of performance. The use of Return on Equity yielded fairly similar results 
as the ones presented earlier, both for the main effects of control differentiation and TMT 
heterogeneity  as  well  as  the  three  interactions.  Except  for  the  main  effect  of  control 
differentiation (which became not significant) and the moderator effect of role differentiation 
(which became marginally significant), results were also fairly stable when we used Earnings 
per Share as dependent variable. The use of Market to Book value shows a different picture, 
as we did not find any support for the hypothesized relationships when using this variable as 
dependent variable. The results of these analyses are included in the appendix to chapter 4. 
 
Control variables. The limited sample size precludes the inclusion of many control variables. 
Therefore, we ran separate tests with different control variables. In the original models we 
used total assets, but we also ran models with number of employees, number of business 
units,  simple  count  measures  of  product  and  geographic  diversification,  and  with  a  self-
reported  measure  of  strategic  variety  as  control  variables.  The  latter  was  based  on  four Chapter 4 
  80
questionnaire  items  (alpha  =  0.69;  median  interrater  agreement  =  0.86)  that  measured 
differences  between  business  units  in  terms  of:  (a)  the  strategies  pursued;  (b)  the  growth 
objectives  (e.g.,  expansion  or  consolidation);  (c)  the  capital  intensity  of  the  industries  in 
which they operate; (d) the turbulence of the markets they serve. The main effects of these 
control variables were not significant. More importantly, inclusion of these variables did not 
change the  results we found earlier. Similar results were also found when we introduced 
industry dummies to control for industry effects on performance.   
 
Surrogate variables. As we indicated in the operationalization section, inter-item reliability 
coefficients are low for control differentiation and TMT heterogeneity. Hence, we decided to 
run additional regression models with surrogate variables instead of these scales. Surrogate 
variables can be chosen from the items that make up the scale. In general, the item with the 
highest factor loading in a factor analysis is an adequate candidate to function as a surrogate 
variable  (Hair  et  al.,  1998).  However,  since  the  factor  loadings  did  not  differ  much,  we 
decided to use an alternative criterion: the extent to which we could cross-check the item with 
other variables
5. This resulted in the use of autonomy differentiation (item a) as surrogate 
variable for the control differentiation scale and the use of tenure heterogeneity (item a) as 
surrogate  for  TMT  heterogeneity.  The  main  effects  remained  unchanged.  Autonomy 
differentiation was significantly negatively related to performance. Thus, hypothesis 1 was 
supported.  Support  was  also  found  for  hypothesis  4,  but  hypotheses  2  and  3  were  not 
supported.  The  results  of  these  additional  analyses  can  be  found  in  the  appendix  to  this 
chapter. 
                                                 
5  Autonomy  differentiation  was  cross-checked  with  a  measure  obtained  from  subsidiary-level  data.  For  17 
corporations in our sample we have data of at least three business units (a total of 75 business units). The managing directors 
of these business units were asked to rate their degree of autonomy based on eight items (alpha is 0.87). Subsequently, 
coefficients  of  variation  were  computed  for  every  corporation.  Correlation  between  the  corporate-  and  business-level 
measures was significant (0.509; p < 0.05). Firm tenure heterogeneity was cross-checked with a measure (coefficient of 
variation) based on objective data that we had for 36 corporations in our sample. Correlation between the two measures was 
significant (0.568; p < 0.001).  Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper provides new insights into the control processes used by corporate headquarters in 
diversified  firms.  Despite  the  great  amount  of  research  in  this  area,  the  performance 
implications of control differentiation remain largely unknown. This paper aims at filling that 
gap.  An important finding is that control differentiation is negatively related to corporate 
performance. Although previous studies emphasized the importance of control differentiation, 
here we claim that these studies supported the importance of tailored control for individual 
business  units  rather  than  control  differentiation  across  business  units.  Based  on  these 
previous studies and the findings from this study, corporations are advised to create portfolios 
of business units with similar strategic, environmental, and industry characteristics to be able 
to reap the benefits of tailoring, while avoiding the costs of differentiation. This conclusion is 
in line with the qualitative, practitioner oriented studies of Collis and Montgomery (1998) and 
Goold and Campbell (1987). 
 
To  the  extent  that  firms  do  face  high  levels  of  variety  in  their  portfolio,  they  are 
advised to take into account the potential problems of control differentiation. Variety in the 
portfolio may be partially beyond control, for example due to changes in the environment. 
Furthermore, variety may be beneficial and a deliberate choice of firms, since it allows risk-
spreading and the creation of balanced portfolios. To establish fit between control style and 
each of the business unit contexts, some degree of control differentiation is then required. 
Likewise, control differentiation can be found in ªambidextrous organizationsº, a term used to 
denote organizations where entrepreneurial, innovative business units are kept culturally and 
structurally separated from the traditional, core business units in the organization (Tushman & 
O'Reilly, 1997). Our findings suggest that these firms should structure their top management 
teams to allow sufficient sociocognitive complexity. However, the findings suggest that this 
may moderate the negative effects, but not outweigh them. Therefore, more attention should 
be  paid  to  the  mitigation  of  problems  of  control  differentiation,  such  as  perceptions  of 
unfairness, unclearness, and fragmentation. 
 
Increasing the heterogeneity among team members by including members with diverse 
backgrounds and experiences does not appear to increase the ability of a team to adopt a 
differentiated control style. Moreover, we found a negative main effect of TMT heterogeneity Chapter 4 
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on firm performance. This suggests that the negative side-effects of heterogeneity outweigh 
the potential benefits. These side-effects may result from communication problems due to the 
use of different ªlanguagesº of members with different cognitive mindsets, introducing the 
risk of conflict and political ªhead-buttingº (Amason, 1996; Miller et al., 1998; Schwenk, 
1998; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). From our study, it can be concluded that diversified firms 
benefit  more  from  homogeneity  than  from  heterogeneity  among  their  TMT  members. 
Homogeneity  enhances  group  cohesion  and  consensus,  facilitating  intra-group 
communication,  mutual  understanding  and  commitment  to  decision  outcomes  (Amason, 
1996; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Such a homogeneous, cohesive 
team  might  be  necessary  to  serve  the  purpose  of  stimulating  and  coordinating  sharing  of 
knowledge and resources between interdependent business units (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). 
In  fact,  homogeneous  teams  might  actually  be  required  to  prevent  fragmentation  in  the 
corporation  and  sustain  integration  between  differentiated  business  units.  It  has  been 
suggested before that  control differentiation  yields the best results if  accompanied by the 
existence  of  shared  values  across  the  different  business  units  (Nohria  &  Ghoshal,  1994). 
Homogeneity in the team might be a first step in communicating these shared values, which 
may also reduce feelings of inequality at the business level. 
 
The present study is not without limitations. We limit our discussion to shortcomings 
in the conceptualization and measurement of control differentiation. Despite the existence of 
many  empirical  studies  in  the  field  of  corporate  control  mechanisms  and  headquarters-
subsidiary relationships, existing instruments are biased towards measuring the content of 
control. More specifically, most studies have focused on what type of  control style (e.g., 
strategic versus financial control) is used by corporations, rather than the degree to which this 
control  style  is  differentiated.  Our  instrument  explicitly  measures  the  degree  of 
differentiation,  but  advances  can  be  made  in  developing  more  sophisticated  measures  of 
control  differentiation.  These  measures  should  also  allow  distinction  of  the  different 
dimensions  of  structure  and  control,  such  as  centralization,  formalization,  control  and 
incentive systems, integration mechanisms, and socialization mechanisms. After all, it is not 
unlikely  that  only  some  dimensions  of  control  are  differentiated,  whereas  others  are 
standardized across business units. Also, more informal means of control and coordination 
need to be incorporated. The suggestion has been made that formal planning systems are 
unlikely to differ across business units in the same firm (Gupta, 1987) but that, at the same Control differentiation, performance and the corporate TMT 
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time, informal attempts to differentiate control systems to fit individual subsidiary contexts 
are likely to be made in many firms (Gupta, 1987; Haspeslagh, 1982).  
 
We believe this study contributes to existing research in two ways. First, it is one of 
the few studies that focus on the potential complexities of control differentiation. We claim 
that existing research concentrated on the benefits of tailored control at the business level, 
while neglecting the negative consequences of differentiation for the corporation as a whole. 
Second,  our  study  also  contributes  to  upper-echelon  research.  Existing  research  on  TMT 
composition has concentrated mainly on the relationship with strategy formulation and the 
strategic direction of firms (see, e.g., Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Hambrick, Cho & Chen, 
1996;  Wiersema  &  Bantel,  1992),  rather  than  strategy  implementation  (for  similar 
observations,  see,  e.g.,  Michel  &  Hambrick,  1992;  Smith  &  Kofron,  1996).  This  is 
unfortunate, since research in the strategy field has emphasized the importance of the correct 
implementation  of  the  chosen  strategies  to  enhance  firm  performance  (Hill  et  al.,  1992; 
Markides & Williamson, 1996; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). This study is one of the few to 
relate  TMT  composition  to  strategy  implementation  issues  in  general  and  control  in 




Control differentiation and business unit performance: 









Most of today's large corporations operate in multiple businesses (i.e., they are diversified). 
Hence, decisions on the composition of corporate portfolios are considered of great practical 
and  theoretical  importance  (Michel  &  Hambrick,  1992).  Practice  witnessed  a  number  of 
trends  over  the  last  decades,  including  trends  of  conglomeration  and  trends  of  focus  in 
corporate  portfolios  (Goold  &  Luchs,  1993).  Today,  still,  diversification  strategy  is 
considered one of the most important topics in strategic management research (Bergh, 2001). 
Although researchers are still undecided over the merits of diversification (Palich, Cardinal & 
Miller, 2000; Van Oijen & Douma, 2000) there seems to be consistency over the fact that 
benefits can only be gained from diversification if the corporate center succeeds in controlling 
its business units in the right way (e.g., Collis & Montgomery, 1998; Golden, 1992; Goold & 
Campbell, 1987; Govindarajan, 1988; Gupta, 1987; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hill, Hitt & 
Hoskisson, 1992; Markides & Williamson, 1996; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). Against this 
background we focus on one aspect of the management of diversified corporations: the use of 
different styles of control for different business units within one and the same corporation. 
 
In many diversified corporations considerable strategic variety among the business 
units exists (Calori, Johnson & Sarnin, 1994). As evidenced by Chandler (1991, p. 48) this 
required companies such as Du Pont and GE, to tailor their corporate planning and control 
processes to the needs of individual businesses or divisions: ªMost significant of all, they Chapter 5 
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learned that the HQ functions varied with the characteristics of the industries in which they 
operated. Therefore, the production and distribution of different types of products or services 
required different types of planning and control systems.º These observations are shared by a 
great  many  researchers,  all  highlighting  the  importance  of  differentiating  the  corporate 
planning and control processes to accommodate for differences in business unit, industry, or 
country characteristics (see, e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Bettis & Hall, 1983; Chandler, 
1991; Gupta, 1987; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Haspeslagh, 1982; Lorange, 1993; Nohria 
& Ghoshal, 1994; O'Donnell, 2000). 
 
To the extent that differentiation induces better fit between context and organization 
design (Galbraith, 1973), it may improve performance for individual business units as well as 
corporations  as  a  whole.  However,  differentiation  of  planning  and  control  processes  may 
bring about a number of complexities. Some of these problems are rooted in the inability of 
corporate center executives to effectively adapt their management styles to a wide variety of 
settings  (Collis  &  Montgomery,  1998;  Goold  &  Campbell,  1987;  Goold  &  Luchs,  1993; 
Lorange, 1993; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Other problems are rooted in subsidiary managers' 
reactions to inconsistencies and dissimilarities in the procedures used by their superiors: ªThe 
danger is that there will be jealousies, suspicions and less than 100 per cent commitment, 
rather than a tolerance for diversity.º (Goold & Campbell, 1987, p. 257). These reactions of 
subsidiary managers have our specific interest in this study. We argue that the problems of 
control differentiation have been largely neglected in the literature on corporate planning and 
control processes. Studying them is relevant though, since the benefits of fit may be (partially) 
offset by the drawbacks of differentiation. In other words, corporate managers may succeed in 
tailoring their styles of control to specific subsidiary contexts but the resulting differences in 
treatment may very well evoke negative reactions from subsidiary managers. 
 
Researchers have used various theoretical perspectives to study control practices in 
multidivisional  corporations.  For  example,  contingency  and  agency  theory  are  helpful  in 
determining the appropriate control style in particular contexts. However, in order to explain 
the  reactions  of  subsidiary  managers  to  differences  in  control  styles  across  subsidiaries  a 
different  theoretical  perspective  is  required.  This  study  applies  insights  from  procedural 
justice theory (see, e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988) to shed new light on the consequences of control 
differentiation.  Procedural  justice  theory  holds  that  fair  decision-making  procedures  are 
important to people because they signal respect and the belief that their interests will be met Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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(Lind  &  Tyler,  1988).  Likewise,  when  procedures  are  perceived  unfair  they  will  trigger 
negative reactions from those affected by the outcomes of these procedures. In organizational 
settings these reactions include a lack of cooperation by those involved in, and affected by the 
decision-making procedures. Similarly, the quality of decisions and their implementation is at 
stake when people involved believe the procedures to be unfair (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998). 
 
Although procedural justice concepts have not been linked yet to the issue of control 
differentiation, it has been claimed that inconsistent procedures in general (Leventhal, 1980) 
and across business units in particular (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991, Taggart, 1997) increase the 
likelihood  of  unfairness  perceptions
1.  Hence,  corporate  control  differentiation  triggers 
negative reactions of subsidiary managers through its effects on fairness perceptions. We will 
argue  that  these  negative  reactions  will,  under  some  conditions,  affect  subsidiary 
performance.  Notably,  we  claim  that  degree  of  inter-unit  resource  sharing  and  ability  to 
express  voice  play  an  important  moderating  role  in  the  relationship  between  control 
differentiation and subsidiary performance. More specifically, we hypothesize that inter-unit 
resource  sharing  accentuates  the  negative  effects  on  subsidiary  performance  whereas  the 
ability to express voice mitigates these negative effects.  
 
In the background section of this paper we discuss insights from procedural justice 
theory and translate the more general insights to the specific context of our study. Hypotheses 
are  developed  and  tested  on  a  sample  of  136  business  units  of  Dutch  corporations.  A 
discussion section concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper we will use fairness and perceived fairness interchangeably. We will also use the terms 
fairness  and  justice  interchangeably.  Although  differences  exist,  the  interchangeable  use  of  these  terms  is  common  in 
procedural justice literature. For a discussion on the difference between objective and subjective procedural justice as well as 




Procedural justice theory holds that people are sensitive to the fairness of decision-making 
processes  rather  than  merely  to  the  outcome  of  the  processes  that  affect  them  (see,  e.g., 
Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988)
2. Likewise, unfavorable outcomes of decisions may be 
more easily accepted by individuals if the procedures used to arrive at those decisions are 
perceived  to  be  just  (Kim  &  Mauborgne,  1998).  Originally  studied  in  legal  and  judicial 
settings (see, e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975) the concept of procedural justice has now found 
its way in a variety of  disciplines and has been applied to a variety of decision settings, 
including organizational ones such as budget allocation (Libby, 1999) and pay raise decisions 
(Folger & Konovsky, 1989). Attempts have been made to develop theoretical insights that can 
be generalized across different settings. Well known is the study of Lind and Tyler (1988) 
who, based on a thorough review of the literature, described two theoretical perspectives that 
explain  the  effects  of  procedural  fairness  perceptions.  According  to  the  first  perspective, 
concerns over fair procedures are mainly based on self-interest of egoistic human beings. 
Procedures are considered fair to the extent that the outcomes of these procedures promise to 
meet the short- or long-term interests of persons. The second perspective emphasizes group 
values  and  group  identification.  According  to  this  perspective,  group  or  organizational 
membership is important to fulfill peoples' needs of self-identity, self-worth, acceptance, and 
respect (Konovsky & Brockner, 1993). Fair procedures strengthen these needs and increase 
people's loyalty and commitment to the group or organization to which they belong (Lind & 
Tyler,  1988).  Together,  these  perspectives  explain  much  of  how  people  react  to  unfair 
procedures.  In  organizational  settings,  unfairness  perceptions  may  lead  to  frustration, 
noncompliance  with  rules  and  procedures,  negative  evaluations  of  superiors,  distrust,  low 
quality of work life, sabotage, low commitment to the organization, and poor performance 
(see, e.g., Cropanzano & Randall, 1993; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; 
Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
                                                 
2  This  distinguishes  procedural  justice  from  distributive  justice,  which  is  concerned  with  the  fairness  of  the 
outcomes of decisions. Researchers have also distinguished interactional justice. Whereas procedural justice refers to the 
structural and formal aspects of processes, interactional justice refers to interpersonal treatment and social aspects of fairness. 
The difference between the fairness classes is not always clear, though, and interactional justice has often been considered an 
aspect of procedural justice rather than a separate form (for overviews see, e.g., Bies, 2001; Greenberg, 1993).  Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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Procedural fairness in headquarters-subsidiary relationships 
Although the  application of procedural justice  literature to  gain insights in the control of 
business units is relatively new, studies in related areas set the stage. Particularly relevant in 
the  context  of  our  study  is  Kim  and  Mauborgne's  theoretical  and  empirical  work  on 
procedural  fairness  perceptions  in  headquarters-subsidiary  strategic  decision-making 
processes (1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1996). Using a total sample of 221 managers
3 of 19 
multinational  corporations,  they  investigated  the  behavioral  and  attitudinal  effects  of 
unfairness perceptions during and after annual strategic planning processes. Their findings 
suggest  that  procedural  fairness  enhances  the  quality  of  strategy  implementation  at  the 
subsidiary  level.  For  example,  they  found  that  procedural  fairness  was  associated  with 
subsidiary  managers'  compliance  with  corporate  strategic  decisions,  both  directly  and 
indirectly through mediating factors such as organizational commitment, trust in corporate 
management, and satisfaction with the outcomes of decisions (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a). 
Their  findings  also  suggest  a  relationship  between  procedural  fairness  and  the  quality  of 
strategy formulation. For example, they found that perceived fairness was associated with 
strategic  decision-making  processes  that  foster  learning,  strategic  renewal,  and  a  balance 
between  corporate  and  subsidiary  level  interests  (Kim  &  Mauborgne,  1993b).  In  the 
remainder of this section we draw upon these insights to explain the link between procedural 
justice perceptions and performance. 
 
Kim  and  Mauborgne's  treatment  of  strategy  implementation  and  formulation  is 
relevant in the  context of large multinational or diversified corporations.  In contrast with 
traditional  views,  strategy  formulation  and  implementation  cannot  be  strictly  separated  in 
most  of  today's  organizations  (Mintzberg,  1990).  Rather,  in  most  large  and  complex 
organizations  strategic  decision  making  is  a  multilayered  process  (Burgelman,  1983)  that 
involves  different  hierarchical  levels  and  a  strategy  process  in  which  formulation  and 
implementation,  and  planning  and  control  go  hand-in-hand  in  an  iterative  rather  than 
sequential manner (Quinn, 1980). Grant (2003) illustrates this process in a study of large oil 
corporations. The general planning cycle in these corporations includes the setting of planning 
                                                 
3 The total sample consists of usable responses from 221 managers (142 at the subsidiary level; 79 at the corporate 
level). After a second round of data collection the sample includes usable data obtained from 119 managers at the subsidiary 
level and 61 at the corporate level. The studies differ in the samples used, depending on whether data from the first or second 
round are used, and whether the unit of analysis is the subsidiary manager or a decision-making unit. Such a decision-making 
unit  is  a  group  of  headquarters  and  subsidiary  managers  who  work  together  to  formulate  the  strategy  of  a  particular 
subsidiary. Chapter 5 
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guidelines  by  corporate  headquarters.  Within  these  guidelines  business-level  executives 
formulate  their  strategic  business  plans,  which  are  subsequently  discussed  with  corporate 
management and ultimately serve as input for annual budgeting and performance appraisal 
processes. In sum, strategic decision making is a combined top-down/bottom-up process that 
requires cooperation and interaction between  corporate- and business-level executives (cf. 
Lorange, 1993). 
 
Fair procedures induce such cooperation through the effects on trust and commitment 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Korsgaard, Schweiger & Sapienza, 1995). Identification with the 
organization  and  trust  in  the  intentions  of  corporate-level  management  enhance  the 
willingness of subsidiary managers to comply with organizational rules and decisions, but 
also to invest time and energy beyond that what is expected of them. This extra-role behavior 
or  voluntary  cooperation
4  is  important,  both  for  strategy  formulation  and  implementation. 
Strategy formulation requires sharing and synthesizing knowledge, wisdom, and insights from 
different parties at different hierarchical levels, and this cannot be achieved without voluntary 
cooperation of those involved. As Kim and Mauborgne (1998, p. 323) point out: ªCreating 
and sharing knowledge are intangible activities that can neither be supervised nor forced out 
of people.º Similarly, implementation of decisions requires more than just complying with 
formal role requirements (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998, p. 324): ªWithout the creative initiatives 
and  spontaneous  actions  of  people    characteristics  of  voluntary  cooperation    needed 
improvisation in implementing strategic decisions is not likely to happen ¼º. In sum, fair 
procedures induce in-role (compliance with formal role requirements and decisions) as well as 
extra-role  behavior.  Unfair  procedures  may  lead  to  in-role  behavior  at  best.  More  likely, 
however, it will lead to a lack of cooperation and unwillingness to share information (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1998; Korsgaard et al., 1995). These observations suggest that the quality of 
strategy  formulation  and  implementation  is  damaged  when  people  involved  perceive  the 
decision-making  processes  to  be  unfair.  Likewise,  since  both  strategy  formulation  and 
implementation  are  important  for  success  (Govindarajan,  1988;  Hill,  1994;  Michel  & 
Hambrick, 1992), unfairness perceptions place performance at stake. 
                                                                                                                                                          
    
4 Kim and Mauborgne (1996) also refer to Williamson (1975), who distinguishes between consummate cooperation 
and perfunctory cooperation. Kim and Mauborgne (1998) use the terms voluntary and compulsory cooperation, respectively. 
Extra-role behavior, consummate cooperation, or voluntary cooperation are also referred to as organizational citizenship 
behavior (OCB) (see, e.g., Tepper & Taylor, 2003; Van der Vegt, Van de Vliert & Oosterhof, 2003). Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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What determines fairness perceptions? 
Researchers  have  identified  a  number  of  factors  that  determine  perceptions  of  procedural 
justice  (see,  e.g.,  Folger  &  Konovsky,  1989;  Greenberg,  1986;  Leventhal,  1980).  In  this 
section  we  elaborate  on  two  factors.  The  role  of  inconsistencies  in  procedures  will  be 
discussed first as it deals with the central topic of this study: differences in the procedures 
used  across  parties,  in  our  case  business  units  or  subsidiaries  within  a  multidivisional 
corporation. Second, the voice effect will be discussed as one of the most prominent elements 
of all literature on organizational justice. 
 
Differences  in  treatments  and  inconsistencies  in  procedures  used  across  different 
parties  have  been  considered  important  determinants  of  fairness  judgments  (Folger  & 
Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1986; Leventhal, 1980, Taggart, 1997; Van den Bos, 1996). 
This is also recognized in Kim and Mauborgne's empirical studies. For example, Kim and 
Mauborgne (1993b, p. 427) speak of consistency as ªa signal that a level playing field exists 
across subsidiary units and that political favoritism does not dominate the dynamics of the 
decision process.º Therefore, in line with the self-interest perspective of procedural justice, 
consistent procedures provide individuals with a clear structure that can be considered to 
protect their interests. Moreover, inferences about fairness of procedures are also based on 
comparison  with  others  in  the  ªgroupº  (cf.  Naumann  &  Bennett,  2000).  In  line  with  the 
group-value perspective of procedural justice, consistencies across different parties within the 
group and equal treatment of these parties will strengthen identification with the group and its 
values and objectives. The extent to which procedures are consistent can also affect justice 
perceptions through other factors. More specifically, the differences in procedures used across 
different parties may cause ambiguity  as these  parties fail to make sense of the different 
procedures  their  superiors  use  (cf.  Goold  &  Campbell,  1987).  It  has  been  argued  that 
understanding and clarity of procedures, expectations, and decisions are important bedrock 
principles of procedural justice that, when violated, may cause feelings of unfairness to arise 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1998). In sum, the lower the consistency of procedures across different 
parties, the lower the likelihood that these procedures will be considered fair (cf. Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1995). 
 
Process control, or the ability to express voice in a decision-making process, has been 
considered one of the most important determinants of fairness (Korsgaard et al., 1995; Lind & 
Tyler,  1988;  Shapiro,  1993).  The  voice  effect  (Folger,  1977)  also  captures  many  related Chapter 5 
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dimensions  of  procedural  justice.  For  example,  it  is  in  line  with  Leventhal's  (1980) 
representativeness rule, Kim and Mauborgne's (1998) bedrock principle of engagement, and 
Kim  and  Mauborgne's  (1991,  1993a,  1993b,  1995,  1996)  dimensions  of  bilateral 
communication  and  ability  to  challenge  views  of  superiors.  Voice  can  influence  fairness 
perceptions because it allows people input into a decision-making process. To the extent that 
these inputs are taken into consideration, people gain control over the process and, ultimately, 
over  the  outcomes  of  these  processes  (Leventhal,  1980;  Thibaut  &  Walker,  1975). 
Alternatively, when people have little opportunities to express voice, their ability to ensure 
that decisions are made in a way that protects their long-term interests will be limited as well 
(Johnson, Korsgaard & Sapienza, 2002). In addition to this self-interest effect, the importance 
of voice can also be explained using the group value model of procedural justice. Irrespective 
of the potential influence over outcomes, voice can enhance fairness perceptions because it 
gives people the ability to present their case or at least tell their side of the story (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Shapiro, 1993; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinsky & Spodick, 1985). Therefore, even 
if voice does not influence the final outcome of a decision-making process, people can derive 
value from the ability to express their ideas, opinions, and viewpoints
5. 
 
Procedural justice and control of business units 
The arguments discussed so far suggest that procedural justice is a relevant perspective to 
study the effects of differences in control practices in multidivisional firms. Although the 
importance of control differentiation to accommodate for differences in business unit strategic 
contexts has been propagated by many (see, e.g., Chandler, 1991; Gupta, 1987;  Lorange, 
1993;  Nohria  &  Ghoshal,  1994)  the  negative  consequences  have  remained  largely 
unrecognized. However, as discussed in the previous sections, procedural justice literature 
provides  important  new  insights  concerning  the  ªinteraction  dynamics  in  head  office-
subsidiary decision-making dyadsº (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a, p. 504). Although we do not 
explicitly  focus  on  strategic  planning  processes,  we  do  focus  on  headquarters-subsidiary 
relationships and this makes our setting comparable to the one used in Kim and Mauborgne's 
                                                 
5 Some nuances can be made with respect to these statements. For example, Shapiro (1993) distinguishes between 
instrumental and value-expressive effects of voice but considers the two intertwined. Although people might derive value 
from merely telling their side of the story, part of this value might be rooted in the instrumental reasons rather than value-
expressive reasons. For example, even if people are told that they cannot influence a decision (e.g., because the decision has 
already been made) the ability to express voice may positively affect fairness perceptions out of value-expression reasons but 
at the same time people may consider this a final opportunity to still influence the decision anyway. It should also be noted 
that many question the effect of having input in decisions when this input is not taken into consideration by those ultimately 
responsible for making the decision: in such a situation ªvoice is void of meaningº (Korsgaard et al., 1995, p. 64).  Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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studies. As discussed earlier, in most large corporations planning and control are interrelated 
processes. Indeed, the literature on control of business units usually deals with elements of 
both  (see,  e.g.,  Goold  &  Campbell,  1987).  Others  have  also  pointed  at  the  relevance  of 
procedural justice in the context of the organizational reward system (see, e.g., Folger & 
Konovsky,  1989;  Welbourne,  Balkin  &  Gomez-Mejia,  1995),  which  is  an  important 
mechanism for the control of business units as well (see, e.g., Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986). In general, justice researchers have used the terms process or 
procedure to refer to ªsomething that is a method, manner, technique, or means by which 
something else is accomplished.º (Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001). To the extent that control 
can be seen as the processes or mechanisms by which organizations ensure that sub-units act 
in a coordinated manner to achieve organizational goals (Das, 1989; Lebas & Weigenstein, 
1986; Ouchi, 1979; Tannenbaum, 1968) differences in these processes across business units in 
one and the same firm, may lead to perceptions of unfairness and their associated negative 
effects. In the next section we build on this notion and focus on the negative consequences of 





In this section we outline our arguments and summarize these in three hypotheses. Our focus 
is  on  the  control  arrangements  that  characterize  headquarters-subsidiary  relationships  in 
multidivisional firms. The arrangements capture important relationships that exist between 
company  headquarters  and  their  subsidiaries.  For  example,  they  involve  the  degree  of 
autonomy granted to an individual business unit and the nature of the criteria used to evaluate 
its performance. The degree to which these arrangements differ across subsidiaries within one 
and  the  same  corporation  is  called  the  degree  of  control  differentiation.  In  terms  of  the 
procedural  justice  arguments  outlined  in  the  background  section,  we  treat  control 
differentiation as an inconsistency in the procedures used by corporate headquarters which 
may give rise to unfairness perceptions. Our level of analysis is the business unit level. Hence, 
control differentiation refers to subsidiary managers' perceptions of the differences that exist 
between the control arrangements used for their own subsidiary and the arrangements used for 
other subsidiaries in the same corporation. The following observations provide the basis for 
our  hypotheses.  First,  in  line  with  the  procedural  justice  literature  we  will  assume  that Chapter 5 
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perceptions  of  unfairness  may  damage  trust  and  organizational  commitment  of  subsidiary 
managers.  This  reduces  their  willingness  to  voluntarily  cooperate  in  the  formulation  and 
implementation  of  important  strategic  decisions.  Since  performance  is  to  a  large  extent 
determined by the quality of both, subsidiary performance will suffer as a result of unfairness 
perceptions. Second, strategic decision making in complex firms is a top-down/bottom-up 
process  that  requires  interaction  and  cooperation  between  corporate  and  business  level 
managers (cf. Lorange, 1993). However, the degree to which cooperation between the two 
levels is required differs across different headquarters-subsidiary pairs. Our first hypothesis 
deals with this effect under the recognition that voluntary cooperation of subsidiary managers 
is important in some contexts but less in others. Likewise, the negative effects of control 
differentiation vary across different subsidiary contexts as well. Third, differences in control 
arrangements increase perceptions of unfairness but other factors are relevant as well. More 
specifically, in line with the bulk of procedural justice literature we argue that process control, 
or voice, makes subsidiary managers less sensitive to the exact nature of the procedures used 
by their superiors (cf. Johnson et al., 2002). The second and third hypotheses deal with this. 
To the extent that subsidiary managers have the ability to exert influence over the processes 
that affect them, the negative performance effects of control differentiation will be mitigated. 
In sum, we will argue that the exact relationship between perceived control differentiation and 
business  unit  performance  depends  on  business  unit  specific  circumstances,  notably,  the 
required  degree  of  cooperation  and  the  ability  to  express  voice.  We  start  now  with  our 
discussion of the former. 
 
Resource sharing 
Our  first  hypothesis  deals  with  the  importance  of  cooperation.  In  diversified  firms  the 
cooperation required in decision-making processes very much depends on the degree to which 
interdependencies between business units exist. Relatedness between business units may give 
rise to all kinds of synergistic advantages (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982). However, the degree 
to which these relationships may actually be exploited depends to a great deal on coordination 
efforts  of  corporate-level  executives  (St.  John  &  Harrison,  1999).  Effective  sharing  of 
resources  and  knowledge  usually  requires  intensive  communication  and  collaboration 
between business units and corporate executives. Although business units are normally more 
knowledgeable of their local circumstances, corporate executives usually have the wider view 
that is required to coordinate processes in which several business units are involved (Egelhoff, 
1988). Planning and control processes therefore depend heavily on the input of both levels of Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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the firm. Inter-unit resource sharing also requires joint decision making, information sharing, 
joint problem solving, and mutual adjustment between units. Under conditions of high inter-
unit resource sharing cooperation in general, and voluntary cooperation in particular, becomes 
especially important. Therefore, the negative effects of control differentiation will become 
particularly  evident  in  situations  of  high  inter-unit  resource  sharing.  Alternatively,  under 
conditions of low inter-unit resource sharing the problems associated with unfairness through 
control differentiation may be present but carry smaller weight. This notion is in line with 
Kim and Mauborgne (1995) who found consistency in procedures positively related to global 
learning. Moreover, they found that perceptions of fairness had a stronger effect on subsidiary 
performance for subsidiaries in global industries than for those operating in multi-domestic 
industries (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993b). To the extent that ª¼social harmony or a cooperative 
atmosphere between the corporate center and subsidiary units will foster global learning by 
making  the  sharing  of  knowledge  and  information  a  ªdesirableº  activity¼º  (Kim  & 
Mauborgne, 1995, p. 47), their findings support our arguments:  
 
Hypothesis  1:  Inter-unit  resource  sharing  accentuates  the  negative 




The first hypothesis dealt with the negative implications of unfairness perceptions caused by 
differences in the control arrangements used across subsidiaries. We now turn our attention to 
other  factors  that  may  influence  perceptions  of  fairness  under  the  assumption  that  the 
presence  of  these  factors  influences  the  likelihood  that  control  differentiation  leads  to 
unfairness in the first place. As we argued in the background section, voice is considered one 
of the dominant determinants of fairness perceptions. Voice strengthens subsidiary managers 
in the feeling that their own interests will be taken into account and that they have control 
over  processes  and  the  outcomes  of  those  processes.  Moreover,  even  if  the  influence  of 
subsidiary managers is limited, voice gives them at least the possibility to present their case. 
Therefore,  voice  is  likely  to  reduce  the  negative  effects  of  control  differentiation.  In  the 
following  we  discuss  two  factors  that  serve  as  proxies  for  voice:  subsidiary  size  and 
communication. 
 Chapter 5 
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Subsidiary  size.  Within  diversified  firms,  business  units  will  differ  in  their  ability  to 
influence the planning and control processes in a way that protects their own interests. We 
expect larger business units to be better able to exert influence on the planning and control 
processes than smaller ones. In general, organizational size has been related to the resource 
levels  an  organization  possesses  (Haveman,  1993;  Ranger-Moore,  1997)  and  similar 
observations  have  been  made  for  the  resource  levels  of  subunits.  Within  organizations, 
resources are unevenly distributed across the different subunits (cf. Tushman, 1977) and unit 
size is an indication of the resource levels a certain sub-unit has (Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000;  Tsai,  2001).  Since  the  possession  of  critical  resources  decreases  a  sub-unit's 
dependence on other parties in the corporation, its powerbase will increase. Although power 
does not necessarily lead to political behavior (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) it does provide 
units with the ability to exert influence. This potential influence gives subsidiary managers 
control  over  planning  and  control  processes.  Because  voice  or  process  control  increases 
perceptions  of  fairness,  the  negative  effects  of  control  differentiation  will  become  less 
pronounced. In sum, since size is a proxy for a subsidiary's resources and power (Ghoshal & 
Nohria, 1989; Tsai, 2001) we expect large business units to be able to exert influence on the 
planning and control process and as such become less sensitive to the inconsistencies in the 
procedures used. Therefore:  
  
Hypothesis  2:  Business  unit  size  mitigates  the  negative  performance 
implications of perceived control differentiation. 
 
 
Communication.  Power  gives  subsidiary  managers  more  control  over  decision-making 
processes but influence in these processes can also be exerted through other ways and in the 
absence of power. In general, people feel that they have influence if they are able to express 
their ideas and if their superiors use these ideas as input into the decision-making process 
(Leventhal,  1980;  Libby,  1999;  Korsgaard  et  al.,  1995).  Moreover,  people  also  value  the 
opportunity to present their case even if they cannot influence processes in any way (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Shapiro, 1993). Communication plays an important role in the effect of voice: 
ª...the ability to express one's ideas or bilateral communication [...] implies the opportunity to 
voice one's perceptions, knowledge, and ideas, and the need to hear opposite parties out.º 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1998, p. 329). Communication provides a mean to voice views and ideas 
to  superiors  (Lee,  2001;  Leventhal,  1980;  Libby,  1999).  The  intensity  of  personal Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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communication between subsidiary and corporate managers positively stimulates perceptions 
of fairness, either because subsidiary managers gain influence over processes or because they 
get a chance to present their case. Frequent communication between corporate and subsidiary 
managers present the latter with opportunities to express voice and this positively affects their 
perceptions  of  fairness.  In  sum,  communication  will  moderate  the  negative  relationship 
between control differentiation and subsidiary performance. 
 
Communication  also  affects  fairness  perceptions  in  a  way  other  than  through 
expression of voice. As we argued earlier, inconsistencies in the planning and control process 
across business units may cause ambiguity as business unit managers fail to understand what 
the expectations are and fail to understand the different styles their superiors use. Through 
bilateral communication, corporate executives can make their expectations clear and business 
unit managers may come to know the views of their superiors in a process of information 
exchange. Moreover, feedback on the process by superiors may give business unit managers 
an account of why certain decision were made, which can further stimulate acceptance of the 
decisions. All in all, communication moderates the negative effects of control differentiation 
through voice as well as through other bedrock principles of procedural justice (cf. Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1998).  
 
Hypothesis 3: Corporate-business unit communication frequency mitigates the 





Sample and data collection 
We  conducted  a  study  among  Dutch  corporations.  We  started  with  a  list  of  all  Dutch 
corporations listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and excluded all financial corporations 
and corporations with less than 500 employees. We then studied annual reports and company 
websites to identify the business units that were located directly below headquarters
6. 
                                                 
6 Corporations with functional structures were left out, as well as corporations for which the annual reports did not 
provide sufficient information on the organizational structure. We also excluded the corporation if it appeared to be majority-
owned by another corporation. Chapter 5 
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We ended up with a selection of 614 subsidiaries from 57 corporations. Since most of 
the data we needed were unavailable from archival databases, we conducted a mail survey. 
We sent questionnaires to the managing directors of each of the 614 subsidiaries. Out of the 
total  of  614  questionnaires  sent  to  business  unit  managing  directors,  140  filled  out 
questionnaires were returned (i.e., a response rate of 22.8%) of which 136 responses were 
usable in this study. The 136 business units represent 45 corporations and cover industries 
such as manufacturing (27.2%), service (28%), printing/publishing (10.3%), trade (22.1%), 
and  construction  (12.5%).  In  total,  our  dataset  includes  business  units  in  14  different 
countries.  A  total  of  34  business  units  (25%)  were  located  outside  the  Netherlands.  On 
average, the subsidiaries employed 1596 employees. 
 
We  used  many  ideas  from  previous  studies  as  input  for  developing  our  own 
questionnaire (see Operationalization of variables for further details). The questionnaire was 
discussed at length with colleagues in strategic management and accounting research and with 
practitioners who held a position as managing or financial director in subsidiaries of large 
corporations.  The  questionnaire  was  developed  in  Dutch,  but  translated  into  German  and 
English  for  foreign  business  units  as  well
7.  We  used  backward-translation  techniques  to 
account  for  differences  in  interpretation.  Based  on  the  backward-translations  and  on  the 
discussions with colleagues and practitioners, we made final changes to the questions. 
 
Operationalization of main variables 
Performance. Since performance data are usually not readily accessible for subsidiaries of 
Dutch  corporations  and  since  we  expected  managers  to  be  reluctant  to  share  objective 
performance data with us, we had to rely on other measures of performance. We used Likert 
type scales and asked managers to rate their subsidiary's average performance over the last 
two  years  in  terms  of  both  profitability  and  sales  growth  compared  to  the  following 
benchmarks: expectations of headquarters, performance in previous years, and performance of 
the most direct competitor. The scores on the six items were averaged to arrive at an overall 
score for subsidiary performance (alpha = 0.86). 
 
                                                 
7 Questionnaires were sent in Dutch to business units located in the Netherlands and the Flemish part of Belgium. 
We sent German translations to business units located in Germany and Austria. English translations were sent to business 
units located in all other countries.  Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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Perceived  control  differentiation.  Although  many  measures  of  organizational  design  and 
planning  and  control  processes  are  available  in  literature,  a  measure  of  perceived 
differentiation does not exist. We decided to use four dimensions of control that are widely 
used in existing literature. We asked subsidiary managers to indicate on a seven-point Likert 
scale  to  what  extent  differences  between  their  subsidiary  and  other  subsidiaries  of  the 
corporation exist in terms of: (a) the extent to which procedures and directives of headquarters 
have to be followed; (b) the autonomy subsidiaries have in relation to headquarters; (c) the 
way the performance of the subsidiary is evaluated by headquarters; (d) the way subsidiary 
managers are compensated by headquarters. The scores on the four items were averaged to 
create the measure for perceived control differentiation (alpha = 0.81). 
 
Inter-unit resource sharing. This variable was measured through eight questionnaire items. 
We chose the items to include both tangible and intangible resources (Porter, 1985, 1987; St. 
John & Harrison, 1999) and to include resource sharing in different functional areas (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1986). Subsidiary managers were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale to 
what extent their subsidiary cooperates with other units in each of the following ways: (a) 
sharing knowledge, information, ideas, etc.; (b) sharing technologies; (c) internal deliveries 
(e.g., components, products, services); (d) using common brand names; (e) sharing physical 
assets (e.g., machines, buildings); (f) exchanging personnel on a temporary basis; (g) collec-
tively  competing  with  competitors;  (h)  shared  functions  or  services  (e.g.,  purchasing, 
marketing, logistics). The average score on these items was used as our measure for resource 
sharing (alpha = 0.87). 
 
Business unit size. We asked business unit managers for the number of people employed by 
the  business  unit  and  used  this  number  as  an  indicator  for  size  (see  also  Gupta  & 
Govindarajan, 2000).  
 
Vertical communication. We asked the subsidiary managers to indicate how often per year 
they  had  personal  interactive  contact  with  their  superiors  at  corporate  headquarters.  The 
answers to this open question included quantitative (e.g., ª12 times a yearº) and qualitative 
(e.g., ªneverº or ªmonthlyº) statements. We recoded the qualitative statements to a concrete 
figure (e.g., ªneverº became 0; ªmonthlyº became 12) to arrive at a quantitative measure of 
communication frequency for each respondent. 
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Control variables 
We  included  a  control  variable  for  the  extent  to  which  shared  values  can  be  expected. 
Inclusion of this variable is in line with others who emphasize the importance of combining 
differentiated control with shared values (see, e.g., Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). Shared values 
can be stimulated by socialization mechanisms such as rotation of managers and corporate 
training programs. We expect these mechanisms to, possibly, influence our results because 
they can make subsidiary managers less sensitive to differences in the control styles used by 
their superiors. We asked subsidiary managers to indicate on seven-point scales the extent to 
which they agreed on the following statements: (a) many managers and key staff employees 
in my unit come from other parts of the corporation; (b) managers and key staff employees in 
my unit often participate in training programs organized by headquarters. Together these two 
items measured the use of corporate socialization mechanisms (alpha = 0.59).  
 
We  also  included  dummies  to  control  for  industry  effects.  Since  we  did  not  find 
industry  effects  and  since  including  these  dummies  had  no  effects  on  the  results,  except 
making the overall fit of the models worse, we excluded the dummies in our final model. 
 
Common method bias 
Like  most  studies  on  the  internal  control  arrangements  in  multidivisional  firms  (cf.  Hill, 
1988b) we had to rely on key informants to obtain our data. The reliance on a single key 
informant for every business unit should make us consider the risk of common method bias. 
We dealt with this concern in a number of ways (see also Brouthers, Brouthers & Werner, 
2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). First, we used a mix of open-ended 
questions and  Likert type scales to measure our variables. Second, we included objective 
measures  (size  and  communication  frequency)  and  used  multiple  measurement  items  to 
measure the less objective variables. Third, we  approached the managing directors of the 
business units to ensure that the person who could be assumed to be most knowledgeable of 
the subject matter acted as our key informant. Fourth, our hypotheses are based on interaction 
effects, which have been found relatively insensitive to problems of common method bias 
(Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). Finally, we performed a one-factor test to assess the likelihood of 
common method bias in our data. We included all the dependent and independent variables of 
interest into a single exploratory factor analysis. Because (a) more than one factor emerged 
from the analysis, and (b) there was no factor that explained the majority of the covariance 




Results of the correlation and regression analyses are reported in tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
Correlation  coefficients  show  that  significant  relationships  exist  between  some  of  our 
independent  variables.  For  example,  resource  sharing  is  negatively  related  to  perceived 
control differentiation and size, and positively related to socialization and communication. 
Socialization appeared to be significantly related to all our independent variables as well. The 




Table 1: Descriptives and correlation matrix 
 
 
Mean  S.D.  1  2  3  4  5 
               
1.Business unit performance  4.62  1.03           
2.Socialization  2.83  1.38  -0.122         
3.Control differentiation  2.78  1.19  -0.018  -0.150 ²       
4.Resource sharing  3.58  1.34  -0.022  0.601 ***  -0.193 *     
5.Business unit size (empl) 
a  1596  4348  0.079  0.334 ***  -0.168 ²  0.164 ²   
6.Communication 
a  26.34  32.57  -0.059  0.290 **  -0.055  0.256 **  0.152 ² 
                
               
n=136 
² : p < 0.1; * : p < 0.05; ** : p < 0.01; *** : p < 0.001  
a : Variables have been transformed (log) to achieve more normal distributions. Descriptive statistics 
reported for original variables. 
 
 
We used regression analysis to test our hypotheses and ran two regression models with 
subsidiary performance as the dependent variable. Model 1 includes main effects only. From 
this model it becomes clear than no significant main effects exist, except for the marginally 
significant effect of socialization. Model 2 includes all main effects and all interaction terms. 
The three interaction terms were computed by taking the product of control differentiation 
and each of the three moderator variables. Following recommendations of Aiken and West 
(1991) we centered each variable before composing the interaction terms. Change statistics Chapter 5 
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indicate the increase in R
2 compared with model 1. The results show that the inclusion of 
interaction  terms  improves  the  overall  model  fit.  All  individual  interaction  terms  have  a 
significant  relationship  with  performance,  as  indicated  by  the  significance  of  each  of  the 
regression coefficients. The signs of the regression coefficients are in line with two of the 
three  expected  relationships.  Resource  sharing  accentuates  the  negative  effects  of  control 
differentiation. This confirms hypothesis 1. Subsidiary size mitigates the negative effects of 
control differentiation, supporting hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Although the 
regression  coefficient  is  significant,  it  does  not  have  the  predicted  sign.  Communication 
seems  to  accentuate  rather  than  mitigate  the  negative  effects  of  control  differentiation. 
Multicollinearity was assessed using VIF scores. None of these scores exceeded 10, indicating 
that no serious multicollinearity was present. 
 
 
Table 2: Results of regression analyses 
  Model 1  Model 2 
(Constant)  (¼.) ***  (¼.) *** 
Socialization  -0.214 ²  -0.203 ² 
Control differentiation  -0.011  -0.035 
Resource sharing  0.093  0.114 
Business unit size  0.139  0.165 ² 
Communication  -0.042  -0.021 
Control differentiation X resource sharing    -0.175 * 
Control differentiation X size    0.205 * 
Control differentiation X communication    -0.176 * 
     
R
2  0.038  0.132 
F-ratio  1.020  2.414 * 
Change in R
2    0.094 
F-ratio change in R
2    4.596 ** 
n=136 
Dependent variable is business unit performance (as reported by the business unit manager). 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
² : p < 0.1; * : p < 0.05; ** : p < 0.01; *** : p < 0.001 (one-tailed if hypothesized; two-tailed 
otherwise). 
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Figures  1,  2  and  3  help  the  interpretation  of  the  results.  We  followed  Aiken  and 
West's (1991) recommendations and plotted the relationship between control differentiation 
and  performance  under  high  (one  standard  deviation  above  mean)  and  low  (one  standard 
deviation  below  mean)  values  of  resource  sharing,  subsidiary  size,  and  communication 
respectively.  Figure 1 shows a negative relationship between control differentiation under 
high levels of resource sharing. The relationship changes into a positive one under low levels 
of resource sharing. Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between performance and control 
differentiation for large business units (in terms of number of employees) and a negative one 
for  small  business  units.  Finally,  figure  3  shows  the  effect  of  vertical  communication. 
Contrary  to  what  we  expected,  the  relationship  between  performance  and  control 























Figure 1: Relationship between control differentiation and 





















Figure 2: Relationship between control differentiation and 






















Figure 3: Relationship between control differentiation and 




5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
 
In  this  paper  we  set  out  to  create  new  insights  into  the  control  of  business  units  in 
multidivisional firms. So far, researchers have concentrated on finding the optimal control 
style under different contexts. The implication is that different contexts in a multidivisional 
corporation  necessitate  the  adoption  of  different  control  styles  by  corporate  center 
management. However, in this paper we argued that such a conclusion is far from complete 
because  it  ignores  the  negative  effects  that  may  be  inherent  in  the  simultaneous  use  of 
different control styles for different subsidiaries of the same corporate family. This study 
provides new insights in the subject matter, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, 
procedural justice literature proved a useful theoretical perspective that can complement the 
more traditional theories that have been used to study control in multidivisional corporations. 
Empirically,  we  found  that  control  differentiation  was,  under  some  conditions,  indeed 
negatively related to subsidiary performance. Accordingly, corporations that attempt to tailor 
their  styles  of  control  to  specific  subsidiary  contexts  should  be  aware  of  the  associated 
problems and the conditions under which these problems are most likely to occur. 
 
Using  procedural  justice  literature  we  argued  that  control  differentiation  reduces 
business  unit  managers'  trust  in  their  superiors,  commitment  to  the  organization,  and 
consequently,  the  degree  of  voluntary  cooperation  they  display.  We  expected  the Control differentiation and procedural justice 
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disadvantages of control differentiation to be salient especially in situations that require high 
levels of voluntary cooperation. The finding that inter-unit resource sharing accentuated the 
negative relationship between control differentiation and subsidiary performance supports this 
notion. Hence, in corporations where exploitation of interrelationships between business units 
forms the heart of corporate strategy, adjusting the control style to subsidiary context may in 
fact  be  counterproductive.  The  positive  relationship  between  control  differentiation  and 
performance under low levels of resource sharing was not hypothesized but can be explained 
in two ways. First, high levels of control differentiation may indicate a better fit between 
corporate control style and the specific contexts of the focal business units. Low levels of 
resource sharing could indicate that business units are strategically different from one another 
as  interrelationships  may  become  more  difficult  to  achieve  when  business  units  pursue 
different  strategic  directions  (Porter,  1985).  These  differences  in  strategic  contexts,  then, 
increase the need for different control styles used by corporate center management. Second, in 
most multidivisional firms the business units either cooperate or compete with one another 
(see also Hill et al., 1992; Hill, 1994). Low levels of resource sharing could indicate that 
competition  for  scarce  corporate  resources  rather  than  cooperation  to  achieve  synergistic 
advantages forms the core of corporate strategy. Control differentiation may strengthen the 
competitive atmosphere, which may then benefit rather than compromise performance.  
 
The findings also suggest that the negative effects of control differentiation pertain to 
small business units but not to large ones. These findings are in line with the effect of voice, 
which is considered a primary dimension of fairness perceptions in the procedural justice 
literature. Large business units, through their larger resource base, are assumed to be better 
able to express voice in a way that protects their own interests. Therefore, the notion that 
control differentiation may be a sign of inconsistencies in the planning and control processes 
used by company headquarters, and therefore evoke perceptions of unfairness, may be valid 
only for small business units that are unable to protect their own interests. Large business 
units, on the other hand, can use their powerbase to influence decision making in general and 
corporate  control  processes  in  particular.  The  positive  relationship  between  control 
differentiation and subsidiary performance even suggests that large business units translate 
control  differentiation  into  better  performance.  This  positive  relationship  can  mean  two 
things. First, as discussed above, control differentiation may be considered a sign of better fit 
between control style and subsidiary context. Second, control differentiation may be a sign to 
large business units that they are able to better protect their own interests than other business Chapter 5 
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units can. In other words, differences in control style are a sign that these business units are 
able to use their influence to receive better treatment than other business units. 
 
Our findings did not support the role of communication. Communication was assumed 
to  be  an  important  factor  to  stimulate  fairness  perceptions.  For  example,  we  expected 
communication to serve the purpose of expressing voice as well as enabling feedback and 
increase clarity of understanding and expectations. Contrary to expectations we found that 
communication  accentuated  rather  than  moderated  the  negative  effects  of  control 
differentiation.  Rather  than  serving  the  purposes  of  voice,  feedback  and  explanation, 
communication may also be an indication that intensive interaction between business-level 
and corporate-level management takes place. Therefore, communication can be considered an 
extra proxy, next to inter-unit resource sharing, for the degree of cooperation that takes place 
between  the  two  levels.  The  significant  correlation  between  resource  sharing  and 
communication  supports  this  (see  table  1).  To  the  extent  that  control  differentiation 
compromises  performance  especially  in  situations  that  require  intensive  cooperation,  the 
findings may provide additional support for this ªcooperation effectº rather than, for example, 
the presence of a voice effect.  
 
As we argued in the introduction, previous research has concentrated on determining 
the appropriate controls for a particular context. Here, we acknowledge that such a tailored 
control style may benefit subsidiaries, but we emphasize that negative effects may also be 
found in the associated differentiation. In this study we moved research away from the focus 
on tailoring to the issue of differentiation. Future research can benefit from incorporating 
both. We showed that insights from procedural justice literature are useful in the context of 
control in multidivisional firms. The procedural justice perspective is worth exploring further, 
though.  In  this  study  a  discrepancy  existed  between  the  conceptual  arguments  and  the 
measurement.  For  example,  concepts  such  as  fairness,  voice,  commitment,  and  voluntary 
cooperation  were  used  in  our  argumentation  but  not  actually  measured.  This  is  not 
problematic in itself. After all, it was not our intention to develop and test procedural justice 
theory but rather to make use of, and apply the insights from previous procedural justice 
literature in a new area. Still, future research could investigate the procedural justice concepts 














The findings of this dissertation have been presented in chapters 2 to 5. This chapter is not 
meant to summarize the findings of the individual chapters. Rather, it is meant to discuss a 
number of topics that cut through the different chapters in an attempt to reconcile the findings 
of  the  individual  projects.  The  subsequent  sections  discuss  the  multilevel  perspective, 
relatedness,  new  organizational  forms,  control  differentiation,  and  control  mechanisms, 
respectively. The chapter ends with a number of concluding remarks. 
 
 
6.2 Multilevel perspective 
 
The  distinction  between  the  corporate  and  business  unit  level,  which  is  prevalent  in  the 
existing literature on control of business units, formed an important starting point for the 
present  study.  More  and  more,  researchers  are  starting  to  emphasize  the  complexities  of 
today's  corporations  (see  also  6.4)  and  multilevel  theory  development  and  statistical 
techniques can aid researchers in getting grip on these complexities (see also Hoffman, 1997). 
This notion has led to the uprise of a multilevel paradigm in the organizational sciences under 
the belief that a true understanding of organizational issues can only be achieved by studying 
phenomena that manifest at different levels and by combining the insights and theories from a 
variety of scientific disciplines (see Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). The importance of multilevel 
research in strategic management has been pointed out as well. For example, Dess, Gupta, Chapter 6 
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Hennart & Hill (1995) distinguished between the corporate, business, and international levels 
of strategy research and suggest a number of research directions that cut across these different 
levels. Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu (1999) emphasize that strategic management research 
swings between different theoretical perspectives on firm performance and conclude that the 
fruitfulness  of  the  field  depends  on  how  well  researchers  succeed  in  integrating  these 
perspectives, which usually focus on explanatory variables at different levels of analysis. A 
similar point was made by Hambrick (2004), who speaks of the need to reconcile or integrate 
multiple perspectives to overcome the trend towards separateness in the field of strategic 
management. As an example, he refers to the different spheres in which those who study 
corporate-level strategy and those who study business-level strategy operate. 
 
Multilevel research is not entirely new to the field of strategic management, however. 
For example, there is a considerable number of studies that have examined the corporate, 
industry, and business unit effects of business unit performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; 
Brush,  Bromiley  &  Hendrickx,  1999;  Chang  &  Singh,  2000;  McGahan  &  Porter,  1997; 
Roquebert,  Phillips  &  Westfall,  1996;  Rumelt,  1991).  These  studies  depart  from  the 
recognition that business units are nested in corporations and industries and that factors at 
these different levels may have an impact on business unit performance. The recognition that 
corporate membership is an important determinant of business unit performance formed the 
initial starting point for this dissertation. After all, the application of control mechanisms by 
the corporate parent is deemed to have an effect on business unit performance over and above 
the effects of business unit- and industry-specific characteristics
1. In chapter 1 it was even 
stated that control is such a crucial task for corporate center management because it provides 
an  important  justification  for  the  existence  of  multidivisional  firms.  The  importance  of 
corporate  membership  has  not  received  consistent  support  from  everyone,  however.    For 
example,  Rumelt  (1991),  in  one  of  the  seminal  studies  in  this  area,  found  a  negligible 
corporate  effect  on  business  unit  performance,  suggesting  the  potential  irrelevance  of 
corporate monitoring and control policies. On the other hand, Brush and Bromiley (1997, p. 
829)  argued  that  the  explanation  could  be  found  in  Rumelt's  ªrestrictive  assumption  that 
corporate management must make a uniform contribution to the performance of its business 
                                                 
1 Business unit characteristics include, for example, business unit specific skills and competitive resources. A 
relevant theoretical perspective is the resource-based view of the firm (see, e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984, and, for a more recent 
discussion, Priem & Butler, 2001a, 2001b; Barney, 2001). Industry effects may include the intensity of competition in the Concluding remarks 
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units.º As they point out, corporate management may not be equally successful in influencing 
the profitability of its divisions through monitoring and control. Hence, corporate membership 
may benefit some but not all business units, which may have caused the averaging out of the 
corporate effects in Rumelt's study. Indeed, as shown in chapter 2 of this thesis, the corporate 
performance implications may differ between the business units in a firm due to differences in 
the degrees of tailoring and in the effects of observed control differentiation. The different 
effects of control differentiation were also supported by the empirical findings of chapter 5: 
the  relationship  between  control  differentiation  and  business  unit  performance  could  be 
positive for some business units and negative for others, depending on the business units' 
specific circumstances. 
 
One of the key challenges of doing multilevel research concerns the complexities of 
data collection at multiple levels. Because data collection at different levels is labor-intensive 
and  time-consuming  (Kozlowski  &  Klein,  2000),  almost  by  definition  trade-offs  must  be 
made between the numbers of observations at different levels of analysis. An assessment of 
the degree of control differentiation, for example, could be based on the variance or some 
alternative  measure  of  dispersion.  This  would  require  detailed  information  on  the  control 
mechanisms  used  in  each  headquarters-business  unit  relationship  in  a  corporation.  As  an 
alternative to this, one can also opt for less demanding measures such as the ones used in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation. In chapter 4 we relied on the assessments of corporate 
center executives, who we expected to be able to base their judgment on a comparison of all 
corporate-business  relations  within  the  corporations.  This  could  be  more  problematic  in 
chapter  5,  where  we  relied  on  business  unit  managers'  judgments  of  the  degree  of 
differentiation that existed between their business unit and the other business units in the 
corporation.  Although  this  way  of  measuring  corporate-level  constructs  is  not  without 
limitations, it was considered appropriate given the aim of the study. For example, although 
business unit managers will lack the information to adequately and objectively assess and 
compare all control relations within the corporation, a limited number of business units could 
already be sufficient to serve as their benchmark. Moreover, as procedural justice researchers 
have pointed out, people's perceptions of fairness rather than the actual fairness of procedures 
                                                                                                                                                          
industry  in  which  a  business  unit  operates.  A  relevant  theoretical  perspective  is  industrial  organization  economics,  the 
insights of which found their way in strategic management with the work of Porter (1980, 1985).  Chapter 6 
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determine their reactions and attitudes  (see also Lind and Tyler, 1988). The same holds for 





The term relatedness has a central position in almost all literature on diversified corporations. 
As we saw in chapter 2, roughly two kinds of relatedness can be distinguished. The first deals 
with relatedness in terms of resource-sharing potential between business units. A variety of 
measures  exists,  including  product  count  measures,  entropy  measures,  and  categorical 
measures  to  determine  a  firm's  degree  of  relatedness  (see,  e.g.,  Lubatkin,  Merchant  & 
Srinivasan, 1993). Recently, researchers have criticized these traditional measures for being 
too focused on product and market similarities rather than resource commonalities between 
businesses (see, e.g., Collis & Montgomery, 1998). As a result, and building on insights from 
the resource-based view, more sophisticated measures of relatedness have been developed to 
more adequately capture synergy potential than traditional measures do (e.g., Brush, 1996; 
Markides & Williamson, 1994, 1996; Robins & Wiersema, 1995). Nonetheless, the emphasis 
stays on capturing resource-sharing potential between business units. Unrelated in this sense 
implies that few opportunities for resource sharing between business units exist.  
 
The second type of relatedness has been labeled organizational relatedness in chapter 
2. It runs as a central theme through this dissertation, although very often in the background 
we must admit. It is this type of relatedness that determines whether differences in the control 
arrangement  between  business  units  should  be  present  or  not.  The  implication  is  that 
businesses that seem unrelated in terms of resource-sharing potential may share a similar 
strategic logic that makes them related in an organizational sense. For example, except for the 
common brand name, the companies that belong to Richard Branson's Virgin group, active in 
businesses such as airline, music, retail, and health clubs, have been considered related mainly 
in an organizational sense (Grant, 2002, p. 90): ªThis array of businesses is linked, first, by 
the Virgin brand and, second, by the group's capabilities in managing start-up businesses with 
a  strong  customer  orientation,  innovative  differentiation,  and  entrepreneurial,  risk-taking 
cultures.º Alternatively, business units that operate in almost identical businesses may differ 
in the strategies they pursue, making them unrelated in an organizational sense. An example is Concluding remarks 
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Dutch airliner KLM, which exploits a low-cost airliner alongside its traditional, full service, 
passenger business. 
 
Several authors have made the distinction between the two kinds of relatedness (Collis 
& Montgomery, 1998; Grant, 1988, 2002; Markides & Williamson, 1996). So far, this has not 
led to accurate measures of relatedness in the organizational sense. This is unfortunate since 
the  absence  of  measures  of  organizational  relatedness  may  have  contributed  to  the 
inconsistent  findings  of  studies  on  the  relationship  between  relatedness  and  corporate 
performance (cf. Grant, 1988). Hence, more research in this area is needed. The strategic 
characteristics  of  business  units  identified  in  previous  studies,  including,  for  example, 
business unit mission, competitive strategy and degree of environmental uncertainty, could 
serve as a useful starting point in developing measures of organizational relatedness that can 
then  be  used  to  further  our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  relatedness  and 
performance. For example, one could compare the performance implications of the different 
kinds  of  relatedness  in  a  study  that  includes  measures  of  both.  Such  a  study  could  also 
investigate the relationship between the two kinds of relatedness. After all, the two could be 
related to the extent that resource sharing between business units becomes easier when the 
business  units  have  similar  strategic  contexts  (cf.  Porter,  1985).  On  the  other  hand,  the 
existence of some successful conglomerates has been explained on the basis of the relatively 
ease with which the business units of such firms can be managed by the corporate parent: 
absence of complex linkages between business units that operate in rather similar strategic 
contexts (cf. Goold & Luchs, 1993). 
 
The two main types of relatedness are also important in assessing the corporate-level 
performance implications of control differentiation. After all, different control styles seem 
warranted only when business units operate in strategically dissimilar contexts (i.e. when the 
business units are unrelated in the organizational sense). At the same time, the results of 
chapter 5 indicate the importance of taking into account the first type of relatedness as well. 
After all, control differences were found problematic especially for business units that were 
heavily engaged in resource sharing with other units in the corporation. Hence, one could Chapter 6 
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expect that control differentiation is appropriate only when business units are unrelated in 




6.4 New organizational forms 
 
Since Chandler's (1962) historical study on the emergence of the multidivisional structure as 
a  new  organizational  form  in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  research  shows  a 
continuing  interest  in  the  complexities  and  challenges  of  managing  large  multi-unit 
corporations.  For  example,  recent  studies  on  multidivisional  firms  address  cross-business 
synergies (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2001), strategic renewal (Volberda, Baden-Fuller & Van den 
Bosch,  2001),  entrepreneurial  M-forms  (Eisenmann  &  Bower,  2000),  structured  networks 
(Goold & Campbell, 2002), and the dynamics of internal reconfiguration of resources and 
product-market responsibilities among business units (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996, 2001).  
 
Each of these studies focuses on the challenges of today's corporations. What they 
have in common is the acknowledgement of the important role played by corporate center 
management.  Indeed,  although  the  rise  of  new  organizational  forms,  such  as  internal 
networks,  would  suggest  a  reduced  role  of  corporate  headquarters,  a  recent  study  on  the 
structures  of  European  corporations  suggests  otherwise  (Ruigrok,  Pettigrew,  Peck  & 
Whittington,  1999).  Internal  network  arrangements  are  undoubtedly  becoming  more 
important in some organizations, but corporate center executives continue to play important 
roles in managing variety, change and synergies in the firm's portfolio of businesses. All in 
all, the interest in new organizational forms should not lead to the impression that these are 
                                                 
2 We tested this assertion by running a number of additional regressions. We ran a regression model that included 
the interaction between strategic variety and degree of control differentiation (see chapter 4 for operationalization details). 
The interaction term was positive and significant when using ROA (p < 0.1) and ROE (p < 0.01) as dependent variables. 
Plots show that the relationship between performance and control differentiation is negative under high and low levels of 
strategic  variety  but  that  the  slope  is  steeper  for  low  levels  of  strategic  variety,  indicating  the  importance  of  taking 
organizational relatedness into account when assessing the consequences of control differentiation. Based on the findings of 
chapter  5  we  also  reran  the  regression  models  of  chapter 4  with  an  additional  control  variable  that had to  capture  the 
resource-sharing relatedness in the portfolio. This measure, obtained by calculating the average number of four-digit industry 
codes per two-digit industry code a corporation is active in (see also Lubatkin et al., 1993; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 
1987), did not affect the results in any way. We also ran a model that included the interaction between this measure of 
relatedness and the degree of control differentiation. The interaction term was not significant when we used Return on Assets 
as dependent variable but became significant (p < 0.05) with Return on Equity and with Market to Book (p < 0.1) as the 
measure  for  performance.  Since  the  sign  of  the  regression  coefficient  was  negative,  some  additional  support  for  the 
importance of this second type of relatedness was also found. Naturally, and given the content of chapter 2, it should be noted 
that this measure may be a limited proxy for resource-sharing potential between business units. The results of the additional 
analyses with the interaction terms are included in the appendix to chapter 6.  Concluding remarks 
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replacing traditional M-form design (Whittington & Mayer, 1997). Most large companies, at 
least in the Netherlands as we experienced, are still organized as multidivisional firms. Within 
this  broad  category  all  kinds  of  variations  in  internal  arrangements  exist  (see  Hill  & 
Hoskisson,  1987;  Hill  &  Pickering,  1986),  and  the  recent  emphasis  on  new  ways  of 
organizing  multidivisional  firms  add  to  this  that  more  variations  in  the  broader  M-form 
category  exist  than  previously  acknowledged.  However,  these  additional  arrangements 
complement rather than replace traditional ways of organizing multidivisional firms. 
 
 
6.5 Control differentiation 
 
What traditional and contemporary studies on the design of organizations have in common is 
the emphasis on the challenges of striking a balance between the often conflicting demands 
placed on organizations: between differentiation and integration (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967); 
between  interdivisional  cooperation  and  competition  (Tsai,  2002);  between  stability  and 
forces  of  renewal  (Volberda,  Baden-Fuller  &  Van  den  Bosch,  2001);  between  global 
efficiency  and  local  responsiveness  (Bartlett  &  Ghoshal,  1989);  between  exploitation  and 
exploration (Benner & Tushman, 2003), and so on. 
 
The focus on control differentiation is in line with this and points at a number of 
challenges corporate executives face. One of the key challenges is to differentiate control 
while at the same time avoid the fragmentation that may go with it (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1987). The findings of chapter 5 suggest that this is a hard task as indicated by the negative 
relationship between control differentiation and business unit performance under high levels 
of  inter-business  unit  resource  sharing.  To  prevent  fragmentation,  firms  may  turn  to  the 
socialization of business unit managers to share common goals and values. However, the 
difficulties of combining this with different treatments have been emphasized (see Nohria & 
Ghoshal, 1994) and the findings of chapter 5 hold after controlling for corporate socialization. 
Moreover, the creation of a strong homogeneous culture can be detrimental in situations that 
call for structural as well as cultural separation between business units (Goold & Campbell, 
2002). For example, Goold and Campbell (2003) pointed at the difficulties British Airways 
had in creating a low cost culture in its subsidiary Go, which had been set up to compete with Chapter 6 
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low cost carriers Easyjet and Ryanair, because of contamination influences from the rest of 
the organization. Hence, the use of socialization processes is limited. 
 
As  an  alternative  to  the  use  of  socialization  mechanisms,  chapter  5  reports  some 
evidence for the importance of procedural justice in corporate control practices. In order to 
stimulate  commitment,  cooperation  and  trust  among  business  unit  managers  who  receive 
different  treatments  from  the  corporate  center,  firms  should  pay  specific  attention  to  the 
factors that determine business unit managers' perceptions of fairness. This is also consistent 
with Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001). In a study of charter changes in a large multibusiness 
corporation they  found  that, in order to temper internal competition, corporate  executives 
were  careful  to  emphasize  the  fairness  of  the  processes  that  led  some  divisions  to  loose 
charters, which were defined as areas of product-market responsibility, to others. The fairness 
of control is worth exploring further. 
 
In contrast with chapter 5, in which we found control differentiation to be negatively 
related to business unit performance only under some circumstances, chapter 4 reveals the 
overall negative implications of control differentiation for the corporation as a whole. These 
results  hold  after  taking  into  account  the  moderating  effect  of  top  team  structure  and 
composition,  and  after  controlling  for  various  dimensions  of  corporate  strategic  context. 
Apparently, the costs of creating sufficient capacity to manage different styles add to the 
danger of fragmentation and feelings of unfairness that may exist among some of the business 
units in a firm. 
 
The  findings  should  make  researchers  and  practitioners  aware  of  the  negative 
consequences  of  control  differentiation  and  other  administrative  complexities  in  the 
organization. The recent emphasis on new, and often complex, organizational forms should be 
approached  with  caution.  Rather  than  rushing  into  the  adoption  of  aspects  of  these  new 
organizational  forms,  managers  should  assess  the  necessity  and  consequences  for  their 
organization  as  a  whole:  ªUnnecessary  organizational  complexity  in  a  relative  simple 
business environment can be just as unproductive as unresponsive simplicity in a complex 
business environment.º (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997, p. 189). Concluding remarks 
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6.6 Control mechanisms 
 
Our findings suggest that control of business units may be both corporate and business unit 
specific. Hence, conceptualizing control in terms of means and variances per firm, as was 
suggested  in  chapter  2,  makes  sense  because  the  use  of  control  mechanisms  can  differ 
between and within multidivisional corporations. Chapter 3, then, reveals that some, but not 
all control mechanisms differ significantly between corporations. For example, it was found 
that the use of lateral integration mechanisms differs between corporations whereas the degree 
of autonomy did not. These results suggest the importance of separating out the different 
dimensions  of  control.  With  the  exception  of  chapter  3,  however,  we  did  not  study  each 
control  mechanism  separately.  Future  research  is  necessary  to  examine  the  role  different 
control mechanisms play to answer questions, such as: What control mechanisms are more 
complex to differentiate than others? Does control differentiation in some dimensions give 
rise to jealousies and unfairness whereas in others it does not? 
 
Hence, separating between the specific control mechanisms could be more productive. 
At  the  same  time  it  should  be  realized  that  the  different  mechanisms  of  control  usually 
interact and reinforce each other (Leifer & Mills, 1996), which could leave the effects of 
individual  control  mechanisms  undetected  when  examined  in  isolation  rather  than  in 
combination with the others (Govindarajan, 1988). For example, control differentiation in 
some dimensions could be accompanied by standardization in others to guarantee integration 
and  prevent  fragmentation.  As  discussed  earlier,  socialization  to  create  shared  norms  and 
values is not necessarily  the most appropriate  overarching device to achieve this. Rather, 
other control mechanisms could dominate to serve this purpose (see, e.g., Ghoshal & Nohria, 
1993; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). The findings of chapter 3 point at the dominance of lateral 
control mechanisms. After all, lateral integration mechanisms and network-based incentives 
appeared to be the only mechanisms with a corporate effect. It should be noted that this does 
not necessarily imply that these mechanisms are standardized across the business units of 
firms, though. Rather, it implies that firms differ on their average scores on these dimensions. Chapter 6 
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6.7 Concluding remarks 
 
During the last decade, discussions on corporate governance have dominated the business 
press.  Only  recently  more  attention  has  been  paid  to  issues  of  internal  governance, 
unfortunately due to serious malpractices that led to bankruptcy of some companies and near 
bankruptcies of others.  Although analysts provide numerous accounts of these failures, at 
least  some  of  them  can  be  attributed  to  inadequate  control  practices  of  corporate  center 
management. For example, Numico, a Dutch manufacturer of baby food and clinical nutrition, 
found out that the newly acquired businesses required a different way of managing than they 
were  used  to.  Lack  of  experience  with  managing  retail  and  vitamins  contributed  to  the 
financial problems of the company in 2002. Similarly, the near bankruptcy of Dutch retailer 
Ahold in 2003 is often attributed to a loss of control due to the enormous expansion of the 
company in the previous decade. For example, the acquisition of US Foodservice in 2000 
meant a move into wholesale, an area new to the company that had previously focused on 
supermarket chains. Lack of experience in this area led to a situation in which this largest 
subsidiary  became  strongly  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  corporation,  including  the 
company's headquarters. Several sources
3 reveal the negative feelings that dominated this 
specific headquarters-business unit relationship. Whereas corporate center staff reports the 
reluctance of US Foodservice managers to allow corporate interference, these business unit 
managers in turn spoke of bad treatment and a lack of corporate attention to business unit 
affairs.  In  combination,  these  feelings  shaped  an  atmosphere  in  which  questionable 
accounting practices could flourish. 
 
These  examples  indicate  the  importance  of  the  central  topic  of  this  dissertation. 
Together with the findings of this dissertation, these examples also suggest that good internal 
governance depends on: the overall complexity of the control task facing the corporate center; 
the  degree  to  which  controls  can  be  tailored  to  business  unit  contexts;  the  information-
processing  and  cognitive  capacities  available  at  the  corporate  center;  and,  the  perceived 
fairness of the control system. The four studies incorporated in this dissertation each shed a 
different light on these important issues. As the discussion of the five topics in this final 
                                                 
3 The information is largely drawn from FEM Business magazine (the issues March 1, 2003 and May 1, 2004), 
Dutch national newspaper De Volkskrant (February 26 and March 1, 2003) and Jeroen Smit's book on the Ahold `disaster' 
(Smit, 2004).  Concluding remarks 
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chapter shows, the insights and findings of these studies are not necessarily restricted to the 
research on control of business units but have implications outside this research context as 
well.  For  example,  the  possible  relevance  of  multilevel  research  for  the  field  of  strategic 
management has been emphasized. Also, the link with recent research on new organizational 
forms has been made explicit. In chapter 1 the relationship with research on the organization 
of  multinational  corporations  was  already  pointed  at  and  it  is  in  that  context  where  the 
complexities of organizational design and the need for new organizational arrangements have 
been emphasized the most. Hence, although the consequences of internationalization have 
remained largely absent from the studies in this dissertation, our findings could contribute to 
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Appendix to chapter 4   152
 
 
Additional analyses chapter 4: Regressions with ROE as dependent variable 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
(Constant)  (.)   (.)  (.)   (.)  (.) 
Total assets (log)  -0.205  -0.154  -0.218  -0.137  -0.138 
Control differentiation  -0.425 **  -0.519 ***  -0.495 ***  -1.333 ***  -1.266 *** 
TMT size  0.176  0.147  0.139  0.148  0.120 
TMT heterogeneity  -0.262 *  -0.216 ²  -0.277 *  -0.321 **  -0.305 ** 
TMT role differentiation  0.116  0.192  0.222 ²  0.267 ²  0.336 ** 
Control differentiation X TMT 
size 
  0.328 **      0.113 
Control differentiation X TMT 
heterogeneity 
    -0.345 **    -0.216 * 
Control differentiation X TMT 
role differentiation 
      .986 ***  0.830 *** 
           
R
2  0.288  0.385  0.395  0.471  0.542 
F-ratio  3.972 **  5.001 ***  5.227 ***  7.123 ***  6.809 *** 
Change in R
2    0.096  0.107  0.183   0.254 
F-ratio change in R
2    7.508 **  8.471 **  16.567 ***  8.498 *** 
n=54 
Dependent variable is Return on Equity (mean 2001 and 2002). 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
²: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 (one-tailed if hypothesized; two-tailed otherwise). 
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Additional analyses chapter 4: Regressions with EPS as dependent variable 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
(Constant)  (.)   (.)  (.)   (.)  (.) 
Total assets (log)  -0.136  -0.084  -0.146  -0.106  -0.116 
Control differentiation  0.084  -0.003  -0.008  -0.324  -0.238 
TMT size  0.218  0.193  0.175  0.207  0.169 
TMT heterogeneity  -0.388 *  -0.348 *  -0.406 **  -0.413 **  -0.409 ** 
TMT role differentiation  -0.190  -0.119  -0.052  -0.124  -0.017 
Control differentiation X TMT 
size 
  0.305 *      0.078 
Control differentiation X TMT 
heterogeneity 
    -0.445 ***    -0.384 ** 
Control differentiation X TMT 
role differentiation 
      0.444 ²   0.240 
           
R
2  0.158  0.241  0.335  0.195  0.352 
F-ratio  1.725  2.380 *  3.782 **  1.816  2.924 * 
Change in R
2    0.083  0.177  0.037  0.194 
F-ratio change in R
2    4.920 *  12.003 **  2.073  4.304 * 
n=54 
Dependent variable is Earnings per Share (mean 2001 and 2002). 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
²: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 (one-tailed if hypothesized; two-tailed otherwise). 
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Additional analyses chapter 4: Regressions with Market to Book as dependent variable 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
(Constant)  (.) *   (.) *  (.) *   (.) *  (.) * 
Total assets (log)  -0.157  -0.168  -0.153  -0.141  -0.139 
Control differentiation  -0.024  -0.004  0.001  -0.229   -0.262 
TMT size  0.436 *  0.441 *  0.448 *  0.430 *  0.444 * 
TMT heterogeneity  -0.230  -0.239 ²  -0.224  -0.243 ²  -0.248 ² 
TMT role differentiation  -0.272 ²  -0.288 ²  -0.310 *  -0.238  -0.276 ² 
Control differentiation X TMT 
size 
  -0.072      -0.044 
Control differentiation X TMT 
heterogeneity 
    0.124    0.127 
Control differentiation X TMT 
role differentiation 
      0.223  0.300 
           
R
2  0.195  0.200  0.209  0.204  0.225 
F-ratio  2.279 ²  1.914 ²  2.026 ²  1.971 ²  1.594 
Change in R
2    0.005  0.014  0.009  0.030 
F-ratio change in R
2    0.267  0.804  0.538  0.559 
n=54 
Dependent variable is Market to Book (mean 2001 and 2002). 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
²: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05 (one-tailed if hypothesized; two-tailed otherwise). 
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Additional analyses chapter 4: Regressions with surrogate variables 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
(Constant)  (.) *   (.) *  (.) *   (.) *  (.) * 
Total assets (log)  -0.448 *  -0.451 *  0.421 *  -0.445 *  -0.416 * 
Autonomy differentiation  -0.275 *  -0.268 *  -0.303 *  -0.780 **  -0.833 ** 
TMT size  0.229  0.224  0.219  0.265  0.251 
TMT tenure heterogeneity  -0.398 **  -0.401 **  -0.378 **  -0.353 **  -0.329 * 
TMT role differentiation  0.048  0.058  0.027  0.047  0.030 
Autonomy differentiation X 
TMT size 
  0.068      0.051 
Autonomy differentiation X 
TMT tenure heterogeneity 
    -0.128    -0.155 
Autonomy differentiation X 
TMT role differentiation 
      0.574 *  0.603 * 
           
R
2  0.241  0.246  0.256  0.302  0.326 
F-ratio  3.113 *  2.604 *  2.749 *  3.461 **  2.781 * 
Change in R
2    0.004  0.015  0.061  0.085 
F-ratio change in R
2    0.284  0.944  4.187 *  1.932 
n=54 
Dependent variable is Return on Assets (mean 2001 and 2002). 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
*: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01 (one-tailed if hypothesized; two-tailed otherwise). 
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Regression models chapter 6: Moderating effects on Return on Assets and Return on Equity 
 
  ROA as dependent 
variable 
  ROE as dependent 
variable 
(Constant)  (¼.) **   (¼.) *    (¼.)  (¼.) 
Total assets (log)  -0.493 **  -0.406 *    -0.304 ²   -0.169 
Control differentiation  -0.403 **  -0.521 ***    -0.504 ***  -0.696 *** 
TMT size  0.250  0.165    0.240  0.106 
TMT heterogeneity  -0.473 **  -0.449 **    -0.346 *  -0.309 * 
TMT role differentiation  -0.081  -0.073    0.037  0.050 
Strategic variety  0.292 *  0.267 ²    0.325 *  0.285 * 
Relatedness in portfolio  -0.039  0.012    -0.074  0.008 
Control differentiation X 
strategic variety 
  0.196 ²      0.308 ** 
Control differentiation X 
relatedness 
  -0.150      -0.248 * 
           
R
2  0.398  0.443    0.361  0.478 
F-ratio  4.438 **  3.984 **    3.793 **  4.574 *** 
Change in R
2    0.046      0.117 
F-ratio change in R
2    1.840      5.030 * 
n=54 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
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Regression models chapter 6: Moderating effects on Earnings per Share and Market to Book 
 
  EPS as dependent 
variable 
  Market to Book as 
dependent variable 
(Constant)  (¼.)   (¼.)     (¼.)²  (¼.) 
Total assets (log)  -0.187  -0.134    -0.117  -0.107 
Control differentiation  0.034  0.096    0.013  -0.123 
TMT size  0.247  0.227    0.408 *  0.366 ² 
TMT heterogeneity  -0.444 **  -0.426 *    -0.190  -0.188 
TMT role differentiation  -0.251  -0.252    -0.230  -0.224 
Strategic variety  0.211  0.220    -0.153  -0.179 
Relatedness in portfolio  0.000  -0.009    0.012  0.056 
Control differentiation X 
strategic variety 
  0.043      0.100 
Control differentiation X 
relatedness 
  0.158      -0.240 ² 
           
R
2  0.191  0.210    0.212  0.260 
F-ratio  1.486  1.253    1.730  1.678 
Change in R
2    0.019      0.048 
F-ratio change in R
2    0.508      1.391 
n=54 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
²: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01 (one-tailed for proposed relations; two-tailed otherwise). 





The  dissertation  reports  the  results  of  four  studies  on  the  control  of  business  units  in 
multidivisional firms. Over the last decades the multidivisional structure became the dominant 
way of organizing large companies that exploit activities in multiple industries and countries. 
Typically,  a  multidivisional  firm  consists  of  a  number  of  semi-autonomous  subsidiaries, 
divisions or business units and a company headquarters. A crucial task of the latter consists of 
the management of the company as a whole, including steering, coordinating, monitoring and 
managing the actions of business unit management. To perform this task, a wide array of 
instruments  is  available  to  corporate  executives  and  their  supporting  staff,  including,  for 
example, performance evaluation, incentive systems, and centralization of authority.  
 
The dissertation departs from the recognition that two views dominate research on 
control of business units in multidivisional firms. The first view would recommend firms to 
choose the control mechanisms in a manner that matches the strategy of the corporation as a 
whole, and therefore in a manner that would be appropriate for all the business units that are 
part of it. The second view emphasizes the internal differentiation of control to match the 
circumstances of individual business units. Both views received support but are not free from 
criticism either. The criticism centers on differences in the level on which the two views 
focus: the focus is either on the corporate or the business unit-specific level but very seldom 
on both. The first view may therefore be considered overly simplistic, as it does not recognize 
intra-firm  differences  in  business  unit  circumstances.  The  second  one  neglects  the 
complexities  of  control  differentiation  for  corporate  center  executives  and  overlooks  that 
different treatments may cause jealousies and feelings of unfairness at the business unit level. 
The  aim  of  this  dissertation  is  to  provide  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the 
management of diversified firms by integrating the insights and implications from the two 
views  and  by  studying,  as  one  of  the  first,  the  complexities  associated  with  the  internal 
differentiation of control mechanisms.  
 
After an introductory chapter, chapter 2 provides a review of the existing literature and 
a conceptual framework. The framework is based on the notion that control of business units   162
is very much a multilevel issue but has not been recognized as such by previous researchers. 
As argued earlier, prior studies treated control either as a corporate-wide or a business unit-
specific issue. These studies are based on the simplifying assumptions of homogeneity and 
independence, respectively. Homogeneity indicates that differences between business units 
are refrained from as the focus is on finding a corporate standard for control. Independence 
implies that individual business units are studied outside, or independent from, the context of 
the  corporation  to  which  they  belong.  As  multilevel  researchers  point  out,  erroneous 
conclusions can be drawn when findings from a single level study are translated to a higher of 
lower level. Hence, the corporate standard may fit some but not all business unit contexts 
given that these contexts may differ considerably. Alternatively, developing business unit-
specific  controls  may  impose  enormous  demands  on  the  capacity  of  corporate  center 
management, causing the potential benefits for individual business units to be off set by the 
associated  costs  at  the  corporate  level.  Given  this  last  observation,  the  plea  for  internal 
differentiation  of  corporate  control  styles  on  the  basis  of  business  level  studies  seems 
premature at best. The framework makes explicit the antecedents and consequences of control 
at both levels and shows that control may be both corporate and business unit specific at the 
same time. For example, centralization, which is an important dimension of a control relation, 
can differ between business units in a firm but that does not exclude the possibility that the 
average of, or variance in the degree of centralization is also a corporate-specific attribute. It 
is  recommended  that  future  studies  incorporate  both  means  and  variances  to  accurately 
characterize a corporation's control approach. 
 
An  implication  from  chapter  2  is  that  control  can  be  business  unit  specific  and 
corporate  specific  at  the  same  time.  In  chapter  3  we  test  this  assertion  with  data  of  136 
headquarters-subsidiary relations in 45 Dutch multidivisional firms. The results show that it is 
important  to  distinguish  between  the  different  control  mechanisms  that  can  be  used  by 
corporate  executives.  In  this  study  the  focus  is  on  centralization,  evaluation  criteria, 
compensation, and integration devices. We found that all these mechanisms were tuned to 
business unit-specific circumstances. A corporate effect was only found for two of the four 
control mechanisms. A striking result is that centralization and evaluation criteria did not 
differ significantly between the corporations in our sample. 
 
Chapter  4  deals  with  the  complexities  of  control  differentiation  for  the  corporate 
center management team. We draw upon research on top management teams and argue that   163
control differentiation places severe cognitive demands on corporate executives that can only 
be  adequately  dealt  with  by  corporate  center  management  teams  that  are  composed  and 
structured in a way that sufficient cognitive capacity is available. This assertion is tested on a 
sample of 54 Dutch corporations. We find that control differentiation is negatively related to 
the performance of these firms. We also find that this negative relationship is moderated by 
certain attributes of a top management team's structure. Notably, we find that the negative 
effects become less severe for larger teams and for teams that assign responsibilities over 
different units to different members of the team. We also studied the moderator effect of top 
management team heterogeneity, which is an important indicator for cognitive capacity as 
evidenced  by  the  widely  available  research  on  top  management  teams.  However,  team 
heterogeneity in terms of tenure, functional background, and industry background was found 
to  make  the  negative  effects  of  control  differentiation  stronger  rather  than  serve  as  a 
moderator. 
 
The  final  study  (chapter  5)  uses  insights  from  procedural  justice  literature  to 
investigate the effects of control differentiation on the performance of individual business 
units. Procedural justice has received much attention in judicial settings but is increasingly 
being  studied  in  organizational  settings  as  well.  In  organizations,  perceptions  of  unfair 
treatment by superiors  may  give  rise to negative attitudes and behaviors, including lower 
commitment,  lack  of  cooperation,  distrust,  unwillingness  to  share  information,  or  even 
sabotage  of  decision-making  processes.  Procedural  justice  literature  recognizes  that 
inconsistent  procedures  may  contribute  to  feelings  of  unfairness  due  to  associations  of 
discrimination and a possible lack of structure in procedures to protect people's interests. We 
draw upon this and argue that the use of different control treatments for different business 
units in a corporation can lead to feelings of unfairness and cause unwillingness to cooperate 
in  corporate-business  unit  decision-making  processes,  which  may,  under  certain 
circumstances, lead to a negative effect on business unit performance. Notably, we assert that 
perceived control differentiation may be problematic especially when the success of business 
units  depends  on  resource  sharing  with  other  units  in  a  corporation.  This  assertion  is 
supported  by  the  data  we  collected  from  136  business  units.  We  also  hypothesize  that 
business unit managers may be less sensitive to differences in the controls when they are able 
to exert influence in their relations with superiors at corporate headquarters. We suspect the 
size  of  a  business  unit  and  communication  with  superiors  to  be  good  indicators  for  the 
potential  influence  business  unit  managers  have  and  hypothesize  that  the  negative   164
implications of control differentiation will become more pronounced for small business units 
and when business unit managers do not frequently communicate with their superiors. Results 
show support for the moderating effect of size but not for communication frequency. 
 
The final chapter includes a discussion of five topics that cut through the preceding 
chapters. It is concluded that control of business units in multidivisional firms is an important 
topic given the internal control problems some large firms recently ran into. We argue that 
recent literature emphasizes the role of new organizational forms that firms can adopt to cope 
with  highly  complex  environments  they  face  and  observe  that  most  large  firms  are  still 
organized  as  multidivisional  firms.  We  conclude  that  multilevel  issues,  procedural  justice 
arguments, cognitive capacities of executives, and the ability to differentiate while preventing 
fragmentation, are all relevant topics to be elaborated upon in future studies.   165




Deze dissertatie rapporteert de bevindingen van vier studies naar de besturing van business 
units  in  multidivisionele  ondernemingen.  Gedurende  de  afgelopen  decennia  is  de 
multidivisionele  structuur  uitgegroeid  tot  de  dominante  ondernemingsvorm  voor  grote 
ondernemingen die activiteiten ontplooien in een groot aantal bedrijfstakken en landen. Een 
multidivisionele  onderneming  bestaat  in  de  regel  uit  een  aantal  semi-autonome 
werkmaatschappijen, divisies, of business units, ressorterend onder een concernhoofdkantoor. 
Belangrijke  taken  van  de  managers  op  het  hoofdkantoor,  meestal  ondersteund  door 
stafmedewerkers,  zijn  het  aansturen,  coördineren,  en  controleren  van  de  acties  van  de 
managers die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de dagelijkse leiding van de diverse business units. 
Om  deze  taken  uit  te  voeren  hebben  ze  de  beschikking  over  een  groot  aantal 
besturingsinstrumenten,  waaronder  bijvoorbeeld  beloningssystemen,  prestatiemeting  en 
centralisatie van beslissingsbevoegdheid. 
 
De dissertatie vertrekt vanuit de constatering dat twee zienswijzen het onderzoek naar 
besturing van business units domineren. De eerste zienswijze stelt dat concernbestuurders de 
besturingsstijl moeten kiezen die past bij de strategie van het totale concern, en dus geschikt 
zou  moeten  zijn  voor  iedere  business  unit  die  daar  onderdeel  van  uitmaakt.  De  andere 
zienswijze gaat uit van intern gedifferentieerde besturing. Een dergelijke besturing heeft als 
voordeel dat verschillen tussen business units kunnen worden opgevangen door voor iedere 
business unit de meest geschikte besturingswijze te bepalen; de besturingswijze die past bij de 
strategie of de omgeving van de betreffende business unit. Beide zienswijzen worden gestaafd 
door empirisch onderzoek maar zijn niet van kritiek gevrijwaard. De kritiekpunten zijn veelal 
terug te voeren tot verschillen in het niveau waarop de benaderingen zich concentreren: de 
nadruk ligt op het concern als geheel òf op de individuele units maar zelden op beide. De 
eerste zienswijze kan daardoor als te simplistisch worden beschouwd aangezien verschillen 
tussen de business units binnen een en hetzelfde concern niet worden erkend terwijl deze toch 
vaak aanwezig kunnen zijn. De tweede benadering lijkt de complexiteit van gedifferentieerde 
besturing  te  negeren  en  gaat  voorbij  aan  de  problemen  die  verschillende  behandelingen 
teweeg kunnen brengen. Het doel van deze dissertatie is een meer compleet beeld te krijgen   166
van de besturing van multidivisionele ondernemingen. Daartoe worden de inzichten van beide 
zienswijzen  gecombineerd  en  wordt  de  complexiteit  van  gedifferentieerde  besturing 
bestudeerd. 
 
Na een inleidend hoofdstuk, waarin het doel van het onderzoek uiteengezet wordt, 
geeft  hoofdstuk  2  een  overzicht  van  de  bestaande  literatuur  en  wordt  een  conceptueel 
raamwerk gepresenteerd. Het raamwerk is gebaseerd op de constatering dat concernbesturing 
op  meerdere  niveaus  bestudeerd  dient  te  worden  maar  dat  dit  tot  op  heden  nauwelijks  is 
gedaan. Zoals eerder is benadrukt, werd concernbesturing voorheen met name behandeld als 
bepaald  door  overkoepelende  concernkenmerken  of  door  de  unieke  eigenschappen  van 
individuele business units. Dit duidt erop dat de twee traditionele visies op concernbesturing 
vertrekken  vanuit  beperkte  veronderstellingen:  respectievelijk  die  van  homogeniteit  en 
onafhankelijkheid.  Homogeniteit  geeft aan dat  geabstraheerd wordt van verschillen tussen 
business units aangezien de nadruk ligt op het vinden van de besturingsstandaard die het beste 
past bij het concern als geheel. Onafhankelijkheid impliceert dat individuele business units 
worden bestudeerd zonder rekening te houden met, en dus onafhankelijk van, de context van 
het concern waartoe ze behoren. De veronderstellingen die ten grondslag liggen aan de twee 
zienswijzen kunnen tot verkeerde conclusies leiden indien de bevindingen uit een bepaalde 
studie vertaald worden naar een hoger of lager niveau dan het niveau waarop de bevindingen 
gegenereerd en gebaseerd zijn. Bijvoorbeeld, de standaard besturingswijze die gebaseerd is op 
de karakteristieken van het gehele concern is wellicht niet geschikt voor enkele business units 
binnen het concern wanneer deze qua omstandigheden afwijken van de rest. Anderzijds kan 
een unit-specifieke-besturingswijze de prestaties van de individuele business units verbeteren 
maar  kunnen  de  concernprestaties  negatief  beïnvloed  worden  door  de  kosten  die  een 
dergelijke manier van besturing met zich meebrengt. Gegeven deze laatste observatie is een 
pleidooi voor gedifferentieerde besturing op basis van onderzoek op louter het niveau van 
business  units  op  zijn  minst  voorbarig.  Het  raamwerk  dat  in  dit  hoofdstuk  wordt 
gepresenteerd maakt de antecedenten en gevolgen van besturing op beide niveaus expliciet en 
concludeert dat besturing tegelijkertijd zowel specifiek voor het concern als de individuele 
business  units  kan  zijn.  Zo  kan  de  mate  van  centralisatie,  een  belangrijke  factor  die  de 
besturingsrelaties  tussen  concernbestuurders  en  business  unit  management  kan  typeren, 
verschillen tussen de business units van een concern terwijl het gemiddelde van en de variatie 
in de mate van centralisatie tevens het concern als geheel kan onderscheiden van andere.   167
Aanbevolen wordt dan ook zowel gemiddelde als variatie te gebruiken om de besturingswijze 
van een concern te duiden. 
 
Een  implicatie  van  hoofdstuk  2  is  dat  besturing  tegelijkertijd  specifiek  voor  het 
concern en de business units kan zijn. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt dit getoetst met behulp van data 
over 136 hoofdkantoor-business unit relaties in 45 Nederlandse concerns. De resultaten laten 
zien  dat  het  belangrijk  is  om  onderscheid  te  maken  tussen  de  verschillende 
besturingsinstrumenten die ingezet kunnen worden door concernbestuurders. In dit onderzoek 
worden  vier  van  dergelijke  instrumenten  bestudeerd,  te  weten  centralisatie, 
beoordelingscriteria,  beloning  en  integratiemechanismen.  Al  deze  besturingsinstrumenten 
vertonen een sterke relatie met de specifieke eigenschappen van individuele business units. 
Een concerneffect is slechts zichtbaar voor twee besturingsinstrumenten. Opvallend is dat de 
mate  van  centralisatie  en  het  belang  van  strategische  beoordelingscriteria  niet  significant 
verschillen  tussen  concerns.  Een  concerneffect  werd  wel  gevonden  voor  de  twee  overige 
besturingsinstrumenten. 
 
In  hoofdstuk  4  wordt  de  complexiteit  van  gedifferentieerde  besturing  voor 
concernbestuurders onderzocht. Gebaseerd op onderzoek naar top management teams, wordt 
in  dit  onderzoek  beredeneerd  dat  gedifferentieerde  besturing  zware  eisen  stelt  aan  de 
cognitieve capaciteiten van concernbestuurders en derhalve slechts adequaat geïmplementeerd 
kan worden indien het team van concernbestuurders dusdanig samengesteld en gestructureerd 
wordt dat voldoende cognitieve capaciteit aanwezig is. Deze redenering wordt getoetst onder 
54  Nederlandse  concerns.  De  resultaten  laten  zien  dat  er  een  negatief  verband  is  tussen 
gedifferentieerde besturing en concernprestaties en dat de sterkte van het verband afhankelijk 
is  van  de  structuur  en  samenstelling  van  het  team  van  concernbestuurders.  Zo  blijkt  het 
verband minder sterk aanwezig te zijn naarmate het aantal teamleden groter is en naarmate de 
verantwoordelijkheid  voor  het  besturen  van  verschillende  units  verdeeld  wordt  over 
verschillende  teamleden.  Daarnaast  blijkt  dat  een  heterogeen  team,  in  termen  van 
dienstverband, functionele achtergrond en bedrijfstakachtergrond, het negatieve verband juist 
sterker  maakt.  Dit  is  in  contrast  met  de  ruim  voorhanden  zijnde  top  management  team 
literatuur waarin heterogeniteit onder concernbestuurder bij uitstek als middel wordt gezien 
om complexe bedrijfssituaties het hoofd te kunnen bieden. 
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De laatste studie (hoofdstuk 5) gebruikt inzichten vanuit procedural justice' literatuur 
om de relatie tussen gedifferentieerde besturing en de prestaties van individuele business units 
te onderzoeken. Procedural justice' (procedurele rechtvaardigheid') is oorspronkelijk met 
name in juridische contexten onderzocht maar is recent ook in toenemende mate een rol gaan 
spelen in studies op het terrein van organisatie en management. Binnen organisaties kunnen 
percepties van oneerlijke behandeling door leidinggevenden negatieve gevoelens en gedrag 
veroorzaken zoals lage toewijding aan de organisatie, niet-coöperatief gedrag, wantrouwen, 
achterwege  houden  van  informatie,  en  zelfs  sabotage  van  besluitvorming.  De  procedural 
justice'  literatuur  beschouwt  inconsistentie  in  procedures  als  een  van  de  belangrijke 
determinanten van oneerlijkheid door de associaties die het oproept met discriminatie en het 
ontbreken van een duidelijke structuur ter bescherming van de belangen van ondergeschikten. 
Gebaseerd  op  deze  inzichten  wordt  in  dit  onderzoek  beredeneerd  dat  het  gebruik  van 
verschillende  besturingswijzen  voor  business  units  binnen  een  concern  kan  leiden  tot 
gevoelens  van  oneerlijkheid.  De  verstoorde  verhoudingen  tussen  concernbestuurders  en 
business unit managers kunnen vervolgens onder sommige omstandigheden de resultaten van 
de business units onder neerwaartse druk zetten. Meer in het bijzonder wordt beredeneerd dat 
gedifferentieerde besturing met name een negatief effect heeft indien business units in sterke 
mate gebruik maken van gedeelde middelen zodat succes afhangt van samenwerking, zowel 
met andere business units als met een coördinerend hoofdkantoor. Deze redenering wordt 
gestaafd  door  het  empirisch  onderzoek  onder  136  business  units.  Daarnaast  wordt 
beargumenteerd  dat  business  unit  managers  minder  gevoelig  worden  voor  verschillen  in 
besturing indien ze in staat zijn invloed uit te oefenen in hun relatie met het concernbestuur, 
waarbij  de  grootte  van  de  business  unit  en  de  frequentie  van  verticale  communicatie  als 
indicatoren  voor  de  mate  van  invloed  dienen.  De  resultaten  van  het  empirisch  onderzoek 
ondersteunen deze  argumenten slechts voor wat betreft de  grootte van business units. De 
conclusie is dat de relatie tussen gedifferentieerde besturing en business unit prestaties sterk 
afhangt van de specifieke omstandigheden van de business unit. 
 
Het  laatste  hoofdstuk  bestaat  uit  een  discussie  van  vijf  onderwerpen  die  de 
verschillende hoofdstukken doorkruisen. Er wordt benadrukt dat besturing van business units 
een  belangrijk  onderwerp  is  gegeven  de  interne  besturingsproblemen  waar  enkele  grote 
ondernemingen  recentelijk  mee  werden  geconfronteerd.  Tevens  wordt  de  literatuur  over 
nieuwe organisatievormen aangekaart en  gerelateerd aan bevindingen uit de dissertatie en 
wordt geconstateerd dat de meeste grote concerns in hoofdlijnen nog steeds georganiseerd   169
zijn als een multidivisionele onderneming. De besturing van dergelijke ondernemingen is een 
complexe zaak. In de dissertatie zijn inzichten naar voren gekomen die tot meer onderzoek 
nopen.  Meer  in  het  bijzonder  wordt  aangegeven  dat  meer  onderzoek  nodig  is  naar  het 
multilevel'  karakter  van  besturing,  de  procedural  justice'  argumenten,  de  cognitieve 
capaciteiten  van  concernbestuurders,  en  tenslotte  naar  de  uitdaging  van  het  gelijktijdig 
differentiëren van besturing en verhinderen van het ontstaan van fragmentatie. 
  